ABF and FIG Primer
JZ

ABF & FIG Primer

Industry primer · Asset-based finance and the financial institutions sector · As of 4 Oct 2026 · Johnew Zhang

PrimerHow lending against pools of assets is structured, funded and priced, who provides it, and how banks, insurers, asset managers and specialty lenders fit together: market size, structures, asset classes, economics, regulation, failures and what to watch next.

Scope

Part A covers asset-based finance: lending secured by pools of consumer, commercial, hard and financial assets through warehouse facilities, forward flow, private securitizations, platform investments, significant risk transfer and fund finance, and how it relates to public securitization. Part B covers the financial institutions sector: banks, insurers, asset and alternative managers, specialty finance companies and business development companies, with their economics, regulation and links to private credit. Geography: the US and Europe.

As of: Oct 4, 2026

How to use it

The Overview tab is the short version and the vocabulary. Part A sizes ABF and explains its structures, asset classes, investors and managers (sections 3–8). Part B covers banks, insurers, asset managers and specialty finance (9–12). Economics & Regulation compares the money, competition and rules and lists what has gone wrong (13–16). Players & Outlook profiles the companies and sets out trends, indicators and dated signposts (17–20). Section links in Contents jump to the right tab.

Data. ABF has no single size estimate; manager, consultant and regulator figures are shown side by side with their definitions. Bank, insurer and system data come from the Fed, FDIC, EBA, ECB, NAIC, FSB and IMF, and company data from filings and releases, for the latest period available (mostly 2025 and Q2 2026). Amounts are in US$ unless noted (US$mm, US$bn, US$tn; € and £ as reported).

Note. Facts marked "secondary" come from trade press or blogs rather than official statistics, rating agencies, industry bodies or filings. Estimates from asset managers are labeled as coming from interested parties. Arithmetic marked "author's" is illustrative.

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Contents

23 sections across six tabs
1

The short version

Overview

Asset-based finance (ABF) lends against pools of assets, such as consumer loans, equipment, aircraft, data centers and royalties, and is supported "first by the contractual cash flows of a pool of assets owned by a limited-purpose borrower, and then by the liquidation value of those assets themselves" (Apollo, interested party). The financial institutions group (FIG) sector comprises the firms that originate, fund, hold and manage financial assets: banks, insurers, asset and alternative managers, specialty finance companies and business development companies (BDCs). The two now form one funding chain. Originators make the loans, banks finance them in warehouses, alternative managers buy the pools and insurers hold the investment-grade notes, so ABF is best read as a product that runs through every FIG balance sheet.

Exhibit 1 maps the four ABF collateral families and the four FIG groups that finance them.

Exhibit 1: The landscape at a glance — four collateral families, financed by four groups of institutions

SegmentWhat they doHow they earnScale (figure, period)Leading players
ABF: consumerFinance card, auto, personal, BNPL, student and second-lien loans through warehouses, forward flow and ABSLoan yields, often above 20% at origination for US/UK auto and card, less funding cost; sellers keep servicing feesUS consumer credit ~US$5.2tn outstanding (Jun 2026)Affirm, PayPal, Upstart, Pagaya (originators); KKR, Blue Owl, Sixth Street, Castlelake (buyers)
ABF: commercialFinance equipment, trade receivables and SME loansAsset yield over funding cost; equipment residual valueUS equipment finance ~US$1.4tn outstanding (Jun 2026)Banks; KKR (Akrapoint); First Citizens–Sixth Street, JPMorgan–Apollo, Goldman Sachs–Apollo partnerships
ABF: hard assetsFinance aircraft, data centers, fiber and GPUs against the asset and its lease or contractContracted lease cash flows plus residual valueData center ABS and CMBS US$61bn outstanding (2026)CoreWeave (borrower); Blackstone; Apollo (PK AirFinance); Carlyle Aviation, AerCap (issuers)
ABF: financial and esotericFinance royalties, litigation claims, insurance-linked assets and, at fund level, subscription and NAV linesContractual cash flows and a complexity premiumUS contractual cash-flow assets ~US$500bn (Jun 2026); fund finance ~US$1.5tn (Jun 2026)Blackstone (Recognition); Concord (issuer); banks in fund finance
BanksTake deposits and lend; finance nonbanks; buy SRT protection; sell loan booksNet interest margin plus feesUS net income US$90.1bn, ROA 1.37% (Q2 2026)JPMorgan, Citigroup, HSBC, BNP Paribas, Barclays, Goldman Sachs
InsurersWrite annuities and back them with long-dated investment-grade assets, increasingly private ABFSpread between portfolio yield and crediting rateUS cash and invested assets US$9.6tn (end-2025)Athene, Global Atlantic, Brookfield Wealth Solutions, Fortitude Re, Allianz
Asset and alternative managersRaise funds and insurance mandates; buy pools; own origination platformsManagement fees; spread earnings from owned insurersGlobal AuM US$147tn (end-2025)Blackstone, Apollo, KKR, Ares, Brookfield, Blue Owl; PIMCO, Castlelake, Värde in ABF
Specialty finance and BDCsNonbanks originate mortgages and consumer loans; BDCs lend to middle-market companiesOrigination and servicing fees; BDCs earn a levered spreadBDCs US$575bn across 179 funds (Q1 2026)Rocket, UWM, Affirm; BCRED, Ares Capital

Sources: PIMCO (interested party); AllianceBernstein (interested party); SFA; FFA; KBRA on FDIC; NAIC; BCG; LSTA; Equipment Finance News (secondary); players as profiled in sections 6, 8 and 17.

