Rescue Capital Primer

Rescue capital is money provided to companies that cannot raise it on ordinary terms, in exchange for seniority, contractual protection and a share of the upside. It spans structured credit, preferred and convertible equity, opportunistic and distressed debt, liability management exercises (LMEs), Chapter 11 financing and fund-level solutions for private equity sponsors. Alternative managers with dedicated funds or insurance balance sheets supply most of it, and its price rises as the issuer's options narrow (Exhibit 1).

Exhibit 1: Nine strategies cover every layer of the capital structure, and pricing rises as the issuer's options narrow

Sources: Eaton Vance; UWM Holdings 8-K; Blackstone; Preqin; WSIB; Crowell & Moring; Debtwire; Proskauer; other filings as cited in sections 4 and 10. Rescue-note range and LTV share are author's arithmetic; targets carry their document's vintage; providers are examples.

Seven things to know

1. Rescue capital is a family of strategies, and no source measures it as one market. It is sized only through reference markets, such as US direct lending at more than US$1.3tn (Dallas Fed), and in fundraising of US$16.3bn for 8 special situations funds and US$5.9bn for 5 distressed funds in H1 2026 (Preqin via Paul Weiss). See section 3.
2. Capital is concentrating in a few flagship funds. Oaktree Opportunities Fund XII closed at about US$16bn on Feb 10, 2025 (Oaktree), and recent flagships are 1.1–2.8x their predecessors (author's arithmetic). See sections 3.3 and 11.
3. A default rate means little without its basis. Moody's issuer-weighted US speculative-grade rate was 5.3% for the 12 months to Aug 2026 (Moody's via First Trust, secondary), while PitchBook LCD's payment-only loan rate was 0.87% in Aug 2026 (PitchBook LCD). See section 3.4.
4. LMEs are now the main way leveraged borrowers default, and most default again. LMEs made up 69% of loan default activity by count in the 12 months to Aug 2025 (PitchBook). Of 89 coercive LMEs, about 40% filed within 2 years and 71% within 3 (Roe & Rotaru (ECGI)). See sections 7 and 12.
5. A rescue preferred earns more from its protections than from its coupon. UWM Holdings' 13% PIK accretes to only 1.29x by year 2, so its 1.4x minimum MOIC sets the early-exit return; call premiums and 330 million warrants add the rest (UWM Holdings 8-K; author's arithmetic). See sections 4.2 and 6.
6. Demand is building inside private credit while public spreads stay tight. "Bad PIK" reached 6.2% of private loans in Q2 2026 (Lincoln International), and 25% of KBRA DLD's middle-market borrowers had interest coverage below 1.0x at Q4 2025 (KBRA). The US high-yield spread was 3.12% on Oct 5, 2026 (FRED). See sections 5 and 16.
7. Courts set the rules case by case, and they are raising the price of aggressive tactics. Serta's uptier was held a breach, and excluded lenders won US$261.13mm plus 9% interest on Jul 7, 2026 (Mayer Brown). Mitel's uptier survived on its contract wording (Mayer Brown). See section 9.

Exhibit 2: Numbers to remember

Sources: as linked in each row. TTM = trailing twelve months. Default rates are not comparable across bases (Exhibit 7).

Rescue finance reuses familiar words with narrow meanings, and several pairs are often confused. Exhibit 3 defines them and shows why each distinction moves value.

Exhibit 3: Terms that get confused, and why the difference matters

Sources: UWM Holdings 8-K; Lucid 8-K; Wolfspeed 8-K; BlackRock; Moody's; Crowell & Moring; King & Spalding; BankruptcyData; Octus; Brattle; Buccola et al.. Definitions are the author's.

Rule of thumb (author's): a quarterly-compounding PIK claim grows to (1 + rate/4)^(4 × years), and it doubles in about 70 divided by the rate in years. At 13%, that is 1.29x after 2 years, 1.90x after 5 years and a doubling in about 5.4 years; at 10% it is 1.22x and 1.64x (author's arithmetic).

Rescue capital is a set of strategies, not a single asset class, and no public source measures it as one. Its size has to be read from the markets it lends into, the funds that raise for it and the default cycle that feeds it. This section defines the strategy range, sizes those reference markets and explains why the most cited default figures disagree.

3.1 What counts

The strategies sit on a spectrum ordered by how much risk the investor takes and how much control it can end up with. Each step to the right accepts a weaker credit or a junior claim in exchange for a higher target return and, at the far end, ownership.

1. Direct lending is the benchmark, not the subject. It is senior, floating-rate lending to healthy, mostly sponsor-backed companies, and it is where much of the stress that later needs rescue capital originates.
2. Capital solutions and structured credit provide bespoke senior or junior debt, often with PIK interest, call protection and warrants, to companies that cannot use the syndicated markets on normal terms.
3. Hybrid and structured equity sits "between debt and equity" in Apollo's description of its Hybrid Value funds, mostly as preferred or convertible securities (Apollo).
4. Opportunistic credit moves between primary rescue loans and discounted secondary debt as prices allow.
5. Special situations covers event-driven and complex situations across the cycle. Preqin notes that special situations funds have outraised distressed debt funds since 2022 "as mandates evolve beyond specific points in the economic cycle" (Preqin).
6. Distressed for control buys debt expected to convert into equity through an exchange or a Chapter 11 plan. Oaktree's flagship opportunities fund names its uses as rescue financings, DIPs, exit financings and opportunistic capital solutions (Oaktree).

The edges overlap with asset-based finance and private equity. A rescue loan secured on receivables or equipment is underwritten like ABF, and a structured minority stake behaves like growth equity with downside protection. Blackstone's Tactical Opportunities platform, which invests across these lines, illustrates the overlap at a single manager (Blackstone). This primer counts a deal as rescue capital when the issuer cannot raise the money on ordinary terms.

3.2 Size

The main markets that rescue capital draws from are each worth US$1.3–2tn, but the rescue slice is not separately measured. No open source reports dedicated assets under management or dry powder for special situations, distressed or opportunistic funds, and no market-wide volume exists for preferred or structured equity. Reported figures are therefore the reference markets in Exhibit 4 and the fundraising data in section 3.3.

Exhibit 4: Private credit, US high yield and US loans are each US$1.3–2tn, measured on different bases

Sources: as linked in each row. Preqin restates AUM between editions, so its series is indicative.

The Dallas Fed and New York Fed describe US direct lending as "comparable in size to both the HY bond and BSL markets" (Dallas Fed). That parity matters for rescue capital because stress in private loans surfaces through amendments and PIK rather than through traded prices (see section 5).

Preqin and PitchBook differed by US$114.5bn in 2025 because they count different funds. PitchBook records US$275.2bn of private debt fundraising in 2025 (PitchBook); Preqin records US$160.7bn (Preqin via Paul Weiss). Comparisons should stay within one provider.

3.3 Fundraising

Special situations fundraising has recovered to US$16.3bn in H1 2026 while distressed fundraising remains lumpy. In H1 2026, Preqin counts US$16.3bn across 8 special situations funds and US$5.9bn across 5 distressed funds, out of US$132.5bn for all private debt (Preqin via Paul Weiss). North America-focused funds took US$15.7bn of the special situations total.

Exhibit 5: Special situations and distressed fundraising swing by half-year with a few large closes

Source: Preqin via Paul Weiss, Credit Fundraising at a Glance, editions H2 2022, H2 2023, H1 2024, H2 2024, H1 2025, H2 2025, H1 2026. Global, closed-end funds by final close. H1 2022 and H1 2023 not retrieved. Preqin restates late-reported closes, so half-year sums may not match later full-year totals.

The swings reflect timing of a handful of final closes, so fund counts are falling while average size rises: about US$2.0bn per special situations fund in H1 2026 against about US$1.1bn in H2 2022 (author's arithmetic). H2 2025 shows the effect: one half-year recorded only US$0.5bn of special situations capital across 3 funds.

Flagship funds are larger than their predecessors, in two cases nearly three times as large. Exhibit 6 lists the largest recent closes. Each is a single manager's figure on its own definition, so the list shows scale rather than market share.

Exhibit 6: The largest recent rescue and opportunistic funds closed at US$4.6–16bn

Sources: manager releases unless marked secondary; SVP terms from the New Jersey Division of Investment memo dated Jan 23, 2025; SVP V from Private Equity Wire (secondary, close date unverified). Sizes include co-invest or affiliated vehicles where the manager reports them that way.

Blackstone reports a 13% net IRR for its opportunistic credit strategy since 2007 (Blackstone), one of few strategy-level track records in the public record (see section 10 for returns).

3.4 Where the sources disagree

Published US default rates for 2025–2026 range from 0.87% to 9.2%, and the range comes almost entirely from method. Four choices drive the gap: whether the rate counts issuers or dollars of par, whether distressed exchanges and LMEs count as defaults, which universe of borrowers is covered and the period measured. Exhibit 7 sets the main measures side by side.

Exhibit 7: Default rates differ mainly by weighting, LME treatment and universe

Sources: as linked in each row. TTM = trailing twelve months.

• Weighting moves the rate by a factor of three. BlackRock put the issuer-weighted default rate at 5.0% against 1.7% notional-weighted in Mar 2026, because the defaulters are mostly small borrowers (BlackRock).
• LME treatment moves it further. PitchBook counted LMEs as 69% of loan default activity by count in the 12 months to Aug 2025 (PitchBook), and Moody's counts about 65% of 2025 defaults as distressed restructurings (Moody's). Moody's private credit proxy rises from 1.6% to 4.7% once distressed exchanges are included (Moody's).
• The universe matters most in private credit. Fitch's own private credit series splits into 5.6% for model-based ratings and 8.5% for privately monitored ratings (Webull, secondary), while Proskauer's index sits at 2.5%.

For rescue capital the issuer-weighted, LME-inclusive measures are the relevant ones, because they capture the amend-and-extend and exchange activity that creates demand. Payment-only measures such as LCD's 0.87% describe the tail that reaches a missed coupon or a filing. This primer states the basis each time it cites a default rate.

Rescue capital buys a company time and flexibility in exchange for a senior or contractually protected claim plus some share of the upside. The instruments differ in three ways that matter: where they rank, whether they pay in cash or in kind, and how much equity they take. Plain direct lending sets the benchmark: unitranche loans priced at 475–525bp over the base rate for non-software borrowers and 550bp+ for software in Q2 2026 (Eaton Vance). Rescue instruments price above that line because the borrower cannot reach it.

4.1 Where rescue capital sits in the capital structure

Rescue capital appears at every layer of the capital structure, and its position sets both its recovery and its leverage over the company. At the top, debtor-in-possession (DIP) loans prime existing liens in Chapter 11. Saks Global's US$1.75bn OpCo term loan paid SOFR+10% PIK plus 6% and 2% PIK fees and an 8% backstop (Debtwire). Below sit first-lien and junior secured rescue notes, then unsecured converts, then holdco PIK notes that are structurally subordinated to operating-company debt. Preferred stock and warrants sit just above the common and carry the most negotiated protections. NAV loans sit outside the company altogether, at the fund that owns it (section 4.8).

Exhibit 8: Rescue capital sits at every layer, from super-senior DIP loans to warrants on the common

Sources: Debtwire; company SEC filings (UWM Holdings, Hertz, Wolfspeed, Carvana, Peloton, Lucid); IFR (secondary); Eaton Vance. Example terms as cited in sections 4.2–4.8.

Two features cut across the stack. One financing often spans several layers: Hertz's 2024 package paired a US$750mm first-lien note with a US$250mm second-lien PIK exchangeable (Hertz 8-K). Equity kickers also travel down the stack, so a secured note can carry conversion rights and a preferred can carry warrants.

4.2 Rescue and structured preferred

Rescue preferred gives a company equity-like capital that does not count as debt, at a price close to distressed debt and with control rights close to a lender's. Terms are bespoke and usually combine a preferred coupon with warrants for upside (Proskauer). The largest managers are building for it: Apollo Hybrid Value Fund III closed at US$6.5bn on May 5, 2026, investing in "solutions that sit between traditional debt and equity" (Apollo). Apollo also booked record capital solutions fees of US$277mm in Q2 2026 (Apollo).

UWM Holdings shows the full toolkit. A US$603mm Q2 2026 hedge loss on its mortgage servicing book triggered the deal (HousingWire, secondary). Oaktree and the Ishbia family then provided US$1.65bn of preferred inside a US$2.05bn package (UWM Holdings 8-K). Proceeds go partly to redeem US$500mm of 5.75% notes due 2027 (UWM Holdings 424B5).

Exhibit 9: UWM–Oaktree layers a minimum return, rising call premiums, warrants and a path to control on one preferred

Sources: UWM Holdings 8-K (Aug 2026); UWM Holdings press release, ex-99.2.

Each layer protects a different scenario. The 13% PIK option accretes to only 1.29x after two years, so the 1.4x floor is what pays Oaktree if UWM Holdings refinances early (author's arithmetic). The rising call premium then makes each year of delay more expensive for the company. KBW estimates dilution of about 55% (HousingWire, secondary), and the payoff math is worked through in section 6. Oaktree has done this with UWM Holdings before: a US$300mm loan in 2020 carried a 15.5% coupon, was repaid in about four months and returned about 1.5x (Bloomberg via Advisor Perspectives, secondary).

Rule of thumb (author's): Value a rescue preferred at the greater of its minimum MOIC and its accreted value plus the call premium, then add the warrants; expect the issuer to refinance once cheaper capital can repay that sum.

4.3 Convertible preferred and PIPEs

Convertible preferred sold privately to one investor (a PIPE) spans growth and rescue capital, and the coupon shows which is which. QXO's Apollo-led preferred pays 4.75% to fund acquisitions (QXO). Lucid's preferred from PIF affiliate Ayar pays 9% PIK and builds a minimum return into its liquidation multiplier (Lucid 8-K). Accuray sits at the distressed end: its lenders converted debt into preferred and took penny warrants (Accuray SPA).

Exhibit 10: Coupon, PIK and governance rise as the issuer's options narrow

Sources: UWM Holdings 8-K; Lucid 8-K; QXO press release; Accuray SPA, ex-99.

Creditors also receive convertible preferred as restructuring currency. In New Fortress Energy's 2026 plan, creditors take 65% of the common plus a preferred that converts to 87% at year 3 (New Fortress Energy).

Rule of thumb (author's): A mid-single-digit cash coupon with a conversion premium is growth capital; a high-single-digit or double-digit PIK coupon with a minimum-return multiplier or penny warrants is rescue capital, whatever the label.

4.4 PIK, PIK toggle and holdco PIK

Payment-in-kind interest adds unpaid interest to principal, so a borrower conserves cash while the lender's claim compounds. Lincoln International found PIK in 11.1% of private loans in Q2 2026 (Lincoln International). More than half of that was "bad PIK," added by amendment after origination, equal to 6.2% of all loans (Lincoln International). The Boston Fed measures the PIK share of BDC loans at about 10% in Q1 2026, up from about 6% in Q1 2022 (Boston Fed).

PIK comes in three forms:

• Toggle at origination. Large borrowers negotiate it up front: toggles appeared in 41% of large-market deals against 7% of middle-market deals in 2024 (S&P/Golub via ABF Journal, secondary).
• PIK by amendment. This form signals stress: loan-to-value on amended loans rose from 49% at close to 86% in Lincoln's Q1 2025 sample (ABF Journal, secondary).
• Holdco PIK. The note sits above the operating company and relies on its dividends or a sale. Verisure's €1bn holdco toggle paid 5.625% cash or 6.375% PIK, secured on Hellman & Friedman's 43.7% stake in the listed company (IFR, secondary).

Rescue deals use PIK for a defined window. Carvana's 2031 exchange notes paid 14% PIK for four coupons before switching to 9% cash (Carvana 8-K). PIK remains a small share of BDC earnings, at about 2–4% of total investment income in Q1 2026 (Eaton Vance).

Rule of thumb (author's): Ask when the PIK was agreed. PIK written in at origination is a structuring choice; PIK added by amendment is a default deferred, and the lender should underwrite it as one.

4.5 Secured rescue debt and exchange notes

Secured rescue debt trades collateral and a higher coupon for runway, either as new money or by exchanging unsecured bonds into secured paper. Carvana's 2023 exchange, IFR's Americas Restructuring deal of the year, moved unsecured holders into three secured tranches with PIK periods (IFR, secondary). It cut total debt by more than US$1.2bn and cash interest by more than US$430mm a year for two years (CNBC, secondary). Wolfspeed shows the limit of the tool: its 2023 secured notes carried a US$500mm minimum liquidity covenant (Wolfspeed 8-K), yet the company filed for Chapter 11 on Jun 30, 2025 and cut debt by about 70% (Wolfspeed 8-K).

Exhibit 11: Rescue debt pairs collateral and step-up coupons with PIK or equity-linked features

Sources: Carvana 8-K; CNBC (secondary); Wolfspeed 8-K (2023); Wolfspeed 8-K (2025); Hertz 8-K; AMC (2024); AMC 8-K (2025); Peloton pricing; Peloton completion.

The same issuers recur because rescue debt often buys one round of time, not a cure: AMC returned for a second liability management exercise (LME) a year after its first (AMC 8-K). Section 7 covers how exchanges become coercive.

Rule of thumb (author's): Compare the runway the new debt creates with the time the business needs to recover; if the step-up coupons arrive before the recovery, the exchange has only moved the default date.

4.6 Convertibles and capped calls

Convertibles let a stressed issuer pay a low cash coupon by selling upside, and they become the natural currency for later exchanges. US convertible issuance reached US$84.8bn by Nov 7, 2025, above the US$71.8bn total for 2024 (IFR, secondary). Issuers often buy a capped call from banks to lift the effective conversion price. IREN paid US$56.7mm, about 5.7% of a US$1.0bn 0% issue, to raise its cap to a 100% premium from a 42.5% conversion premium (IREN 8-K). In stress the same structure reverses. Hertz's exchangeable struck at about an 89% premium sits in second lien and pays 8% PIK, so its holders own a secured claim first and an option second (Hertz 8-K). Peloton used new converts and a term loan to buy back about US$800mm of 0% converts at a discount (Peloton).

Rule of thumb (author's): A convert trading well below par is unsecured debt with a lottery ticket attached; price it on recovery, and treat the issuer's discounted buyback as the first step of a restructuring.

4.7 Sale-leasebacks, royalties and synthetic equity

Asset-level financing raises cash against owned property, future revenue or a share of a project without issuing corporate debt or equity. Big Lots sold a distribution center and 26 owned stores to Blue Owl affiliates for US$318mm gross in Jul 2023, using US$100mm to repay a synthetic lease and the rest to pay down its asset-based loan (Big Lots 8-K). Synthetic royalties play the same role for public biotechs. Covington's study of 58 deals from 2019–2024 found a median starting royalty of 7.0%, returns capped in 72% of deals at a median 1.95x for approved products, and security in 81% of deals (Covington). At the largest scale, Intel sold an interest in operating rights at its Fab 34 plant through its SCIP program (Intel 10-K), reported as US$11bn from Apollo for 49% (Manufacturing Dive, secondary).

Rule of thumb (author's): A sale-leaseback swaps an unencumbered asset for a senior rent claim; it rescues a company only if the cash fixes the problem faster than the rent consumes it.

4.8 NAV loans and GP-level solutions

NAV loans and continuation vehicles fund rescues one level up, at the private equity fund rather than the company. NAV lenders lend against a portfolio's value at low leverage. Primary NAV spreads mostly sat below 5% over the benchmark in 2025, clustered at 4–5%, with 57% of responses citing LTVs below 5% and 32% at 5–10% (Proskauer). The rescue link is the use of proceeds: 19% of primary NAV borrowing went to managing portfolio-company debt, behind follow-on investments at 45% (Proskauer). Continuation vehicles do the same through equity. GP-led secondaries reached US$115bn of a US$240bn market in 2025 (Jefferies) and US$62bn of US$118bn in H1 2026 (Jefferies). Continuation vehicles were 89% of GP-led volume in H1 2026, and 68% of those held a single asset (Jefferies).

Rule of thumb (author's): With about nine in ten primary NAV survey responses below 10% loan-to-value (author's arithmetic), the loan itself is rarely the risk; the risk is the weakest portfolio company the proceeds are propping up.

Instruments compared

Seniority and upside move in opposite directions across the toolkit, and the providers sort accordingly.

Exhibit 12: Each rescue instrument trades seniority for upside in a different proportion

Sources: Debtwire; company SEC filings as cited in Exhibits 9–11; IFR (secondary); Covington; Proskauer; Jefferies. Provider categories are the author's classification.

Demand for rescue capital comes from issuers that need money they cannot raise on ordinary terms, and in 2026 that group is widening even as spreads stay near their lows. Five customer types account for most of it, and seven drivers explain why their numbers are rising.

5.1 Who needs the capital

Sponsor-backed private companies are the largest pool of potential demand. KBRA DLD's sample alone covers 2,416 sponsored middle-market borrowers carrying more than US$1tn of direct lending debt, and 25% of them had interest coverage below 1.0x at Q4 2025 (KBRA). These borrowers typically turn first to their lenders for PIK amendments, then to junior capital or a sponsor equity cure.

Public issuers facing maturities buy time with secured exchanges and preferred equity. Carvana exchanged about US$5.2bn of unsecured notes into new secured notes in 2023, covering more than 83% of its 2025 and 2027 maturities (CNBC, secondary). UWM Holdings is using part of its 2026 preferred and rights-offering proceeds to redeem US$500mm of 5.75% notes due 2027 (UWM 424B5).

Companies hit by a sudden shock need capital in weeks. UWM's rescue followed a US$603mm Q2 2026 hedge loss (HousingWire, secondary; terms in section 4). Spirit Airlines shows the failure case: a fuel-price spike tied to the Iran conflict pushed it into a wind-down in May 2026 after a possible US$500mm government investment fell through (Octus, secondary).

Private equity GPs and their funds are customers in their own right. Unsold portfolios push sponsors toward NAV loans, continuation vehicles and preferred equity at the fund level. In Proskauer's 2025 NAV survey, 19% of primary NAV proceeds went to portfolio-company debt management (Proskauer).

Banks partner rather than compete. Instead of holding riskier credit on balance sheet, large banks have formed origination ventures with alternative managers: Citi with Apollo (US$25bn), JPMorgan (US$50bn of balance sheet plus about US$15bn from co-lenders) and Wells Fargo with Centerbridge (ABF Journal, secondary). The Wells Fargo–Centerbridge venture has completed more than US$7bn of deals since launch (Bloomberg, secondary).

Exhibit 13: Five customer types need rescue capital for different reasons

Sources: KBRA; CNBC (secondary); UWM 424B5; HousingWire (secondary); Octus (secondary); Proskauer; ABF Journal (secondary). Links in text. Categories are the author's.

5.2 Demand drivers

Higher rates are the root driver because floating-rate borrowers absorbed them directly. The Fed raised its target range by 25bp to 3.75–4.00% on Sep 16, 2026, noting that inflation "remains elevated" (Federal Reserve), and the 10-year Treasury yield reached 5.27% on Oct 6, 2026 (US Treasury). KBRA's median middle-market coverage of 1.5x leaves little room for further increases (KBRA).

PIK creep shows lenders deferring cash interest rather than recognizing losses. Lincoln International finds PIK in 11.1% of private loans in Q2 2026, and "bad PIK" added after origination in 6.2% of all loans (Lincoln). The Boston Fed measures the PIK share of BDC loans at about 10% in Q1 2026, up from about 6% in Q1 2022 (Boston Fed). On loans amended to allow PIK, loan-to-value rose from 49% at close to 86% (ABF Journal, secondary) (author's inference: little equity cushion remains). BDC non-accruals rose to 2.75% of cost in Q2 2026 from 1.81% in Q1 (KBRA via Alternative Credit Investor, secondary).

The maturity wall builds from 2027. S&P's mid-2025 chart shows global speculative-grade nonfinancial maturities rising from about US$400bn in 2026 to about US$1.0tn in 2029 (S&P Global Ratings via Maalot, read from chart). BofA puts 25% of US high-yield par maturing in 2029 and 19% in 2030 (BofA via Eaton Vance).

The private equity exit backlog keeps weak companies in sponsor hands. Bain counts 32,000 unsold companies worth US$3.8tn, with distributions at 14% of NAV in 2025, below 15% for a fourth straight year (Bain). Secondaries absorb part of the pressure: volume reached US$240bn in 2025, of which GP-led deals were US$115bn (Jefferies), and US$118bn in H1 2026, of which GP-led deals were US$62bn (Jefferies).

Bank retrenchment from riskier lending shifts that demand to private managers. The partnerships in section 5.1 are the visible form, described as origination infrastructure "that neither could construct alone" (ABF Journal, secondary). Regulatory context is in section 9.