Seven things to know

  1. ABF is large by any definition, but the capital dedicated to it is small. KKR sizes the market at over US$6tn, rising to US$9tn by 2029 (KKR filing); Apollo uses US$20tn-plus on a broad definition (Apollo); PIMCO counts about US$25tn of US loans and contractual cash-flow assets but only roughly US$200bn of third-party, non-captive ABF AUM (PIMCO). All three raise ABF capital and are interested parties. Closed-end ABF fundraising reached US$27.1bn in 2025, 16.4% of closed-end private credit against 10.6% in 2024 (McKinsey). See sections 3 and 5.
  2. Private structures let originators and banks move loans and risk off their balance sheets. Originators fund new loans in a bank warehouse, then refinance through term ABS, forward flow or whole-loan sales; the largest disclosed forward flow lets KKR buy up to €65bn of PayPal's European BNPL receivables through Mar 2028 (PayPal). Banks keep loans but sell the junior risk through SRT: they securitized €378bn of loans and protected €30bn of tranches in 2025 (IACPM). See sections 4, 7.2 and 7.4.
  3. Banks finance the nonbanks that compete with them. US commercial bank loans to nondepository financial institutions reached US$2,066.8bn in the week to Sep 23, 2026, up 11.9% y/y (Fed H.8). The FDIC's call-report measure, a different definition, was US$1.4tn at end-2025 (FDIC), and bank credit commitments to nonbanks totaled US$2.6tn in Q4 2025 (Fed FSR). See sections 7.1 and 9.3.
  4. Life insurers are the anchor buyers. US insurers held US$9.6tn of cash and invested assets at end-2025 (NAIC), about 13% of it in private credit (NAIC). Record US retail annuity sales of US$464.1bn in 2025 keep liabilities growing (LIMRA). See sections 5 and 10.
  5. Alternative managers turn permanent capital into the sector's widest margins. The largest listed alternative managers report fee-related earnings margins of 42–70% (see section 11), against about 30% for asset managers overall on global AuM of US$147tn (BCG). Perpetual capital makes up 60% of Apollo's AUM (Apollo 8-K). See sections 11 and 13.
  6. The largest recent ABF losses involved collateral that was allegedly missing or pledged twice. First Brands carried debt of over US$11bn, including US$6.2bn on and US$4.6bn off balance sheet, and converted to Chapter 7 on Aug 24, 2026 (BRAKE Report; BRAKE Report, both secondary). Tricolor cost JPMorgan US$170mm, Fifth Third US$178mm and Barclays US$150mm (Banking Dive, secondary). See section 16.
  7. Stress is now showing in semi-liquid funds and corporate private credit. Blue Owl's OTIC received redemption requests for 40.7% of shares in Q1 2026 against a 5% cap (PitchBook). Fitch's US private credit default rate reached 6.3% in the twelve months to Aug 2026 (Benzinga via Webull, citing Fitch, secondary). See sections 12 and 16.

Policy is pulling in two directions: the US Basel III endgame re-proposal of Mar 19, 2026 would ease bank capital (Freshfields, secondary), while new NAIC charges on residual tranches tighten insurer capital (Sidley, secondary). Section 15 sets out the rules and section 20 the calendar.

Exhibit 2 collects the figures that recur most often; each is stated in full once in the body and labeled with its definition.

Exhibit 2: The numbers to remember

MetricValuePeriodSource
ABF market size, by definition>US$6tn, to US$9tn by 2029 (KKR); ~US$25tn US loans and contractual cash flows (PIMCO)Apr 2026; Jun 2026KKR; PIMCO (interested parties)
Third-party, non-captive ABF AUM~US$200bn (lower bound)Jun 2026PIMCO
Closed-end ABF fundraisingUS$27.1bn (16.4% of closed-end private credit)2025McKinsey
Largest ABF fundAres Pathfinder III, US$8.5bnJun 2026Ares
European ABF; nonbank share€4.2tn; 13% (US 34%)Feb 2026Oliver Wyman
Public securitization issuanceUS ABS ~US$339bn (secondary); Europe €252.3bn2025Valuation Research; AFME
US bank loans to nondepository financial institutionsUS$2,066.8bn (+11.9% y/y)Week to Sep 23, 2026Fed H.8
SRT loans securitized; tranches protected€378bn; €30bn2025IACPM
Fund finance market~US$1.5tn (range US$1.4–1.75tn)Jun 2026FFA
US bank net income; ROAUS$90.1bn; 1.37%Q2 2026FDIC via KBRA
EU/EEA bank CET1; ROE; NPL ratio16.1%; 11.3%; 1.8%Q2 2026EBA
US insurer cash and invested assets; private creditUS$9.6tn; ~US$1.2tn (~13%)End-2025NAIC; US$1.2tn via Insurance Business (secondary)
US retail annuity salesUS$464.1bn2025LIMRA
Global AuM; NBFI assetsUS$147tn; US$256.8tn (51% of global financial assets)End-2025; end-2024BCG; FSB
BDC universeUS$575bn across 179 fundsQ1 2026LSTA
US private credit default rate (TTM)6.3%Aug 2026Fitch (secondary)

Sources: KKR Asset-Based Finance Fund (SEC); PIMCO; McKinsey; Ares; Oliver Wyman; Valuation Research Corp (secondary); AFME; Federal Reserve H.8; IACPM; FFA; KBRA; EBA Risk Dashboard; NAIC asset mix; NAIC letter; Insurance Business citing NAIC (secondary); LIMRA; BCG; FSB; LSTA; Benzinga via Webull, citing Fitch (secondary).

2

Units and vocabulary

Overview

Money carries a currency prefix and a scale suffix: US$mm for millions, US$bn for billions and US$tn for trillions, with € and £ figures kept as reported. Spreads are in basis points (bps; 100bps = 1 percentage point), changes in rates are in percentage points (pp) and leverage is in multiples (x). "About" marks an approximation in prose and "~" in tables. Company figures are mostly Q2 2026.

Exhibit 3 defines the fourteen terms that recur most often, with a typical figure for each.

Exhibit 3: Fourteen terms carry most of the analysis in this primer

TermMeaningTypical figure or exampleSection
ABF vs ABL vs ABS vs specialty financeABF lends against asset pools; ABL is a corporate revolver against a company's receivables and inventory; ABS is the tradeable bond form of ABF; specialty finance is a fundraising category that includes ABFSpecialty finance closes US$47.4bn in 2025, of which ABF just under US$20bn (With Intelligence)3.1
Borrowing base and advance rateEligible collateral, net of exclusions and concentration limits, sets the base; the advance rate is the share the lender fundsOportun 95.0% (floor 92.0%); prime consumer ~75–85% (secondary)4.2
Overcollateralization and excess spreadCollateral in excess of the notes, and asset yield left after interest and fees; both absorb losses before noteholders doCard ABS excess spread ~10.0x charge-offs (Jun 2026)6.1, 7.3
Attachment and detachment pointsPool loss levels at which a tranche starts and stops absorbing lossesInsurer SRT protection 2.0% / 7.9% on average (2025, secondary)7.4
Warehouse vs term securitizationA revolving facility funds a growing pool; a term deal refinances the seasoned pool with rated bondsOportun warehouses revolve for 2–3 years; Pagaya >US$26bn of ABS issued by Feb 20254.2, 4.3
Forward flowA buyer commits to purchase new loans as they are originated; the seller usually keeps servicingKKR up to €65bn of PayPal BNPL receivables7.2
SRT (synthetic risk transfer)A bank keeps its loans but buys protection on a junior tranche to reduce risk-weighted assetsAverage capital relief 43bps of CET1 (BIS)4.5, 7.4
Subscription line vs NAV loanA sub line is secured on investors' uncalled commitments; a NAV loan on portfolio value~200bps vs 200–400bps; NAV loan-to-value generally ≤30% (FSB)7.5
Rated note feeder and CFOVehicles that turn fund interests into rated debt that insurers can holdKBRA rated US$9bn of feeders and US$16bn of CFOs by Sep 20257.5
Risk retentionThe sponsor's obligation to keep part of a securitization's credit riskA plain forward flow sale generally falls outside EU and UK rules unless leverage is added (Weil, secondary)7.2
NAIC designationThe credit grade that sets a US insurer's risk-based capital charge; NAIC 1–2 is investment grade~96% of PE-owned insurers' structured holdings at NAIC 1–2 (YE2024)7.3, 10.3
CET1 and RWACommon equity tier 1 capital divided by risk-weighted assetsEU/EEA CET1 16.1% (Q2 2026); US re-proposal cuts IG corporate risk weight from 100% to 65%9, 15
NIMNet interest income over earning assetsUS 3.31% (Q1 2026, secondary); euro area 1.54% (Q2 2026)9.2
Fee-related earnings (FRE)Manager earnings from management and other recurring fees, excluding performance fees and balance-sheet gainsKKR FRE margin 70% (LTM Q2 2026)11, 13

Sources: With Intelligence; Oportun 10-K; Axis Group Ventures (secondary); Capital Advisors Group; Finadium (secondary); Pagaya; PayPal; BIS; FSB; KBRA; Weil (secondary); NAIC; EBA; Federal Reserve, Bowman; Premier Insights (secondary); ECB Banking Supervision; KKR.

Rule of thumb (author's): treat any ABF size, nonbank share or bank-to-nonbank figure as unusable until its definition, date and source are stated; most apparent conflicts between sources in this primer are definitional, not errors.

3

ABF definition and size

Part A · ABF

Asset-based finance has no agreed boundary, so its reported size runs from US$5.5tn to about US$25tn depending on what each source counts. The figures below come mostly from managers raising ABF capital, who are interested parties; each estimate is labeled with its definition.

3.1 What counts

ABF lends against pools of assets, not against a company's enterprise value. Apollo defines it as lending "supported first by the contractual cash flows of a pool of assets owned by a limited-purpose borrower, and then by the liquidation value of those assets themselves" (Apollo). KKR groups the collateral into hard assets, financial assets and contractual cash flows such as leases and royalties (KKR). The pools are typically self-amortizing, with front-loaded principal and a 1–5 year average life (KKR).