Software is the sector most exposed to private credit stress. The BIS estimates software-as-a-service loans at more than US$500bn, or 19% of direct loans, at end-2025 (BIS). Software is 20–24% of private credit against 3% of high yield and 13% of loans, according to CI GAM (CI GAM). As AI disruption fears repriced the sector, the average software loan bid fell to 87.71 and spread-to-maturity widened to 809bp in May 2026, 395bp wider than in Dec 2025 (Alvarez & Marsal). Software and second-lien exposure accounted for 89% of the year-on-year rise in top BDCs' distressed positions (PitchBook). Fitch recorded no software defaults among privately monitored borrowers in 2025 (IDN Financials, secondary), so the stress so far shows in prices and PIK rather than defaults.

Tight spreads coexist with elevated defaults, which favors private rescue over public refinancing. The ICE BofA US high-yield spread was 3.12% on Oct 5, 2026, near its 2026 low of 2.60% (FRED), yet issuer-weighted default rates exceed 5% (see Exhibit 7). Healthy issuers refinance cheaply in public markets, while the CCC tier, at a 12.02% spread on Oct 2, 2026 (FRED), is left to private capital. S&P counted 372 large US corporate bankruptcies in H1 2026, the highest first half since 2010 (CFO Dive, secondary).

Exhibit 14: Cycle indicators point to rising demand despite tight headline spreads

Sources: as linked in each row. Default rates are in Exhibit 7. "Read for demand" is the author's interpretation.

A rescue investor earns its return from a stack of contractual layers rather than from the coupon alone: compounding PIK, a minimum-return floor, a rising call premium, warrants and control rights. Each layer is a transfer from common shareholders, and the issuer accepts them only when the capital is worth more than the transfer. This section prices those layers with the UWM–Oaktree terms (see section 4.2) and generic inputs. All figures below are author's arithmetic unless a source is shown, and none uses UWM Holdings' actual share price or share count.

6.1 PIK accretion and the minimum-MOIC floor

The floor, not the coupon, sets the early-exit return. UWM's Series A pays 10% a year in cash or 13% in kind, compounding quarterly, with a 1.4x minimum MOIC if a Liquidation Event occurs before the second anniversary (UWM Holdings 8-K). Quarterly compounding lifts 13% to an effective 13.6% a year, yet full PIK accretes stated value to only 1.29x by month 24 (author's arithmetic). PIK alone would not reach 1.4x until about 2.6 years, so the floor adds about 0.11x at month 24 and about 0.26x at month 12 (author's arithmetic). A Liquidation Event at month 12 would therefore return 1.4x, a 40% IRR, against 1.25x on an optional call at the year-1 premium.

Exhibit 15: Compounding PIK reaches 1.9x in five years, but the 1.4x floor binds on a Liquidation Event before year 2

Source: author's arithmetic on terms in the UWM Holdings 8-K (Aug 2026). Inputs: US$1,000 stated value = 1.00x; 13% PIK or 10% cash, paid or accreted quarterly; premium applied to accreted value; premium of 10% in year 1 rising 10 points a year to 60% on or after the fifth anniversary and 70% after the sixth; cash coupons summed without reinvestment. * Optional redemption in years 1–2 is restricted to cases meeting net income and share-count conditions. † Figures in parentheses apply if a Liquidation Event before the 2nd anniversary triggers the 1.4x floor, which counts cash dividends paid. ‡ Series A-1 dividends must be paid in cash at 10% after year 5, so all-PIK figures from year 6 are hypothetical.

The table shows why the 10% cash option is the cheaper path for the issuer: over five years it sums to 0.50x of cash, against 0.90x of accretion under PIK (author's arithmetic).

Rule of thumb (author's): 13% PIK compounded quarterly roughly doubles a claim in about 5.4 years; any floor above about 1.3x at year 2 is worth more than the coupon in an early exit.

6.2 Call premiums and the refinancing incentive

A rising call schedule makes each year of delay more expensive for the issuer. UWM's optional redemption pays stated value plus accrued dividends plus a premium of 10% in year 1 that rises 10 points a year (UWM Holdings 8-K). Conventional high-yield calls run the other way: Wolfspeed's 2023 secured notes carried a make-whole to year 3, then a call at 109.875% stepping down (Wolfspeed 8-K). A step-down schedule rewards the issuer for waiting. A step-up schedule penalizes it, so the issuer should refinance as soon as its credit allows, and the investor's expected life shortens to the restricted window in years 1–2 or soon after. Exhibit 15 shows the result: an all-PIK call costs the issuer a 23–25% IRR in every year through year 5, so waiting never cheapens the exit (author's arithmetic).

The holder's value equals the present value of the lesser of the call price and the hold-to-maturity value, plus the warrants. At year 7, or earlier on a Special Event of Noncompliance, the Series A-1 majority can also force a Liquidity Transaction whose proceeds redeem it in full at the redemption price (UWM Holdings 8-K). That right converts a perpetual instrument into one with a hard date.

Rule of thumb (author's): a step-up call schedule signals that both sides expect a take-out within two to three years; price the preferred to that date, not to perpetuity.

6.3 Warrants and dilution

Long-dated, low-strike warrants are close to equity. UWM issued 330 million 10-year warrants, half struck at US$2.00 and half at US$6.00, cash exercise only, with the strike reduced dollar for dollar by cash dividends (UWM Holdings 8-K). Black-Scholes values a call as C = S·N(d1) − K·e^−rT·N(d2), and a warrant as about C × n/(n + m), where n is shares outstanding and m is new warrant shares. Exhibit 16 uses an illustrative US$5.00 share price, not UWM's, with the 10-year Treasury at 5.27% (US Treasury, Oct 6, 2026) as the risk-free rate and no dividend yield.

Exhibit 16: A US$2.00-strike, 10-year warrant is worth 80–86% of the share; treasury-stock dilution rises with the share price

Source: author's arithmetic. Panel A: Black-Scholes, T = 10 years, r = 5.27% (US Treasury, Oct 6, 2026), no dividends; strikes from the UWM Holdings 8-K; share price, volatility and share counts are generic. Panel B: treasury-stock method, net new shares = m − m × K/S when S > K.

The treasury-stock method understates the economic cost because it ignores time value: at a US$5.00 share price the US$6.00 warrants add no shares on paper, yet Panel A values each at US$2.81–3.57. Penny warrants dilute almost one for one, which is why lender groups use them in debt-for-equity rescues such as Accuray's 15,253,473 penny warrants (Accuray SPA). For UWM itself, KBW estimated dilution of about 55% (HousingWire, secondary).

Rule of thumb (author's): value a 10-year warrant struck at 40% of the share price as about 80% of a share, and one struck at the share price as about 60–75%.

6.4 How value transfers from common

Common holders pay four ways, and gain only if the capital prevents larger distress costs. The warrant value is a direct transfer. A 10–13% coupon costs far more than growth capital: Apollo's convertible preferred for QXO pays 4.75% (QXO). Call premiums, the minimum MOIC and the forced-sale right shift control toward the investor. A rights offering priced below market adds a fourth transfer: UWM's US$400mm offering is priced at the greater of US$2.00 or 85% of the 10-day VWAP, and Oaktree holds the first right to backstop it (UWM Holdings 8-K). In Chapter 11, backstop parties' all-in compensation averaged 20.1% of capital raised across 49 cases since 2016 (Buccola et al.).

Exhibit 17: The coupon is the smallest of several return sources in a rescue preferred

Sources: UWM Holdings 8-K; Lucid 8-K; QXO; Covington (2019–2024 deals); Wolfspeed 8-K; Accuray SPA; Brattle (15 Chapter 11 rights offerings, 2007–2018).

6.5 Underwriting the downside

Rescue investors underwrite recovery through covenants and control as much as through collateral. UWM's preferred is unsecured equity, so Oaktree relies on consent rights over senior or parity securities, debt above leverage thresholds, restricted payments and asset sales, backed by minimum tangible book value, minimum liquidity and maximum leverage covenants (UWM Holdings 8-K). A breach accelerates the board-majority and forced-sale rights, so the downside case ends in investor control rather than in a court queue. Secured rescue debt uses collateral and liquidity tests instead: Wolfspeed's notes carried a US$500mm minimum liquidity covenant (Wolfspeed 8-K), and 81% of synthetic royalty deals in 2019–2024 were secured (Covington). Wolfspeed still filed for Chapter 11 on Jun 30, 2025 (Wolfspeed 8-K), a reminder that covenants convert a failure into control but cannot prevent it (see section 12).

Liability management exercises (LMEs) have become the main way US leveraged borrowers default. LMEs accounted for 69% of loan default activity by count in the 12 months to Aug 2025 (PitchBook), and distressed restructurings made up about 65% of 2025 defaults (Moody's). An LME uses the borrower's existing documents to raise new money or cut debt without a court, usually with the support of a lender majority and often at the expense of a minority. The record so far is mixed: LMEs buy time, but most borrowers that use them default again.

7.1 Why LMEs exist

Three features of modern credit documents make LMEs possible.

• Loose covenants leave room to move assets. J.Crew moved more than 70% of its domestic trademarks, worth about US$250mm, through a US$150mm non-guarantor investment basket and a US$100mm general basket (King & Spalding).
• Majority amendments let a bare majority rewrite the deal. In TriMark, majority amendments stripped the protections against priming and subordination and added barriers to suit (Alston & Bird).
• Exceptions to pro rata sharing let the borrower deal with some lenders only. Mitel's credit agreement allowed the borrower to "purchase" loans "at any time" with no "open market" qualifier (Mayer Brown).

Lenders now track these gaps by name: Serta, J.Crew, PetSmart/Chewy, Envision, MFN carve-outs and "pick-your-poison" provisions (LSTA/LMA panel, Covenant Review data).

7.2 The playbook

Every LME gives new money or better priority to the lenders that take part. Excluded lenders pay for it through structural subordination, lien subordination or a second claim on the same collateral. Five structures dominate.

• Drop-down. The borrower moves valuable assets to a subsidiary outside the credit group and raises new debt against them. J.Crew's unrestricted subsidiary raised US$300mm of new loans against the moved IP (King & Spalding). Optimum Communications (Altice USA) completed a drop-down of about US$2bn in Nov 2025 (Octus).
• Non-pro-rata uptier. A lender majority amends the documents to permit new super-priority debt, then swaps its own loans into it. Excluded lenders keep their old claim, which now ranks behind. Serta Simmons Bedding is the template (Exhibit 18).
• Double-dip and pari-plus. A non-guarantor subsidiary issues new debt and on-lends the proceeds to the credit group, and existing group entities guarantee the new debt. New lenders then hold two claims against the same collateral (Reorg). Pari-plus takes the guarantee or collateral from entities outside the credit group instead (Reorg).
• Amend-and-extend (A&E) and equity handovers. Lenders extend maturities or swap debt for equity on consensual terms. These became the dominant tools in H1 2026, while "coercive uptier structures that defined 2025 have all but vanished" (9fin).
• DIP roll-up. In Chapter 11, prepetition lenders that fund the debtor-in-possession (DIP) loan convert old debt into super-priority DIP claims. Roll-ups act as an in-court LME (section 8).

The excluded lenders' loss is the participants' gain. In Serta, participants recovered 79.5% against 1.5% for excluded lenders (Crowell & Moring).

Exhibit 18: Three ways to move value from excluded lenders to participants

Sources: King & Spalding (J.Crew); Serta Simmons Bedding; Reorg (double-dip, At Home). Diagram simplified by the author.

Exhibit 19 shows that each structure exploits a different gap. The landmark deals map onto the litigation that followed (see section 9).

Exhibit 19: Each LME type exploits a different gap in the documents

Sources: King & Spalding; Reorg/Octus; Octus; Serta Simmons Bedding; Mayer Brown; Reorg; BankruptcyData; 9fin; Octus; Morgan Lewis; Cleary Gottlieb.

Discounts are the participants' main source of value. Serta's exchange prices captured a 26% discount on first-lien debt and a 61% discount on second-lien debt, cutting net debt by about US$400mm (Serta Simmons Bedding). In Rackspace, non-ad-hoc creditors received about 17% less consideration than under equal treatment, and the ad hoc group improved its recovery by about 7% (Reorg/Octus). No cross-market average haircut is publicly available. The examples point to discounts of about 20–30% on senior debt and about 60% on junior debt (author's arithmetic from the Serta and Rackspace terms).

Rule of thumb (author's): in a non-pro-rata deal, an excluded lender should expect to lose most of its claim. Participation is worth more than the exchange price suggests.

7.3 Volume and outcomes

On the Octus count, LME volume peaked in 2024, and most borrowers that completed one later re-defaulted or filed. Counts differ by provider because each defines an LME differently. Octus counted 23 uptiers, drop-downs and pari-plus deals in 2023, 34 in 2024 and 28 in 2025, with 18 of the 2025 deals in H1 (7 in Q1 and 11 in Q2) (Octus). 9fin counted 25 completed LMEs in H1 2026 against 24 in H1 2025 under a different definition (9fin). Exhibit 20 brings the outcome data together.

Exhibit 20: LMEs dominate defaults, and most borrowers default again

Sources: as listed in the table. Counts are not comparable across providers.

The re-default data cut against the case for LMEs. Within 3 years of a coercive LME, only 7% of borrowers had avoided both bankruptcy and re-default, and post-LME bankruptcies lasted 2–3x longer than non-LME prepacks (Roe & Rotaru (ECGI)). Moody's long-run study of 1,173 borrowers finds that more than 1 in 3 soft events ends in hard default or another distressed event (Moody's). Excluded lenders bear most of the loss: Del Monte's first-lien recovery was estimated at about 35%, against about 95% for the first-out tranche created in its exchange (Creditflux, secondary).

Rule of thumb (author's): treat an LME as a two-to-three-year option on recovery, not a cure. Price the stub claim as if a filing is more likely than not.

7.4 Lender defenses

Lenders have answered with cooperation agreements, document blockers and litigation over sacred rights.

• Co-ops bind lenders to act together. Members agree not to transact unless Required Holders, typically 50–75% of the group's debt, approve. Outside dates run 3–18 months, transfers are limited to members or qualified market makers, and early signers get priority on new money and fees (Crowell & Moring). Co-ops are "now a staple of lenders' preparation" (HLC). Optimum's cooperation agreement covers about 99% of CSC Holdings' US$21.8bn of debt (Optimum 8-K).
• Co-ops now face antitrust suits. Excluded lenders sued in Selecta and the borrower sued its lenders in Optimum v. Apollo, both under the Sherman Act (HLC). Both cases are pending (see section 9). Warner Bros. Discovery's Jun 2025 indenture bars noteholders from co-ops that limit new money, with a carve-out for customary defensive co-ops (Crowell & Moring).
• Blockers are near-standard in US loans. J.Crew, Serta and Chewy blockers are "now near-standard" in US leveraged loans. J.Crew blockers in non-sponsored US high-yield bonds rose from 14% in 2025 to 27% in H1 2026 (9fin).
• Blocker quality is uneven in Europe. J.Crew protection appeared in 89% of European leveraged loans and 44% of high-yield bonds in 2025. But 71% of bond blockers were rated "ugly", and only 10% covered all material assets (Octus).
• Sacred rights give minorities a claim. TriMark and Boardriders let sacred-rights and implied anti-subordination theories proceed past dismissal (Alston & Bird; Proskauer). The Fifth Circuit's Serta ruling and the US$261.13mm damages award on remand raise the cost of non-pro-rata deals (see section 9).

Rule of thumb (author's): in a stressed credit, the most valuable lender protection is membership in the majority group, not any single covenant.

Chapter 11 is where failed LMEs end and where rescue capital earns its highest fees. S&P Global Market Intelligence counted 372 large US corporate bankruptcies in H1 2026, the highest first half since 2010 (CFO Dive, secondary). Rescue investors engage at four points in a case: the DIP loan, the restructuring support agreement (RSA), the rights offering and backstop, and the sale or exit. Each now carries LME-style fights over who gets to participate.

8.1 DIP financing and roll-ups

The DIP loan ranks ahead of prepetition debt and funds the case. Incumbent lenders usually provide it so they can protect their position. Prepetition lenders provided 13 of 16 DIPs in Jan–Feb 2026 (Debtwire), and roll-ups appeared in about 82% of prepetition-lender DIPs in 2025, with ratios of 2:1 to 4:1 increasingly common (Octus). Pricing has fallen. Many DIPs priced above 15% in early 2025, with commitment fees of 3–5% and exit fees of 5–6% (Debtwire). By Jan–Feb 2026 PIK interest ranged 4.5–12.5%, cash interest 7.5–13% and backstop premiums 8–11.5% (Debtwire).

Exhibit 21: DIP pricing eased from early 2025 to early 2026, but roll-ups spread

Sources: Debtwire, Feb 25, 2025; Debtwire, 2026.

Roll-ups are where the LME fight continues in court. First Brands paired a US$1.1bn new-money DIP with a US$3.3bn roll-up (Octus). Spirit Aviation's second-case DIP combined US$475mm of new money with up to US$750mm of non-interest-bearing roll-up, priced at SOFR+800 with a 9% PIK backstop premium (Bondoro, secondary). Courts have pushed back on non-pro-rata roll-ups: in American Tire, the court signaled it would reject one, and a pro rata US$90mm roll-up was approved instead (Cleary Gottlieb).

Rule of thumb (author's): a DIP lender's return comes mostly from the roll-up and fees, not the coupon. A 3:1 roll-up turns each dollar of new money into four dollars of super-priority claim.

8.2 RSAs, rights offerings and backstops

Many large cases now start with an RSA, which locks in a creditor majority behind a plan before filing. Saks Global's RSA with an ad hoc group of senior secured bondholders includes US$500mm of exit financing (SFNet, secondary). The plan then raises new equity through a rights offering, and backstop parties guarantee it in return for a fee, a discount and reserved shares. Backstop economics are rich compared with public markets: all-in backstop compensation averaged 20.1% of capital raised, against 3–7% underwriting spreads for IPOs and follow-ons (Buccola et al.).

Exhibit 22: Backstop parties earn far more than public-market underwriters

Sources: Brattle; Buccola, Marcovich Gross and McBrady (Oxford Business Law Blog); Octus, secondary; Debtwire; UWM Holdings 8-K.

The ConvergeOne ruling limits how far a majority can keep these economics to itself. The district court reversed confirmation because exclusive backstop rights gave majority lenders about 30% more recovery without new consideration, breaching equal treatment under §1123(a)(4) (HLC). The holding is covered in section 9.

Rule of thumb (author's): a backstop seat is worth roughly one-fifth of the capital it commits. That value is why groups fight to keep it exclusive.

8.3 Sales, cramdown and prepacks

• 363 sales and credit bids. Secured lenders can bid their claims to buy the business; the court approved Robertshaw's credit-bid sale (Octus). Cases with §363 sales ran about 67% longer than other cases with similar fees (FTI Consulting).
• Cramdown and absolute priority. A plan can bind a dissenting class if it is fair and equitable, which for unsecured creditors means no junior class keeps value unless the dissenting class is paid in full (11 U.S.C. §1129(b)). Plans that skip creditors to reward participants now face fairness challenges in the US and UK alike (see sections 9 and 15).
• Prepacks. Prepackaged cases solicit votes before filing. Standard prepacks run 30–60 days, and Belk completed one in under 24 hours in Feb 2021 (Morris Nichols). Prepack and pre-negotiated cases took about half as long as free-falls, with similar total fees but much higher fees per day (FTI Consulting).
• Third-party releases. Purdue barred nonconsensual releases of claims against non-debtors in Jun 2024, which limits a sponsor's ability to buy peace through a plan (Squire Patton Boggs; see section 9).

8.4 Venue, costs and timelines

Large cases have left Delaware for Texas and New Jersey. Delaware's share of US$1bn+ Chapter 11 cases fell from 40% in 2024 to 23% in 2025 and 7% in H1 2026. The Southern District of Texas ranked first and New Jersey second in H1 2026 (Octus). Costs are significant: professional fees averaged 3.7% of liabilities across 326 large cases from 2019 to 2024, rising to 4.8% in 2023–24 (FTI Consulting). Exhibit 23 compares the three routes.

Exhibit 23: Out-of-court LMEs have no public time or cost benchmark, and their borrowers often file later anyway

Sources: Roe & Rotaru (ECGI); Morris Nichols; FTI Consulting; BlackRock (Moody's/JPM).

The comparison favors a fast court process over an out-of-court deal that leads to a later filing. An LME saves fees up front, but the borrower often pays them later in a longer bankruptcy.

Rule of thumb (author's): professional fees cost about 4% of liabilities in a large case. A prepack halves the time, not the bill.

Courts, not legislators, set the rules of rescue finance. Since 2021 US judges have narrowed the open-market purchase exception, capped what majority lenders can take inside Chapter 11 and barred nonconsensual third-party releases, yet they still uphold uptiers that a credit agreement plainly permits. Policy makers have turned to private credit itself: its size, its bank funding and the income it books in kind.

9.1 US case law on LMEs

The same tactic wins or loses on a few words of contract text. The Fifth Circuit held in Serta that an "open market purchase" requires a market "generally open to participation by various buyers and sellers", so the privately negotiated Jun 2020 exchange breached pro rata sharing (Mayer Brown). On the same day, Dec 31, 2024, a New York appellate court upheld Mitel's uptier because its agreement allowed loan purchases "at any time" with no open-market qualifier (Mayer Brown). On remand the Serta bankruptcy court treated the cashless exchange as a "payment" and awarded excluded lenders US$261.13mm plus 9% prejudgment interest from Jun 22, 2020 (Cleary Gottlieb).

Winning on liability does not guarantee a useful remedy. In Robertshaw the court found a breach but limited the remedy to a prepetition unsecured damages claim, with no rescission (Paul Weiss). In Wesco/Incora the bankruptcy court unwound the 2022 multi-step uptier, but the district court reversed on Dec 8, 2025 after testing each step separately, and a Fifth Circuit appeal was pending as of Jan 2026, with no decision found (Mayer Brown).

Inside Chapter 11, equal treatment limits majority-only economics. The ConvergeOne reversal makes exclusive backstop rights for a majority group hard to confirm without a market test (HLC). The next test is Trinseo, where the court refused on Jul 30, 2026 to dismiss challenges to about US$1.5bn of intercompany claims and took confirmation under advisement on Aug 19, 2026 (BankruptcyData; 9fin, secondary). Courts are split on non-pro-rata DIP roll-ups: American Tire's court signaled it would reject one absent a DIP exception, while Del Monte's court partly dismissed claims that its roll-up breached pro rata sharing (Cleary Gottlieb).

Exhibit 24: Decisions that set the rules turn on contract wording and equal treatment

Sources: Alston & Bird; Reorg (secondary); Proskauer; Paul Weiss; Squire Patton Boggs; Mayer Brown (Jul 2026); Mayer Brown (May 2025); Mayer Brown (Jan 2026); HLC (Red River); HLC (ConvergeOne); 9fin (secondary).

9.2 Releases, two-steps and venue

Purdue took nonconsensual releases out of the plan toolkit. The Supreme Court held 5–4 that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize nonconsensual releases of claims against non-debtors, leaving consensual releases open (Squire Patton Boggs). Judge Lopez applied it in dismissing Red River Talc, Johnson & Johnson's third talc bankruptcy (HLC).

Large cases have left Delaware. Delaware's share of US$1bn+ Chapter 11 cases fell from 40% in 2024 to 23% in 2025 and 7% in H1 2026, with the Southern District of Texas first and New Jersey second (Octus). Texas kept its lead even after Judge David Jones resigned in Oct 2023 after his undisclosed relationship with a Jackson Walker lawyer became public (Bloomberg Law, secondary).

9.3 Co-ops and antitrust

Lender cooperation agreements are now being litigated as possible cartels. Excluded minority lenders sued Selecta's co-op lenders under Sherman Act §1 in Oct 2025, and Optimum Communications, the borrower, sued Apollo and other co-op members in Nov 2025, alleging a concerted refusal to deal (HLC). The LSTA and four other trade groups filed an amicus brief supporting dismissal on Mar 30, 2026 (LSTA). Issuers are also drafting against co-ops: Warner Bros. Discovery's Jun 2025 indenture bars noteholders from agreements that limit new-money provision, with a carve-out for customary defensive co-ops (Crowell & Moring).

9.4 Private credit oversight

Official attention has moved from LME tactics to private credit's size and funding. The Dallas and New York Feds launched a private credit pilot survey and put US direct lending at more than US$1.3tn, comparable to the high-yield and broadly syndicated loan markets (Dallas Fed). The Boston Fed flagged PIK as an early warning: its share of BDC loans rose to about 10% in Q1 2026 from about 6% in Q1 2022 (Boston Fed). The BIS counted more than US$500bn of SaaS loans, or 19% of direct loans, at end-2025 (BIS). Banks are tied in through origination partnerships such as Citi–Apollo (US$25bn) and JPMorgan's US$50bn balance-sheet commitment (ABF Journal, secondary).