Four neighboring terms overlap with ABF and are often confused with it:

  • Asset-based lending (ABL) is a narrower corporate product: borrowing-base revolvers secured by a company's receivables and inventory. One forecast cited by Proskauer sizes it at US$609.6bn in 2022, rising to US$1.5tn by 2032 (Proskauer, secondary).
  • Asset-backed securities (ABS) are the tradeable, bond-form subsector of ABF (Guggenheim). Private ABF finances the same collateral through bilateral loans, warehouses and unrated or privately rated notes.
  • Specialty finance is a fundraising category that includes ABF. With Intelligence counted US$47.4bn of specialty finance closes in 2025, of which ABF was just under US$20bn (With Intelligence).
  • Direct lending finances operating companies against their cash flow, usually with interest-only bullet loans. In an Apr 2025 document, Brookfield puts direct lending at about US$3tn with about 50% nonbank penetration, against an ABF market of US$7tn with about 5% (Brookfield). Its later Sep 2025 presentation, citing Oliver Wyman, uses a narrower US$5.5tn US universe excluding real estate (Exhibit 4).

3.2 Size estimates

The estimates cluster in two bands: about US$5–11tn for assets reachable by private capital, and US$20tn or more once residential mortgages and bank-held loans are included. PIMCO counts US$13tn of US residential mortgages alone, which explains most of the gap (PIMCO).

Exhibit 4: ABF size estimates differ about fivefold because the definitions differ

Source (interested party unless noted)Estimate (US$tn)DefinitionDate
Brookfield, citing Oliver Wyman5.5US ABF universe excluding real estateSep 2025
KKR (interval-fund filing)>6, to 9 by 2029Private credit backed by diversified pools of hard or financial assets; insights page gives ~9.2 by 2029Apr 2026
AllianceBernstein6.3Private ABF and nonbank lendingMar 2025
Blue Owl~11.2Addressable ABF marketSep 2025
Apollo20+Global; includes residential mortgage, consumer, CRE, hard and financial assetsDec 2022; restated Aug 2025
PIMCO>20ABF excluding CRE lendingApr 2025
PIMCO~25US loans plus contractual cash-flow assetsJun 2026
Guggenheim~25Total ABF, public and privateSep 2025

Sources: Brookfield ABF 101; KKR Asset-Based Finance Fund semi-annual report (SEC); KKR; AllianceBernstein; PitchBook on Blue Owl; Apollo; PIMCO (Apr 2025); PIMCO (Jun 2026); Guggenheim.

The capital actually dedicated to the strategy is far smaller than any of these totals. PIMCO puts third-party, non-captive ABF AUM at roughly US$200bn as a lower bound (PIMCO), while Blue Owl estimates US$450bn of dedicated manager AUM, about 4% penetration (PitchBook). In Europe, Oliver Wyman sizes ABF at €4.2tn, with nonbanks holding 13% against 34% in the US (Oliver Wyman). Larger "US$30tn" and "US$40tn" figures from Blackstone, McKinsey, Apollo and Moody's describe private credit as a whole, not ABF (Apollo; McKinsey).

3.3 Public securitization context

Public securitization is the exit and pricing benchmark for most private ABF, and US CLOs set an issuance record in 2025. Private lenders fund a pool until it is large and seasoned enough to sell as rated bonds, so public spreads cap what a warehouse lender can charge.

Exhibit 5: Public securitization issues hundreds of billions a year on each side of the Atlantic

Market2025 issuance (US$bn)2025 issuance (€bn)Note
US ABS~339–Secondary compiler; KBRA forecasts 385.2 for 2026, about 5% above KBRA's own 2025 base
US CLOs (new issue)~206–Record year; secondary compiler
European securitization (issued)–252.3+3.0% y/y
European securitization (placed)–156.362.0% of issuance; rest retained by originators
European CLOs (placed)–60.5Largest placed segment

Sources: Valuation Research Corp, secondary; KBRA; AFME FY 2025.

Public spreads were tight going into 2026: in Oct 2025, prime auto ABS priced at 75bps (AA) to 130bps (BBB) and card AAA at 32bps (IMF). Tight public spreads push investors seeking yield toward private, less liquid structures.

3.4 Where the sources disagree

Most disagreements trace to definitions rather than errors, but a few cannot be reconciled from public data. Exhibit 6 sets out the main conflicts a reader will meet.

Exhibit 6: Five headline ABF figures depend on which source is used

QuestionLow readingHigh readingWhy they differ
Market sizeUS$5.5tn (Brookfield/Oliver Wyman)~US$25tn (PIMCO, Guggenheim)Inclusion of residential mortgages and bank-held loans
Nonbank share, US~4% (Blue Owl); <5% (Brookfield, Sep 2025)34% (Oliver Wyman)Fund managers only vs all nonbanks, including insurers and finance companies
Dedicated ABF AUM~US$200bn (PIMCO)~US$450bn (Blue Owl)Third-party non-captive only vs all dedicated managers
2025 ABF fundraisingJust under US$20bn (With Intelligence)US$27.1bn (McKinsey)Fund classification; both miss insurer balance-sheet and SMA capital
2025 US ABS issuance~US$339bn (VRC, secondary)US$358bn to Oct 2025 alone (IMF)Sector inclusion (CLO, esoteric, 144A); not reconcilable from public data

Sources: as Exhibit 4; With Intelligence; McKinsey; IMF US ABS Monitor; PIMCO.

No regulator or rating agency publishes a loss series for private ABF, so performance claims rest on public ABS and CLO records used as proxies (Apollo).