Rescue capital pays its managers through the private equity fee model, yet the realized net returns of most funds cluster near 8–12%, well below the mid-teens targets in fund documents. The profit pool extends beyond the funds: insurers' balance sheets, financial advisors, law firms and backstop parties each take a share of every rescue.

10.1 Fee structures and fund terms

Opportunistic and distressed funds charge about 0.8–1.65% plus 20% carry over an 8% preferred return. Strategic Value Partners' Special Situations Fund VI charges 0.825% on commitments, stepping up to 1.65% once half the capital is deployed, with 20% carry over an 8% preferred return and a GP commitment of at least US$130mm (NJ Division of Investment). Clearlake Opportunities Partners II charged 1% on commitments during the investment period and then 1.5% on invested capital, with the same 20% over 8% (Cliffwater for Rhode Island). Davidson Kempner's distressed fund charged 1.5% and 20% over 8% (Cliffwater for Rhode Island). The step-up and invested-capital bases tie fees to deployment, which matters in a strategy that may wait years for distress. Evergreen pools such as Sixth Street TAO avoid forced liquidation altogether (Wikipedia, secondary). Standard fund-life terms were not found in a primary source.

10.2 Return targets by strategy

Published targets rise with risk, but the figures are dated. No 2025–26 primary document in this research discloses a target IRR for distressed or structured equity, so Exhibit 25 relies on pension memos from 2017–2024 and flags each vintage.

Exhibit 25: Published targets run from 10–13% net for direct lending to mid-teens net for distressed

Sources: Jacksonville Police & Fire Pension Fund; Cliffwater for Rhode Island (Antares); Buyouts, secondary; Cliffwater for Rhode Island (Clearlake); Cliffwater for Rhode Island (Davidson Kempner).

The UWM preferred illustrates why the targets hold on paper: its contractual terms imply 19–25% IRRs on a call in years 1–3, before warrants (Exhibit 15, author's arithmetic), well above the fund-level targets after fees and losses.

10.3 Realized returns and dispersion

Realized net returns outside crisis vintages cluster at 8–12%, below the targets. Washington State's distressed bucket of US$4.52bn commitments returned a 9.64% net IRR and 1.5x as of Sep 30, 2025; its special situations subtotal returned 6.06% and 1.4x (WSIB). Preqin puts the median net IRR of special situations funds at about 8% since 2014 (Preqin). Managers report better strategy-level figures: Blackstone states a 13% net IRR for its opportunistic credit strategy since 2007 (Blackstone), and Apollo reports Hybrid Value gross returns of 17.9% over the 12 months to Q2 2026 (Apollo). Net IRRs for Apollo Hybrid Value are not publicly available.

Exhibit 26: Net IRRs span 4–28% by vintage

Sources: Washington State Investment Board (distressed debt bucket); NJ Division of Investment (SVP prior funds, memo dated Jan 23, 2025); Oregon OPERF Opportunity Portfolio.

Young vintages deserve caution. Oaktree Opportunities XI fell from 10.49% to 9.44% between Dec 31, 2024 and Sep 30, 2025 (WSIB), and SVP V's 17.6% rests on unrealized marks with no distributions.

10.4 Profit pools

Fees accrue to every party in a rescue, and the largest pools sit with managers that pair funds with insurance balance sheets. Apollo earned a record US$277mm of capital solutions fees in Q2 2026, alongside US$785mm of fee-related earnings and US$877mm of Athene spread-related earnings (Apollo). Advisors and other professionals take a separate cut: professional fees averaged 3.7% of liabilities across 326 large Chapter 11 cases in 2019–2024, rising to 4.8% in 2023–24 (FTI Consulting).

Exhibit 27: Managers, insurers, advisors and backstop parties each take a distinct slice of a rescue

Sources: Apollo; Ares; Brookfield Asset Management; Debtwire; Buccola et al. (49 Chapter 11 cases since 2016); Houlihan Lokey; FTI Consulting; Bloomberg Law, secondary.

Restructuring advisory is flat at the top of the market: Houlihan Lokey's restructuring revenue fell 3% in its latest fiscal year while corporate finance grew, and management called the decline fee mix and timing, "not a trend" (Houlihan Lokey). The shift from free-fall bankruptcies to LMEs and private rescues moves fees from courts and advisors toward the capital providers themselves.

Rescue capital is concentrating in a few mega-funds, and scale now decides who can write the largest checks. Oaktree Opportunities Fund XII alone held about US$16bn of commitments at its Feb 10, 2025 final close (Oaktree via Business Wire). That is close to the US$16.3bn Preqin counted across all eight special situations funds closed in H1 2026 (Preqin via Paul Weiss).

Flagship funds are 1.1–2.8x the size of earlier funds in the same strategy (author's arithmetic). Ares Special Opportunities Fund III closed at US$9.8bn, against US$3.5bn for its first fund in Jun 2020 (Ares; Ares). Silver Point's second distressed fund reached US$4.6bn, against US$1.7bn in 2019 (Alternatives Watch, secondary). Apollo Hybrid Value Fund III, at US$6.5bn, is 41% larger than Fund II (Apollo). SVP Special Situations Fund VI, at US$6.5bn, follows a US$5bn Fund V (NJ Division of Investment; Private Equity Wire, secondary).

Scale gives the largest managers three advantages.

• Cheque size. Oaktree funds alone bought US$1.5bn of UWM Holdings preferred (UWM 8-K). One ad hoc group funded a US$1.1bn new-money DIP for First Brands (Octus).
• Permanent capital. Apollo's insurer Athene earned US$877mm of spread-related earnings in Q2 2026 (Apollo). Brookfield Wealth Solutions supplied US$45bn of Brookfield's US$51bn Q2 2026 credit raise (Brookfield). Oaktree bought the insurer Atlantic Coast Life in Mar 2026 (Alternative Credit Investor, secondary).
• Weight in the capital structure. Large holders anchor co-ops. Optimum's lender co-op covers about 99% of CSC Holdings' US$21.8bn of debt (Optimum 8-K).

Banks have turned from rivals into origination partners. Citi and Apollo set up a US$25bn program with Mubadala and Athene on Sep 26, 2024. JPMorgan committed US$50bn of balance sheet plus about US$15bn from co-lenders on Feb 24, 2025 (ABF Journal, secondary). Wells Fargo and Centerbridge's Overland Advantage has done more than US$7bn of deals (Bloomberg, secondary).

Co-ops reward size inside a capital structure. Co-op members typically agree not to transact without 50–75% approval, for 3–18 months, and early signers get priority on new money and fees (Crowell & Moring). The gap between insiders and outsiders can be wide: in Serta, participants recovered 79.5% and excluded lenders 1.5% (see section 7). Excluded lenders and borrowers now sue co-ops under antitrust law, and those cases are pending (see section 9).

Competition and tighter documents are compressing returns outside crisis vintages. Oaktree's 2001 opportunities fund returned 28.02% net, against 9.44% for its 2020 fund (WSIB). Preqin puts the median net IRR of special situations funds at about 8% since 2014 (Preqin). Documents are also closing the LME opportunity. J.Crew, Serta and Chewy blockers are now near-standard in US leveraged loans, and J.Crew blockers in non-sponsored high-yield bonds rose from 14% in 2025 to 27% in H1 2026 (9fin). Coercive uptiers "have all but vanished" in H1 2026 (9fin).

Competition differs by segment (Exhibit 28): incumbent holders dominate in-court and LME financing, while new-money rescue and opportunistic credit are open to any manager with a large enough fund.

Exhibit 28: Incumbent holders control in-court and LME financing; open competition is fiercest in opportunistic credit

Sources: Bloomberg via Advisor Perspectives (secondary); Octus; Crowell & Moring; WSIB; Houlihan Lokey; 9fin; fund-size ratios are author's arithmetic from the sources above.

Rescue capital fails in a small number of repeatable ways, and most show up in documents and liquidity data before they show up in default rates. Exhibit 29 groups recent failures by cause. The common thread is that new money buys time, not solvency: about 40% of coercive LME borrowers filed within two years (ECGI; see section 7 for the full re-default evidence).

Exhibit 29: Failures cluster in re-defaults, contested priority and illiquid vehicles

Sources: Octus (Spirit); Wolfspeed 8-K (2023); Wolfspeed 8-K (2025); Crowell & Moring; Norton Rose Fulbright; Judiciary UK; Octus (DIP roll-ups); BNN Bloomberg (secondary); Lincoln International.

Re-default is the most common failure. Spirit Airlines shows the full arc: after its second filing, a possible US$500mm US government investment fell through, and DIP lenders funded up to US$125mm for the wind-down after a fuel-price spike tied to the Iran conflict (Octus). Its second DIP had already primed prepetition noteholders with a US$1.225bn facility, US$750mm of it a roll-up (Bondoro, secondary).

Rescue financing before bankruptcy often only moves the date. Wolfspeed's 2023 notes carried a US$500mm minimum liquidity covenant and step-up coupons (Wolfspeed 8-K). Two years later the company filed and cut its debt by about 70% (Wolfspeed 8-K).

Litigation and fairness challenges reprice the deal after closing. Post-LME bankruptcies lasted 2–3x longer than non-LME prepacks (ECGI). In Petrofac, the Court of Appeal held that above-market new-money returns count as a restructuring benefit that must be fairly shared, which reaches directly into rescue investors' economics (Judiciary UK).

Sudden filings and vehicle liquidity are the newer risks. First Brands filed for Chapter 11 on Sep 28, 2025, funded by a US$1.1bn DIP from an ad hoc cross-holder group (Business Wire). In vehicles, Blue Owl's redemption requests were "substantially above the cap" (BNN Bloomberg, secondary). Across 20 private credit funds, Q2 2026 redemption requests exceeded US$22bn and fewer than 40% were honored (HSF Kramer, secondary).

PIK and distressed exchanges hide losses that headline default rates miss. Moody's private credit proxy default rate is 1.6% excluding distressed exchanges and 4.7% including them (Moody's). BDC non-accruals rose to 2.75% of investments at cost in Q2 2026 from 1.81% in Q1 (Alternative Credit Investor, secondary), so the stress described in section 5 is starting to surface.

Five groups make up the industry: alternative managers that supply most of the capital, specialist distressed investors, insurance and bank balance sheets that feed the managers, advisors and law firms that run the process, and pension funds that bear the returns. Exhibit 30 maps them, and sections 13.1–13.3 profile the most active firms.

Exhibit 30: Alternative managers supply the capital; advisors, lawyers and insurers earn around them

Sources: company releases and pension reports cited in Exhibits 31–33; KKR; ABF Journal (secondary); WSIB (Sep 30, 2025).

13.1 Multi-strategy alternative managers

The listed alternative managers run the largest rescue and opportunistic vehicles, but few disclose platform-level data for them (Exhibit 31).

Exhibit 31: The largest managers run US$300bn–1.3tn firms; dedicated rescue funds are a small slice

Sources: AUM at Jun 30, 2026 unless dated. Pulse 2.0 (secondary, from the Blackstone Q2 2026 release); Blackstone; Apollo; Apollo; Brookfield; Oaktree; KKR; Ares; Ares; Carlyle; Alternatives Watch (secondary); BNN Bloomberg (secondary); Wikipedia (secondary); Alternatives Watch (secondary).

Economics. These firms earn mostly from fees, so their income grows with assets even when vintage returns compress. Apollo booked US$1.001bn of management fees and US$785mm of fee-related earnings in Q2 2026, including a record US$277mm of capital solutions fees (Apollo). Insurance adds a second engine: Athene's spread-related earnings of US$877mm exceeded Apollo's fee-related earnings in the same quarter (author's comparison). Performance is reported gross: Apollo Hybrid Value returned 17.9% over the last twelve months to Q2 2026 (Apollo), and no pension report in the research set shows its net IRR.

13.2 Specialist and hedge-fund-style investors

Specialists are smaller and mostly private, and several do not publish AUM. They compete on restructuring skill and on willingness to take control, and their flagship funds now reach US$4–7bn.

Exhibit 32: Specialists run US$19–80bn firms and raise US$4–7bn flagships

Sources: Elliott; Express & Star (secondary); Cerberus; Fortress; Centerbridge; CalPERS (Mar 31, 2026); Alternatives Watch (secondary); King Street; NJ Division of Investment.

Economics. Specialists start with a low fee on commitments and earn carry over a hurdle. SVP Special Situations Fund VI charges 0.825% on commitments, stepping up to 1.65% once 50% of capital is deployed, with 20% carry over an 8% preferred return and a GP commitment of at least US$130mm (NJ Division of Investment). Net returns cluster below the headline targets. WSIB's distressed bucket earned 9.64% net and 1.5x on US$4.52bn of commitments at Sep 30, 2025 (WSIB). Across its 1995–2022 vintages, net IRRs run from about 4% to 28% and cluster around 8–12% (author's reading of the WSIB and other pension data; see section 10).

13.3 Advisors and law firms

A small group of banks and law firms advises on most large cases. Houlihan Lokey is the only large advisor that reports restructuring revenue separately.

Exhibit 33: Houlihan Lokey leads the disclosed advisory pool; Gibson Dunn and Kirkland lead the legal tables

Sources: Houlihan Lokey; PJT Partners; Octus; Kirkland (Debtwire); First Brands; Wolfspeed 8-K; Proskauer.

Economics. Advisors are paid out of the estate or by the borrower, so their pool tracks case size more than investor returns. Professional fees averaged 3.7% of liabilities across large US cases (see section 8). The top of the market is flat: Houlihan Lokey's restructuring revenue fell 3% while its corporate finance revenue grew 14% to US$1.745bn, and management called the dip a matter of fee mix and timing, "not a trend" (Houlihan Lokey). PJT, by contrast, credited restructuring for part of its 14% advisory growth in 2025 (PJT Partners).

The cases from 2020 to 2026 show the toolkit moving from coercive non-pro-rata deals toward negotiated exchanges, equity handovers and priced rescue equity. Exhibit 34 lists nine cases in date order, and five narratives follow.

Exhibit 34: Rescue deals since 2020 range from non-pro-rata uptiers to creditor takeovers and priced preferred

Sources: Serta; Mayer Brown; CNBC (secondary); Carvana 8-K; Arendt; Wolfspeed 8-K (2023); Wolfspeed 8-K (2025); AMC 8-K; Octus; SFNet (secondary); New Fortress Energy; UWM 8-K; HousingWire (secondary).

UWM Holdings and Oaktree: rescue equity priced like debt, with control as the backstop

One quarter's hedge loss pushed UWM Holdings to raise rescue capital. UWM Holdings lost US$603mm on hedges in Q2 2026 (HousingWire, secondary). It raised a US$2.05bn package led by Oaktree's preferred, whose full terms appear in section 4.2 (UWM 8-K). Part of the proceeds will redeem US$500mm of 5.75% notes due 2027 (UWM 424B5). HousingWire reports that leverage falls from 5.6x to about 1.2x and that KBW estimates about 55% dilution for existing holders (HousingWire, secondary). Oaktree knew the borrower: its 2020 US$300mm loan to UWM carried a 15.5% coupon and returned about 1.5x (Bloomberg via Advisor Perspectives, secondary).

Carvana: a distressed exchange that bought time with PIK

Carvana swapped maturities for collateral and deferred cash interest. In Jul 2023 holders exchanged about US$5.2bn of unsecured notes into new secured notes, covering more than 83% of the 2025 and 2027 maturities, and Apollo was the largest holder (CNBC, secondary). The new notes paid in kind first and in cash later. The 2031 series, for example, paid 14% PIK for four coupons and 9% cash thereafter (Carvana 8-K). Total debt fell by more than US$1.2bn, and cash interest fell by more than US$430mm a year for two years (CNBC, secondary). Creditors gave up face value and current cash in exchange for priority, the usual trade in a distressed exchange.

Serta Simmons Bedding: the uptier that courts ruled a breach

Serta shows how much a non-pro-rata deal transfers, and what it can cost the winners later. In Jun 2020 a majority group provided US$200mm of first-out money and exchanged its loans into US$875mm of second-out debt at 74 for first-lien and 39 for second-lien paper (Serta). Participants later recovered 79.5%, against 1.5% for excluded lenders (Crowell & Moring). The Fifth Circuit held on Dec 31, 2024 that the private exchange was not an "open market purchase", and the Supreme Court denied certiorari on Nov 10, 2025. On remand, the court awarded excluded lenders US$261.13mm plus 9% prejudgment interest on Jul 7, 2026 (Mayer Brown).

Wolfspeed: rescue debt that delayed, but did not prevent, Chapter 11

Wolfspeed's 2023 secured notes bought two years, not a solution. In Jun 2023 the company sold US$1.25bn of senior secured notes, with a US$750mm accordion, at 9.875% for three years and stepping to 11.875% (Wolfspeed 8-K). The notes carried a US$500mm minimum liquidity covenant (Wolfspeed 8-K). Wolfspeed filed for Chapter 11 on Jun 30, 2025 and confirmed a plan in Sep 2025 that cut debt by about 70%, with Renesas and the convertible holders as the main counterparties (Wolfspeed 8-K).

New Fortress Energy: a creditor takeover through a cross-border plan

New Fortress Energy shows creditors taking the equity rather than lending more. Its Mar 17, 2026 RSA restructures about US$5.7bn of debt, including US$2.73bn of 2029 notes and a US$1.27bn term loan B (New Fortress Energy). Creditors provide up to US$643mm of new CoreCo term loans and receive 65% of the common plus a convertible preferred that takes them to 87% at year 3; existing holders keep 35% until then (New Fortress Energy). The company is using a UK Part 26A plan paired with Chapter 15, a route section 15 covers. The structure fits the H1 2026 shift toward equity handovers noted by 9fin (see section 7).

Outside the US, statutory plans with cross-class cram-down do most of the work that LMEs and Chapter 11 do at home, and courts are testing fairness harder. US-style creditor-on-creditor tactics have nonetheless reached Europe. Exhibit 35 compares the main regimes.

Exhibit 35: Cram-down is common across regimes; the fairness test differs

Sources: HLC; Judiciary UK; A&O Shearman; Heuking; Miller Thomson; HKEX; DealStreetAsia (secondary). US cram-down is statutory (§1129(b)); "n/a in sources" means the research did not cover the point.

15.1 United Kingdom

Part 26A plans are the UK's main rescue tool, and the Court of Appeal is tightening them. Forty-one companies registered a plan between Jun 26, 2020 and Feb 28, 2025 (Insolvency Service). Adler set aside a plan for an unjustified departure from pari passu (Norton Rose Fulbright), and Petrofac barred excluding out-of-the-money dissenting classes without justification (Judiciary UK). Thames Water's interim plan, sanctioned on Feb 18, 2025, allowed up to £3bn of super-senior debt at 9.75% (Express & Star, secondary). Its creditors' Mar 2026 recapitalization proposal offers £3.35bn of new equity and up to £6.55bn of new debt with a 30% Class A write-off; it is non-binding and its later status is unconfirmed (Thames Water). US issuers use the plan too: New Fortress Energy is restructuring about US$5.7bn through a Part 26A plan plus Chapter 15 (New Fortress Energy).

15.2 Continental Europe

European LMEs have arrived despite stronger blockers. CreditSights named Selecta, Hunkemöller, Victoria and Altice International as 2025's marquee deals and concluded that "creditor-on-creditor violence has definitively arrived in Europe" (CreditSights). J.Crew protection appeared in 89% of European leveraged loans and 44% of high-yield bonds in 2025, but 71% of bond blockers were rated "ugly" (Octus). Distressed exchanges drove most European defaults: S&P's trailing spec-grade rate was 3.3% in Q1 2026 (AFME). Statutory tools are maturing alongside: Germany's Constitutional Court dismissed 19 shareholder complaints against Varta's StaRUG plan, which cut equity to zero (Heuking).

15.3 Canada and Asia

Canada favors fast asset sales. CCAA filings totaled 71 in 2025, and 18 of 51 sale-process cases closed through reverse vesting orders (Miller Thomson). Hudson's Bay filed in Mar 2025 and was liquidated (Retail Insider, secondary).

In Asia, court processes have mostly ended in liquidation or stalemate. Hong Kong's High Court ordered Evergrande wound up on Jan 29, 2024 (HKEX). China Vanke missed the original Dec 2025 maturity on two onshore bonds worth CNY5.7bn (about US$817mm), and creditors rejected 12-month extensions (Bloomberg Law, secondary). In Korea, the court scrapped MBK-owned Homeplus's rehabilitation plan on Jul 3, 2026 after it failed to raise about US$130mm (DealStreetAsia, secondary).

Rescue capital is getting larger, more structured and more consensual, while the stress that creates demand for it builds inside private credit and under rising rates. Ten trends define the outlook. Where forecasters disagree, the range is shown with each source.

Structured equity is scaling, and fund sizes are scaling with it. Apollo Hybrid Value Fund III closed at US$6.5bn on May 5, 2026, against US$4.6bn for Fund II (2022) and US$3.3bn for Fund I (2019) (Apollo). Ares Special Opportunities Fund III raised US$9.8bn, up from US$3.5bn for its first fund in 2020 (Ares). Silver Point's second distressed fund reached US$4.6bn, against US$1.7bn for the 2019 fund (Alternatives Watch, secondary). Apollo earned record capital solutions fees of US$277mm in Q2 2026 (Apollo), and Apollo, Sixth Street and Bain have "ramped up preferred-equity deals" (Bloomberg via Advisor Perspectives, secondary). UWM Holdings–Oaktree is the current template (see section 4.2). No market-wide figure for preferred or structured equity volume is publicly available.

LMEs are turning consensual. In H1 2026, equity handovers and consensual amend-and-extends became the dominant tools, and "coercive uptier structures that defined 2025 have all but vanished" (9fin). Octus data show the turn: 18 of its 28 uptiers, drop-downs and pari-plus deals in 2025 came in H1 (Octus). Total activity has held up, with 25 completed LMEs in H1 2026 against 24 a year earlier (9fin). Documents are tightening as well. J.Crew, Serta and Chewy blockers are "near-standard" in US leveraged loans, and J.Crew blockers in non-sponsored HY bonds rose from 14% in 2025 to 27% in H1 2026 (9fin).

Courts are raising the cost of aggressive tactics, though not uniformly. The Serta remand awarded excluded lenders US$261.13mm plus 9% prejudgment interest on Jul 7, 2026 (Mayer Brown). The ConvergeOne reversal bars exclusive backstop rights that give majority lenders extra recovery without new consideration (HLC). The Wesco/Incora district court went the other way on Dec 8, 2025, upholding a multi-step uptier (Mayer Brown). The Fifth Circuit appeal and the Trinseo ruling therefore carry the open questions (see section 9 and Exhibit 37).

Co-ops face antitrust risk. Excluded lenders in Selecta and the borrower in Optimum v. Apollo allege that creditor co-ops violate Sherman Act §1 (HLC). The LSTA and four other trade groups backed dismissal on Mar 30, 2026, and no ruling had been found by Oct 7, 2026 (LSTA). Issuers are drafting against co-ops too: Warner Bros. Discovery's Jun 2025 indenture bars noteholders from agreements that limit new money, with a carve-out for defensive co-ops (Crowell).

Stress is building inside private credit, led by software. "Bad PIK" added after origination reached 6.2% of all loans in Q2 2026, up from 5.9% in Q1 (Lincoln). BDC non-accruals rose to 2.75% of cost from 1.81% over the same quarter (KBRA via Alternative Credit Investor, secondary). SaaS loans exceeded US$500bn, or 19% of direct loans, at end-2025 (BIS), and UBS projects defaults of up to 11% for high-AI-risk software loans (Alvarez & Marsal). Software and second lien account for 89% of the year-on-year rise in top BDCs' distressed exposure (PitchBook).

Insurance and retail capital now fund the asset class, with opposite liquidity. Brookfield Wealth Solutions supplied US$45bn of Brookfield's US$51bn Q2 2026 credit raise (Brookfield), and Oaktree bought Atlantic Coast Life in Mar 2026 (Alternative Credit Investor, secondary). Retail money is less patient. Redemption requests at 20 private credit funds exceeded US$22bn in Q2 2026, and less than 40% were honored (HSF Kramer, secondary). Two Blue Owl funds kept 5% quarterly caps because requests were "substantially above the cap" (BNN Bloomberg, secondary).

Banks are partnering with managers rather than competing. Citi and Apollo formed a US$25bn program in Sep 2024, and JPMorgan committed US$50bn of balance sheet plus about US$15bn from co-lenders in Feb 2025 (ABF Journal, secondary). The Wells Fargo–Centerbridge venture has completed more than US$7bn of deals (Bloomberg, secondary). Regulators are watching the linkage: the Dallas Fed and New York Fed released a private credit pilot survey on Aug 5, 2026 (Dallas Fed).