4

How ABF works

Part A · ABF

An ABF transaction moves a pool of loans from an originator into a bankruptcy-remote vehicle, funds it with layered debt while it grows, and then refinances it through a bond sale or a sale to a long-term buyer. Each step has its own lenders, documents and failure points.

4.1 Originators and the assets

Originators supply the assets and usually keep the customer relationship. They include banks, captive finance arms, fintech lenders such as Affirm, Upstart, Pagaya and Oportun, and specialty finance companies. Fintechs fund themselves through several channels at once: Affirm had US$28.2bn of committed funding capacity across warehouses, securitizations and forward flow at Mar 31, 2026 (Affirm). Large managers increasingly own originators outright. KKR had 18 captive ABF platforms in Jul 2025 (KKR), and Apollo's 16 proprietary platforms originated US$127bn of its US$309bn 2025 origination (Apollo). Owning the platform gives the manager "repeatable origination it controls, rather than being subject to competitive auctions" (Covenant Lite, secondary).

4.2 Warehouse funding

A warehouse is a revolving loan to a special-purpose vehicle, sized by a borrowing base of eligible assets. The borrower is "typically a special-purpose vehicle" isolated from its parent's credit (Mayer Brown, secondary). Lenders advance a percentage of eligible collateral, cap concentrations by borrower, geography, product or vintage, and exclude assets that fail eligibility tests (Axis Group Ventures, secondary).

Filed terms show the range. Oportun's four personal-loan warehouses total US$1.14bn, with a 95.0% advance rate (floor 92.0%), pricing of Term SOFR plus 2.56–3.18% and two- to three-year revolving periods (Oportun 10-K). ACV Auctions' US$125.0mm floorplan warehouse prices at Term SOFR plus 0.11448% plus 3.00%, with step-ups after an early amortization event (ACV 10-K). Market commentary puts prime consumer advance rates at 75–85% and pricing at SOFR plus 350–500bps for fintechs with 12–18 months' history (Axis Group Ventures, secondary). The FSB reports about 225bps for borrowing-base facilities and collateralized ABF leverage of up to 65% loan-to-value (FSB). No citable source publishes separate senior and mezzanine warehouse spreads.

Rule of thumb (author's): the advance rate sets the first-loss check. At an 85% senior advance, each US$100 of loans needs US$15 from a mezzanine lender or the originator (author's arithmetic).

Banks remain the main warehouse lenders. US commercial bank loans to nondepository financial institutions reached US$2,066.8bn in the week to Sep 23, 2026, up 11.9% y/y, on the Fed's weekly H.8 measure (Federal Reserve H.8). The FDIC's call-report measure, a different definition, was US$1.4tn at end-2025, or 5.6% of industry assets; its 35.2% rise in 2025 partly reflects reclassification (FDIC). Section 7.1 covers these series in depth.

Exhibit 7: A warehouse funds the pool in layers until a takeout refinances it

Servicer Usually the originator; collects controlled account; back-up servicer ready Originator Bank, fintech, captive or specialty lender keeps the customer SPV (bankruptcy-remote) Borrowing base = eligible receivables × advance rate − reserves Concentration limits by borrower, geography, product and vintage Triggers: early amortization, cash trap Capital stack Senior warehouse Banks; nonbank warehouses Advance ~75–85% (prime consumer) Filed example: SOFR + 2.56–3.18% Mezzanine ABF funds; pricing rarely public Equity / first loss Originator residual Cash waterfall 1. Servicing, trustee, admin fees 2. Senior interest 3. Mezzanine interest 4. Borrowing-base cure 5. Mezzanine principal 6. Residual to equity On a trigger breach, all cash goes to senior until repaid Term ABS Rated public or 144A bonds proceeds repay the warehouse Forward flow buyer Buys new loans as made largest: up to €65bn (KKR) sells funds collections cash paid out in order takeout sells new loans directly

Sources: Oportun 10-K; FSB; Axis Group Ventures, secondary; Weil, secondary. Payment order is illustrative.

4.3 Takeout: securitization, forward flow and whole-loan sales

The warehouse is temporary; three takeouts refinance it.

  • Term securitization sells the seasoned pool as rated bonds and repays the warehouse. Pagaya, for example, had issued over US$26bn of ABS by Feb 2025 (Pagaya).
  • Forward flow commits a buyer to purchase new loans as they are originated, usually with the seller keeping servicing. Purchase prices can include deferred consideration, sellers must repurchase ineligible assets and buyers often require minimum volumes (Weil, secondary). The largest disclosed agreement lets KKR buy up to €65bn of PayPal's European buy-now-pay-later receivables through Mar 2028 (PayPal). Pricing is rarely disclosed.
  • Whole-loan sales move an existing book in one trade. KKR agreed to acquire £5.2bn of NewDay card receivables in Sep 2025 (CVC), and HSBC sold an A$36bn Australian loan book to Blackstone in Jul 2026 (FinanceAsia, secondary).

4.4 Servicing, data and controls

The servicer collects the cash, so servicer integrity and data quality determine whether the collateral exists. Back-up servicers come in three grades: cold (monthly data, several weeks to take over), warm (about 30 days) and hot (parallel running with daily reconciliation), with fees such as US$3,000 a month on one 2025 deal (Academy Securities, secondary). The Tricolor and First Brands failures in 2025 involved collateral allegedly pledged to more than one lender (Willkie, secondary); section 16 covers both. The lender response has been granular collateral schedules, updated lien searches, controlled collection accounts, independent receivable verification and a rule against the company acting as sole servicer (Willkie, secondary).

4.5 Bank capital tools: SRT

In a significant risk transfer, a bank keeps its loans but sells the junior risk to investors in exchange for capital relief. Banks securitized €378bn of loans and protected €30bn of tranches in 2025 (IACPM). The Basel Committee counts about €750bn of protected assets, or 1.1% of bank assets, across Canada, the euro area, the UK and the US (BCBS). Relief is modest per deal, averaging 43bps of CET1 (BIS). Section 7.4 covers investors and regulation.

4.6 Fund-level finance

Fund finance lends to the funds themselves, adding a second layer of leverage above the asset-level structures. The Fund Finance Association estimates the market at about US$1.5tn (range US$1.4–1.75tn), with subscription lines alone at least US$1.1tn (FFA). Subscription lines are secured on investors' uncalled commitments; NAV facilities are secured on portfolio value, at loan-to-values "generally limited to 30%" (FSB). Rated note feeders and collateralized fund obligations turn fund interests into rated debt that insurers can hold; section 7.5 covers them.

Exhibit 8: The six structures differ mainly in who holds first loss and for how long

StructureWhat is financedFirst loss held byTypical tenorPricing (where sourced)Main providers
WarehouseGrowing loan pool in an SPVOriginator, then mezzanine lender2–3 year revolving periodSOFR + 256–318bps (Oportun, filed); ~225bps (FSB)Banks; ABF funds for mezzanine
Forward flowNew originations bought as madeBuyer, net of deferred price and repurchases15 months to ~3 yearsNot disclosedABF managers, pensions
Private securitizationSeasoned pool as private or privately rated notesResidual holder1–5 year average life300–450bps unlevered (PIMCO, interested)Insurers, ABF funds
Platform equityOwnership of the originatorManager as ownerOpen-endedNot disclosedKKR, Apollo, Blue Owl
SRTJunior tranche of a bank loan poolProtection sellerNot sourcedMezzanine 383–886bps (IMF)Credit funds, SRT specialists, insurers
Sub lines and NAVFund commitments or portfolio valueFund investorsSub lines revolving; NAV term~200bps sub; 200–400bps NAV (FSB)Banks; insurers entering

Sources: Oportun 10-K; FSB; Fortress; Affirm; KKR; PIMCO; IMF WP/25/200; Gibson Dunn, secondary.

The table shows the trade-off at the center of ABF: the longer an investor holds the first loss, the more its return depends on the originator's underwriting rather than on structural protection.

5

Investors and demand drivers

Part A · ABF

Insurers are the anchor buyers of ABF, with pensions, sovereign funds, banks and retail vehicles filling specific layers. They buy for spread, amortization and diversification, and bank retrenchment and regulation keep supplying assets.

Insurers want long-dated investment-grade yield to match annuity liabilities. US insurers held US$9.6tn of cash and invested assets at end-2025 (NAIC), of which about 13% was private credit (NAIC). Privately placed ABS rose from 9.8% to 14.3% of life insurers' private placements between 2017 and 2024, and private-equity-owned insurers held over 40% of financial and ABS private placements in 2024 (Chicago Fed). Record US retail annuity sales of US$464.1bn in 2025 kept the liability side growing (LIMRA).

Closed-end funds are a smaller but faster-growing channel. Closed-end ABF fundraising reached US$27.1bn in 2025, 16.4% of closed-end private credit against 10.6% in 2024 (McKinsey). The largest fund, Ares Pathfinder III, closed at US$8.5bn in Jun 2026 (Ares).

Exhibit 9: Each investor type fills a different layer of the ABF capital stack

InvestorTypical positionScale indicatorMain motive
Private-equity-affiliated insurersIG private ABS, senior and mezzanine notesABS and structured securities 31% of bonds vs 13% industry (NAIC, YE2024)Spread over public IG to fund annuity crediting rates
Traditional insurersPrivate placements, rated notes; unfunded SRT protection€4.7bn SRT tranches protected in 2025 (IACPM via Finadium, secondary)Capital-efficient yield
Pensions and sovereign fundsFund LP stakes; direct forward flowExamples: ADIA, Mubadala (see section 17)Diversification, amortizing cash yield
BanksSenior warehouse lender; loan seller; SRT issuerCredit commitments to nonbanks US$2.6tn (Fed, Q4 2025)Senior spread at lower capital charges
Credit funds and SRT specialistsMezzanine, residual, SRT junior tranchesMulti-strategy managers and specialized SRT funds >70% of SRT investors (IACPM)Mid-single-digit to mid-teens target IRRs (KKR)
Wealth and retail vehiclesInterval funds and ELTIFs holding diversified ABFUS interval funds US$126.4bn, all strategies, late 2025 (secondary)Income and access to private credit

Sources: NAIC; Finadium, secondary; Affirm release (reprint); Fed Financial Stability Report; IACPM; KKR; Squire Patton Boggs, secondary.

Investors cite three reasons for buying, all argued mainly by managers:

  • Spread premium. PIMCO models a private-over-public premium of 240bps for ABF against 70bps for direct lending, and expected five-year returns of 9.4% against 8.5% (PIMCO, interested party).
  • Amortization. Principal returns monthly from thousands of obligors rather than at a single bullet maturity (KKR).
  • Diversification, with limits. PIMCO's own data show ABF correlation to high-yield factors of 0.59, rising to 0.83 in stress (PIMCO).