GP-led secondaries compete with rescue capital for sponsor-backed companies. GP-led volume rose 32% to US$62bn in H1 2026, and continuation vehicles made up 89% of it (Jefferies). Ropes & Gray projects total secondary volume of about US$300bn a year within 12–24 months (Ropes & Gray). The exit backlog behind this demand is described in section 5.

Rates are rising again, which prolongs the stress. The FOMC raised its target range by 25bp to 3.75–4.00% on Sep 16, 2026, stating that "inflation remains elevated" (Federal Reserve). The 10-year Treasury yield stood at 5.27% on Oct 6, 2026 (US Treasury). Higher base rates raise cash interest for floating-rate borrowers, and a quarter of KBRA's middle-market sample was already below 1.0x coverage (see section 5). The maturity wall then builds, with about US$500bn of global spec-grade nonfinancial maturities in 2027 and about US$800bn in 2028 (S&P Global Ratings, as of Jul 1, 2025, read from chart).

Default forecasts diverge by measure more than by view. Year-end 2026 baselines run from 1.8% to 5.0%:

• Moody's US spec-grade (issuer-weighted): 4.3% by Dec 2026, raised from 3.7% in the Jul forecast (Moody's via First Trust, secondary).
• Fitch: US leveraged loans 4.5–5.0% and HY 2.5–3.0% (Fitch via Crypto Briefing, secondary).
• JPMorgan HY by par, including distressed exchanges: 1.8% for 2026 and 2.3% for 2027 (JPMorgan via Eaton Vance).
• Moody's Apr 2026 pessimistic scenario, 12 months ahead (not a baseline): about 8% (Bloomberg Government, secondary).

Spreads price the benign end of that range. US HY OAS was 3.12% on Oct 5, 2026, close to its 2026 low of 2.60% (FRED).

Fifteen public indicators, most monthly or quarterly, show where rescue demand sits in the cycle. Exhibit 36 groups them by defaults, prices, private credit health, restructuring activity, capital supply and rates.

Exhibit 36: Defaults and private credit stress are elevated while spreads stay tight

Sources: Moody's via First Trust (secondary); Fitch via Crypto Briefing (secondary); Fitch via Webull (secondary); PitchBook LCD; FRED HY OAS; FRED CCC OAS; Lincoln International; KBRA via Alternative Credit Investor (secondary); KBRA DLD; 9fin; CFO Dive (secondary); ABF Journal (secondary); Paul Weiss; Federal Reserve; US Treasury.

The readings diverge in a consistent direction: default and private credit measures sit near cycle highs, while the 3.12% HY spread prices little of that stress. Read each default rate on its own basis (see Exhibit 7).

The rest of 2026 brings two FOMC meetings, the close of the UWM Holdings rights offering and several court rulings that will set the rules for LMEs and co-ops. Exhibit 37 lists each event with what to watch. Dates marked "expected" are not confirmed.

Exhibit 37: Court rulings and the UWM rights offering are the key signposts through Mar 2027

Sources: Federal Reserve FOMC calendar; Apollo Q2 2026 release; UWM Holdings 8-K; Moody's via First Trust (secondary); Fitch via Webull (secondary); CFO Dive (secondary); Lincoln International; BankruptcyData; LSTA; HLC; Mayer Brown; Octus; Paul Weiss; Jefferies; Thames Water; Global Restructuring Review. Expected dates are the author's estimates from prior publication timing.

The three pending rulings matter most for pricing: together they decide how much value a majority group can capture in a non-pro-rata deal and whether lenders can organize to stop one.

All firms below appear in the body. Scale figures use each firm's latest disclosed basis and date, so they are not comparable.

Exhibit 38: Key players in rescue capital

Sources: Apollo; Pulse 2.0 (secondary); Blackstone; Brookfield; Oaktree; KKR; Ares; Carlyle; Alternatives Watch (secondary); BNN Bloomberg (secondary); Wikipedia (secondary); Alternatives Watch (secondary); Elliott; Cerberus; Fortress; Centerbridge; Alternatives Watch (secondary); King Street; NJ Division of Investment; Houlihan Lokey; PJT Partners; Octus; Kirkland (Debtwire); First Brands; ABF Journal (secondary); WSIB. n/d = not disclosed.

363 sale

Court-approved sale of a debtor's assets, free of most liens.

A&E

Amend-and-extend: consensual maturity extension, usually for better terms.

Absolute priority

A dissenting class is paid in full before juniors keep value.

Accreted value

Stated value plus PIK accrued to date.

Ad hoc group

Creditors organized informally to negotiate together.

Backstop

Commitment to buy unsold rights-offering shares, for a premium and discount.

BDC

Business development company; a US vehicle holding mostly private loans.

Capped call

Option bought with a convert to lift the effective conversion price.

Chapter 15

US recognition of a foreign restructuring proceeding.

Continuation vehicle

New fund, run by the same GP, that buys assets from an older fund.

Co-op

Cooperation agreement binding lenders to act only together.

Cramdown

Plan confirmation over a dissenting class's objection.

Credit bid

Secured lender's bid for assets using its claim instead of cash.

DIP loan

Debtor-in-possession loan with court-approved priority.

Distressed exchange

Swap of debt into a less valuable package to avoid default.

Double-dip

Structure giving new lenders two claims on the same collateral.

Drop-down

Moving assets out of the credit group to borrow against them.

Dry powder

Committed fund capital not yet invested.

Exit financing

New capital that funds emergence from Chapter 11.

Free-fall

Chapter 11 filing without a pre-agreed plan.

GP-led secondary

Sponsor-run sale of fund assets, usually into a continuation vehicle.

Holdco PIK

PIK debt above the operating company, structurally subordinated.

J.Crew blocker

Covenant stopping material assets moving to unrestricted subsidiaries.

Liquidation preference

What a preferred receives before common in a sale or liquidation.

LME

Liability management exercise: out-of-court deal using existing documents.

Make-whole

Redemption price equal to the present value of forgone coupons.

Minimum MOIC

Floor on the multiple paid on early repayment.

MOIC

Multiple on invested capital: cash returned divided by cash invested.

NAV loan

Loan to a private equity fund secured on its portfolio value.

Non-accrual

Loan on which the lender has stopped booking interest income.

OAS

Option-adjusted spread over Treasuries.

Open market purchase

Exception to pro rata sharing, read narrowly in Serta.

Pari-plus

New debt supported by entities outside the credit group.

Part 26A plan

UK restructuring plan with cross-class cram-down.

PIK toggle

Debt letting the issuer choose cash or PIK interest each period.

Prepack

Chapter 11 case with votes solicited before filing.

Pro rata sharing

Lenders in a class share payments equally.

Rights offering

Offer of new shares to holders or creditors, often at a discount.

Roll-up

Prepetition debt converted into super-priority DIP debt.

RSA

Restructuring support agreement binding creditors to a plan.

Sacred rights

Terms that need each affected lender's consent to change.

Sale-leaseback

Sale of owned property to an investor that leases it back.

Uptier

Majority amendment creating debt senior to excluded lenders.

Every linked source in the primer, listed once under the section where it first appears. Sources marked "secondary" in the text are trade press, aggregators or blogs.

1. The short version

• Eaton Vance — eatonvance.com/content/dam/im/assets/publication/thought-leadership/ar…
• UWM Holdings 8-K — sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001783398/000178339826000114/xbrl-2026080…
• Blackstone — blackstone.com/news/press/blackstone-closes-flagship-opportunistic-cre…
• Preqin — preqin.com/insights/research/sector-in-focus/strategy-in-focus-special…
• WSIB — sib.wa.gov/docs/reports/quarterly/ir093025.pdf
• Crowell & Moring — crowell.com/en/insights/publications/an-overview-of-the-use-of-coopera…
• Debtwire — ionanalytics.com/insights/debtwire/creeping-roll-ups-gain-traction-in-…
• Proskauer — proskauer.com/uploads/insights-on-the-nav-financing-market-full-year-2…
• Dallas Fed — dallasfed.org/news/releases/2026/nr260805privatecredit
• Preqin via Paul Weiss — paulweiss.com/media/gfxhgp3c/credit_fundraising_at_a_glance_h1_2026.pd…
• Oaktree — businesswire.com/news/home/20250210248809/en
• Moody's via First Trust — ftportfolios.com/Blogs/InvestBlog/2026/9/17/factoid---thursday,-septem…
• PitchBook LCD — pitchbook.com/news/distressed-debt
• PitchBook — pitchbook.com/news/articles/leveraged-loan-default-rate-ticks-higher-i…
• Roe & Rotaru (ECGI) — ecgi.global/publications/blog/liability-managements-limited-runway-cor…
• Lincoln International — lincolninternational.com/news/the-lincoln-private-market-index-earning…
• KBRA — kbra.com/publications/kpbzZfGH/kbra-releases-research-private-credit-q…
• FRED — fred.stlouisfed.org/data/BAMLH0A0HYM2
• Mayer Brown — mayerbrown.com/en/insights/publications/2026/07/serta-simmons-bedding-…
• Mayer Brown — mayerbrown.com/en/insights/publications/2025/05/serta-and-mitel-the-la…
• Preqin via Paul Weiss — pwv13.live.multimediasolutions.com/media/vaafr2qj/credit_fundraising_a…
• Moody's/JPM via BlackRock — blackrock.com/gls-download/literature/market-commentary/credit-current…
• FRED — fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLH0A3HYC
• S&P Global MI via CFO Dive — cfodive.com/news/us-corporate-bankruptcies-hover-16-year-high-sp/82512…

2. Units and vocabulary

• Lucid 8-K — sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1811210/000110465924038177/tm249613d1_8k.h…
• Wolfspeed 8-K — sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/895419/000119312523174504/d462549d8k.htm
• Moody's — moodys.com/web/en/us/insights/credit-risk/private-credit/lend-extend-a…
• King & Spalding — kslaw.com/attachments/000/008/521/original/How_did_they_do_it_J._Crew.…
• BankruptcyData — bankruptcydata.com/article/from-the-courtroom-trinseo-plc-debtors-warn…
• Octus — octus.com/resources/articles/dip-rollups-the-final-frontier-for-credit…
• Brattle — brattle.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/17995_assessing_the_reasonablen…
• Buccola et al. — blogs.law.ox.ac.uk/oblb/blog-post/2025/06/backstop-party

3. Definition and size

• Apollo — apollo.com/insights-news/pressreleases/2026/05/apollo-hybrid-value-fun…
• Blackstone — businesswire.com/news/home/20230821564665/en/Blackstone-Announces-Reco…
• PitchBook — pitchbook.brightspotcdn.com/74/45/4f36da844589a606c5cea79f2aeb/q2-2026…
• ICE via Eaton Vance — eatonvance.com/content/dam/im/assets/publication/thought-leadership/ar…
• LSTA — lsta.org/content/morningstar-lsta-leveraged-loan-index-analysis-decemb…
• H2 2022 — paulweiss.com/media/3982988/credit_fundraising_at_a_glance_h2_2022.pdf
• H2 2023 — WWW.PAULWEISS.COM/media/3984288/credit_fundraising_at_a_glance_h2_2023…
• H1 2024 — paulweiss.com/media/3985082/credit_fundraising_at_a_glance_h1_2024.pdf
• H2 2024 — paulweiss.com/media/3985960/credit_fundraising_at_a_glance_-h2-2024.pd…
• H1 2025 — pwv13.live.multimediasolutions.com/media/inwlvamg/credit_fundraising_a…
• Ares Special Opportunities Fund III — businesswire.com/news/home/20260330751690/en/Ares-Raises-Over-9.8-Bill…
• Ares — businesswire.com/news/home/20200622005166/en/Ares-Management-Corporati…
• Bain Capital Special Situations — alternativeswatch.com/2024/11/18/bain-capital-closes-global-special-si…
• SVP Special Situations Fund VI — nj.gov/treasury/doinvest/pdf/AlternativeInvestments/PrivateEquity/Agen…
• Silver Point DOIP II — alternativeswatch.com/2024/09/16/silver-point-closes-opportunistic-cre…
• Private Equity Wire — privateequitywire.co.uk/svpglobal-closes-strategic-value-special-situa…
• Crypto Briefing — cryptobriefing.com/fitch-us-corporate-default-rates-july-2026/
• Webull — webull.com/news/15578827387765760
• IDN Financials — idnfinancials.com/news/62007/us-private-credit-default-hits-record-9-2…
• FI Desk — fi-desk.com/defaults-creep-higher-in-leveraged-credit-markets/