Three forces keep supplying assets. Bank retrenchment leaves room for nonbanks, especially in Europe, where their share of ABF is 13% against 34% in the US (see section 3.2). Regulation shapes the pace: banks have cut high-capital-charge loans in response to "stricter regulations, changes in loan accounting, and a rapid rise in interest rates" (PIMCO), but the US Basel III endgame re-proposal of Mar 19, 2026 would modestly lower system capital (Freshfields, secondary), which could slow the transfer. Rates cut both ways: the rapid rise PIMCO cites pushed banks away from some lending, while tight public spreads (see section 3.3) narrow the premium over public alternatives. Section 15 covers the regulatory calendar.

6

Asset classes

Part A · ABF

ABF collateral falls into four families, and their credit behavior differs far more than their legal structures do. KKR groups ABF into hard assets, financial assets and contractual cash flows such as leases and royalties (KKR, interested party). Its retail ABF interval fund shows a typical diversified mix: hard assets 24%, consumer and residential 23%, contractual cash flows 21%, commercial finance 14% and non-core holdings 11% at Apr 30, 2026 (KKR ABF Fund N-CSRS). By outstanding US balances, residential mortgages (US$13tn) and consumer credit (about US$5.2tn) dwarf equipment finance (US$1.4tn) and contractual cash-flow assets (about US$500bn) (PIMCO, interested party). Exhibit 10 summarizes the main asset classes, and Exhibit 11 tracks how they are performing.

6.1 Consumer

Consumer credit is the deepest ABF pool and the best measured. US household debt reached US$18.77tn in Q2 2026, with card balances up US$21bn (1.7%) in the quarter and card delinquency transitions "largely steady" (NY Fed).

  • Credit cards: bank-dominated, with improving losses. The bank card charge-off rate fell to 3.82% in Q2 2026 from 4.19% a year earlier (Federal Reserve via FRED). Card ABS trusts are stronger still: excess spread covered charge-offs about 10.0x in Jun 2026, against 2.0–3.0x before 2008, and monthly payment rates ran at about 38–42% (Capital Advisors Group, citing trust disclosures).
  • Auto: prime is stable and non-prime is deteriorating. US vehicle ABS issuance hit a record US$165bn in 2025, and captive finance arms issued about half of it (Inside Mortgage Finance). KBRA's July 2026 indices put prime annualized net losses at 0.66%, unchanged year on year, and non-prime at 9.46%, up 61bps (KBRA). The Tricolor collapse, now the subject of fraud charges (see section 16), hit this segment.
  • Unsecured personal loans: fintech-originated and fast-growing. Unsecured consumer loan ABS issuance rose 54% to US$25.6bn in 2025, and Fitch estimates fintechs originate about half of US personal loans (Asset Securitization Report, secondary). Warehouse lenders typically advance 75–85% against prime consumer installment loans, and some structures go to 90% or more at higher pricing (Axis Group Ventures, secondary).
  • BNPL: funded mainly by forward flow. PayPal, Affirm and Klarna sell receivables to private buyers while keeping the customer and the servicing (see section 7.2).
  • Private student loans: a new forward-flow market. KKR's ABF funds agreed in Nov 2025 to buy a seed portfolio plus at least US$2bn a year of new Sallie Mae loans for an initial three years, with Sallie Mae retaining servicing (Sallie Mae release).
  • Residential: second liens are scaling. Second-lien RMBS (HELOCs and closed-end seconds) reached US$30bn in 2025, and SFA expects about US$40bn in 2026; securitized delinquencies run at about 1.0% for closed-end seconds and about 1.5% for HELOCs (SFA). Home equity investments are smaller: the three largest providers originated about 54,000 agreements in 2015–2025, and at least ten states have acted on the product (HousingWire, secondary).
  • Residential solar: the clearest consumer stress. Sunnova and Solar Mosaic both filed for Chapter 11 in Jun 2025 (Solar Builder, secondary). KBRA's solar loan index showed annualized net losses of 3.93% in Mar 2026, up 132bps year on year (KBRA).

6.2 Commercial and SME

Commercial ABF is less transparent than consumer ABF, and its largest recent loss involved alleged receivables fraud. Equipment finance is the measured segment: ELFA reported Jul 2026 new business volume of US$14.3bn, up 47.3% year on year, with 30-day-plus delinquencies of 1.8% and charge-offs of 0.46% (ELFA). KKR launched the Akrapoint equipment finance platform with a US$350mm commitment in Sep 2026 (Alternative Credit Investor, secondary). Trade and supply chain receivables carry different risks, because a lender depends on invoices it cannot easily verify. First Brands showed how that fails (see section 16). No reliable volume or loss series was found for small business loans, merchant cash advances or fleet lending.

6.3 Hard assets

Hard-asset ABF is growing fastest where digital infrastructure needs capital. Lenders finance the asset and its lease or contract, so residual value and counterparty strength drive losses.