4. How it works: the instruments

• Hertz 8-K — sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1657853/000095010324008615/dp213147_ex9901…
• Proskauer — proskauer.com/alert/structured-preferred-equity-a-versatile-tool-in-th…
• Apollo — ir.apollo.com/sec-filings/content/0001858681-26-000036/agmearningsrele…
• HousingWire — housingwire.com/articles/uwm-preferreds-warrants-dilution
• UWM Holdings 424B5 — sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001783398/000162828026063816/uwmc-rights4…
• UWM Holdings press release, ex-99.2 — sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001783398/000178339826000114/ex992oaktree…
• Bloomberg via Advisor Perspectives — advisorperspectives.com/articles/2026/09/22/oaktrees-1-5-billion-deal-…
• QXO — s204.q4cdn.com/433193842/files/doc_news/2026/Jan/05/PDF-Final-QXO_-_Pr…
• Accuray SPA — sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001138723/000143774926024904/ex_995022.ht…
• New Fortress Energy — ir.newfortressenergy.com/node/10201/html
• Boston Fed — bostonfed.org/publications/current-policy-perspectives/2026/early-warn…
• ABF Journal — abfjournal.com/the-pik-divide-separating-structural-flexibility-from-s…
• IFR — ifre.com/ifr-awards/2332504/europe-high-yield-bond-verisure-holdcos-1b…
• Carvana 8-K — sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1690820/000169082023000243/cvna-20230801.h…
• IFR — ifre.com/ifr-awards/1443705/americas-restructuring-carvanas-us5.5bn-de…
• CNBC — cnbc.com/2023/07/19/carvana-deal-to-reduce-debt-shares-soar.html
• Wolfspeed 8-K — sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/895419/000119312525199310/d36059dex991.htm
• AMC (2024) — businesswire.com/news/home/20240722193675/en/
• AMC 8-K (2025) — sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001411579/000110465925064419/tm2519525d1_…
• Peloton pricing — investor.onepeloton.com/news-releases/news-release-details/peloton-int…
• Peloton completion — investor.onepeloton.com/news-releases/news-release-details/peloton-ann…
• IFR — ifre.com/equities/2338749/us-cbs-head-to-all-time-record-issuance-in-2…
• IREN 8-K — sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1878848/000114036125038083/ef20056955_ex99…
• Big Lots 8-K — sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/768835/000076883523000097/exhibit991-press…
• Covington — cov.com/-/media/files/corporate/publications/2025/06/third-annual-synt…
• Intel 10-K — sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/50863/000005086325000009/intc-20241228.htm
• Manufacturing Dive — manufacturingdive.com/news/intel-apollo-enter-joint-venture-at-leixlip…
• Jefferies — jefferies.com/insights/the-big-picture/2025-global-secondary-market-re…
• Jefferies — jefferies.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2026/07/Jefferies-Global-Seco…

5. Customers and demand drivers

• Octus — octus.com/resources/articles/spirit-airlines-wind-down-second-chapter-…
• ABF Journal — abfjournal.com/banks-and-private-credit-managers-are-building-an-origi…
• Bloomberg — bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-01-29/wells-fargo-centerbridge-ventur…
• Federal Reserve — federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20260916a.htm
• US Treasury — home.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-rates/Tex…
• KBRA via Alternative Credit Investor — alternativecreditinvestor.com/2026/09/07/non-accruals-rise-as-credit-s…
• S&P Global Ratings via Maalot — maalot.co.il/Publications/FTS20250903140619.pdf
• Bain — bain.com/about/media-center/press-releases/2026/private-equity-resurge…
• BIS — bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt2603v.htm
• CI GAM — cifinancial.com/ci-gam/ca/en/expert-insights/articles/private-credit-a…
• Alvarez & Marsal — alvarezandmarsal.com/sites/default/files/article/pdf/Debt%20Market%20U…

7. Liability management exercises

• Alston & Bird — alston.com/-/media/files/insights/publications/2021/09/trimark-client-…
• LSTA/LMA panel, Covenant Review data — events.lsta.org/app/uploads/2025/05/Liability-Management-Transactions-…
• Octus — octus.com/resources/articles/the-year-in-lmes/
• Reorg — reorg.com/articles/double-dips-vs-pari-plus/
• 9fin — 9fin.com/insights/h1-2026-lme-update
• Serta Simmons Bedding — sertasimmons.com/news/serta-simmons-bedding-enters-into-agreement-with…
• Reorg/Octus — reorg.com/global-liability-management-quarterly-altice-france-asset-dr…
• Morgan Lewis — morganlewis.com/de/pubs/2026/01/anthology-and-in-court-liability-manag…
• Cleary Gottlieb — clearygottlieb.com/-/media/files/alert-memos-2026/lme-litigation-revie…
• Ropes & Gray — ropesgray.com/-/media/files/events/2026/2026-credit-funds-forum-docs/2…
• Bloomberg Law — news.bloomberglaw.com/bankruptcy-law/distress-exchange-leads-to-re-def…
• Wellington — wellington.com/en-au/institutional/insights/the-impact-of-lmes
• Creditflux — newsletter.creditflux.com/distress-caused-by-lmes-triggers-headache-fo…
• HLC — hlc.com/en/publications/cooperation-agreements-under-fire-two-new-laws…
• Optimum 8-K — sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001702780/000121390026063161/ea029287101e…
• 9fin — 9fin.com/insights/us-covenant-trends-report-h1-26-leveraged-loans-HY-b…
• Octus — octus.com/resources/articles/the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly-of-j-crew-b…
• Proskauer — proskauer.com/pub/boardriders-minority-lenders-win-round-one

8. Chapter 11 and in-court tools

• Debtwire — ionanalytics.com/insights/debtwire/high-cost-dip-loans-and-unique-stru…
• Bondoro — app.bondoro.com/preview/cases/Spirit_Aviation_Holdings_Inc/dip-terms
• SFNet — sfnet.com/home/chapters/canada/news-detail/2026/04/06/saks-global-targ…
• Octus — octus.com/resources/articles/court-opinion-review-1025/
• HLC — hlc.com/en/publications/federal-court-limits-lme-tactic-in-chapter-11-…
• Octus — octus.com/resources/articles/robertshaw-credit-bid-sale-approved
• FTI Consulting — fticonsulting.com/-/media/files/insights/articles/2025/nov/professiona…
• Morris Nichols — morrisnichols.com/insights-one-day-restructuring-the-new-trend-of
• Squire Patton Boggs — squirepattonboggs.com/insights/publications/purdue-pharma-supreme-cour…
• Octus — octus.com/resources/blog/delaware-losing-its-grip-on-chapter-11/

9. Law, regulation and policy

• Paul Weiss — paulweiss.com/insights/client-memos/texas-bankruptcy-court-rules-on-li…
• Mayer Brown — mayerbrown.com/en/insights/publications/2026/01/the-state-of-play-on-u…
• 9fin — 9fin.com/insights/trinseo-lme-trial
• Reorg — reorg.com/trimark-settlement/
• HLC (Red River) — hlc.com/en/publications/johnson-johnsons-red-river-bankruptcy-strategy…
• Bloomberg Law — news.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberg-government-news/booming-texas-bankrupt…
• LSTA — lsta.org/content/optimum-communications-inc-v-apollo-capital-managemen…

10. The money

• Cliffwater for Rhode Island — data.treasury.ri.gov/dataset/222f11fc-2a13-4d61-9786-8873a4c509ce/reso…
• Cliffwater for Rhode Island — data.treasury.ri.gov/dataset/ce394e0f-d832-4903-b10c-c4e13e39d964/reso…
• Wikipedia — en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sixth_Street_Partners
• Jacksonville Police & Fire Pension Fund — jacksonville.gov/getattachment/Departments/Police-Fire-Pension-Fund/Fi…
• Cliffwater for Rhode Island (Antares) — data.treasury.ri.gov/dataset/6bb32e18-bae3-429d-b8e9-ddbdc7bc8309/reso…
• Buyouts — buyoutsinsider.com/apollos-hybrid-fund-focus-structured-equity-senior-…
• Oregon OPERF Opportunity Portfolio — oregon.gov/treasury/invested-for-oregon/Documents/Invested-for-OR-Perf…
• WSIB — sib.wa.gov/docs/reports/quarterly/ir123124.pdf
• Ares — sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001176948/000162828026051191/a2026q2-ex99…
• Brookfield Asset Management — bam.brookfield.com/sites/brookfield-bam-v2/files/BAM-IR-Master/Press-R…
• Houlihan Lokey — investors.hl.com/news/press-and-earnings-releases/news-details/2026/Ho…
• Bloomberg Law — news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/ftxs-950-million-bankruptcy-fees-amo…

11. Market structure and competition

• Alternative Credit Investor — alternativecreditinvestor.com/tag/oaktree-capital-management/

12. What goes wrong

• Norton Rose Fulbright — nortonrosefulbright.com/en/restructuring-touchpoint/blog/2024/01/engli…
• Judiciary UK — judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Saipem-and-others-v-Petrofac-p…
• BNN Bloomberg — bnnbloomberg.ca/business/company-news/2026/07/30/blue-owls-second-quar…
• Business Wire — secure.businesswire.com/news/home/20250928297847/en/First-Brands-Group…
• HSF Kramer — hsfkramer.com/insights/2026-07/asia-private-capital-quarterly-analysis…

13. The industry map and company profiles

• KKR — sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001404912/000140491226000022/q226earnings…
• Pulse 2.0 — pulse2.com/blackstones-aum-reach-record-1-35-trillion-in-second-quarte…
• Carlyle — sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001527166/000152716626000036/cg202606308-…
• Alternatives Watch — alternativeswatch.com/2026/08/04/tpg-q2-2026-earnings-327-billion-aum/
• Elliott — elliottmgmt.com/about-elliott/
• Express & Star — expressandstar.com/uk-news/thames-water-lenders-propose-new-rescue-dea…
• Cerberus — cerberus.com/
• Fortress — fortress.com/
• Centerbridge — centerbridge.com/
• CalPERS — calpers.ca.gov/investments/about-investment-office/investment-organiza…
• King Street — kingstreet.com/
• PJT Partners — ir.pjtpartners.com/news-events/press-releases/detail/110/pjt-partners-…
• Octus — octus.com/resources/league-tables/americas-restructuring-advisor-leagu…
• Kirkland (Debtwire) — kirkland.com/news/award/2026/01/debtwire
• Proskauer — proskauer.com/release/proskauer-advises-bausch-health-on-79-billion-re…

14. Case studies

• Arendt — arendt.com/news-insights/news/arendt-advises-an-ad-hoc-group-of-credit…
• SFNet — sfnet.com/home/chapters/canada/news-detail/2026/02/23/saks-global-rece…

15. Global notes

• A&O Shearman — aoshearman.com/en/insights/global-restructuring-outlook/dutch-restruct…
• Heuking — heuking.de/en/news-events/newsletter-articles/detail/the-success-of-th…
• Miller Thomson — millerthomson.com/en/insights/restructuring-and-insolvency/by-the-numb…
• HKEX — hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2024/0129/2024012900565.pdf
• DealStreetAsia — dealstreetasia.com/stories/s-korea-bankruptcy-court-homeplus-487785
• Insolvency Service — assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/684fe83a77c424182b0c4e52/FOI182…
• Express & Star — expressandstar.com/uk-news/thames-water-restructuring-approved-by-high…
• Thames Water — thameswater.co.uk/news/2026/mar/recapitalization-update-press-speculat…
• CreditSights — know.creditsights.com/insights/european-liability-management-2025-year…
• AFME — afme.eu/publications/data-research/european-high-yield-leveraged-loan-…
• Retail Insider — retail-insider.com/retail-insider/2026/03/hudsons-bay-collapse-one-yea…
• Bloomberg Law — news.bloomberglaw.com/bankruptcy-law/china-vanke-faces-next-test-as-de…

16. Trends and outlook

• Ropes & Gray — ropesgray.com/en/insights/alerts/2026/03/secondaries-q1-2026-update
• Bloomberg Government — news.bgov.com/bankruptcy-law/modest-default-rate-masks-shaky-credit-fo…

17. Tracking the industry

• ABF Journal — abfjournal.com/epiq-aacer-total-bankruptcy-filings-increase-8-y-y-in-a…

18. Signposts and calendar

• Federal Reserve FOMC calendar — federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomccalendars.htm
• Global Restructuring Review — globalrestructuringreview.com/article/thames-water-seeks-senior-credit…