  • Aviation. Aircraft ABS issuance topped US$10bn in 2025, up 85% and the strongest year since 2019; Griffin Global Asset Management priced the largest aircraft ABS on record at US$1.245bn (Maples Group, secondary). Forecasts for 2026 range from US$10bn to US$15bn (GlobalCapital, secondary).
  • Data centers and fiber. Data center ABS and CMBS outstanding grew from US$4bn in 2020 to US$61bn in 2026, and SFA cites projections of US$180bn by 2028 (SFA). The same note puts data center capex through 2028 at US$2.9tn, of which US$1.5tn needs external financing, so securitization can fund only a slice (SFA). KBRA has rated more than US$14bn of fiber ABS from 11 issuers since 2020 without a downgrade (KBRA).
  • GPUs. CoreWeave closed an US$8.5bn non-recourse facility in Mar 2026, the first investment-grade GPU-backed financing, rated A3 by Moody's and priced at SOFR+225bps floating; Blackstone Credit & Insurance anchored it (CoreWeave). Its collateral pairs the GPUs with a contract from an unnamed "leading AI enterprise" (CoreWeave).

6.4 Financial and esoteric assets

Esoteric assets offer diversification, but each market is small and concentrated among a few issuers.

  • Music royalties. KBRA has rated US$12.9bn of music royalty bonds since 2020 and expects issuance to fall about 25% to US$2.5bn in 2026 as catalogs consolidate (Music Business Worldwide, secondary).
  • Litigation finance. US commercial funders committed US$2.8bn in 2025, up 23%, across 39 active funders (Risk & Insurance, secondary, citing Westfleet).
  • Insurance-linked assets. Reinsurance sidecar capital reached a record US$23bn at end-Jun 2026 (Artemis, secondary, citing Aon Securities). Conning projects life settlement volume of about US$4.6bn a year through 2034 (Conning).

Exhibit 10: Consumer assets are the largest pools, while digital infrastructure is the fastest-growing

Asset classUS scale marker (US$bn)Typical private structurePublic ABS spread, Oct 17, 2025 (bps)Performance markerRepresentative issuers and capital providers
Credit cards1,250 balances (Q1 2026)Bank master trusts; forward flow for UK cards32 (AAA)Bank charge-offs 3.82% (Q2 2026)Banks; KKR (NewDay)
Auto, prime and non-prime165 ABS issued (2025)Warehouse to public ABS75 (prime AA); 180 (subprime BBB)ANL 0.66% prime; 9.46% non-prime (Jul 2026)Captives; banks; KKR and PIMCO (Harley-Davidson)
Unsecured personal25.6 ABS issued (2025)Warehouse at ~75–85% advance; forward flown/aIndex losses −36bps y/y (May 2026)Castlelake; Fortress; Blue Owl
BNPL~7 largest US flow (PayPal)Forward flow; seller servicesn/an/aKKR; Blue Owl; Sixth Street
Residential second lien30 RMBS issued (2025)Warehouse to RMBSn/aDQ ~1.0% CES; ~1.5% HELOCn/a
Private student≥2 a year (Sallie Mae flow)Forward flown/an/aKKR
Equipment14.3 new business (Jul 2026)Bank and platform balance sheets; ABSn/aCharge-offs 0.46%Banks; KKR (Akrapoint)
Aviation>10 ABS issued (2025)Lease ABS; master trustsn/an/aCarlyle Aviation, AerCap (issuers); Apollo (PK AirFinance)
Data centers and fiber61 ABS/CMBS outstanding (2026)Term ABS and CMBS145 (A)No fiber downgrades since 2020n/a
GPU-backed8.5 largest facility (CoreWeave)Non-recourse delayed-draw term loann/aA3 rated (Mar 2026)Blackstone; Magnetar; PIMCO; Blue Owl
Royalties and litigation3.3 music ABS; 2.8 litigation commitments (2025)Rated ABS; fund equityn/an/aBlackstone (Recognition); Concord (issuer)

Sources: Capital Advisors Group (card balances, citing WSJ, secondary); Federal Reserve via FRED; IMF GMM US ABS Monitor (spreads); Inside Mortgage Finance; KBRA auto; KBRA marketplace loans; ASR (secondary); Axis Group Ventures (advance rates, secondary); PayPal; SFA second liens; Sallie Mae; ELFA; Maples Group (secondary); SFA data centers; KBRA fiber; CoreWeave; Music Business Worldwide (secondary); Risk & Insurance (secondary); PitchBook (Harley-Davidson). Scale markers mix balances, issuance and single deals and are not comparable across rows. ANL = annualized net loss; DQ = delinquency; CES = closed-end second.

Exhibit 11 shows the split that matters for underwriting in 2026: prime collateral is stable or improving, while non-prime auto and residential solar are getting worse.

Exhibit 11: Prime consumer and equipment credit is stable, while non-prime auto and solar loans are deteriorating

AssetIndicatorLatest (%)Change y/y (bps)Date
Bank credit cardsCharge-off rate (SA)3.82−37Q2 2026
Bank consumer loansCharge-off rate (SA)2.66−21Q2 2026
Bank card ABS trustsAnnualized charge-offs1.24–2.28n/aJun 30, 2026
Prime auto ABSAnnualized net loss (KBRA)0.660Jul 2026
Non-prime auto ABSAnnualized net loss (KBRA)9.46+61Jul 2026
Subprime auto ABS60+ day delinquency (Fitch)6.74+59Dec 2025
Solar loan ABSAnnualized net loss (KBRA)3.93+132Mar 2026
Marketplace consumer loan ABSAnnualized net loss (KBRA)n/a−36May 2026
Equipment financeCharge-offs (ELFA)0.46n/aJul 2026
Second-lien RMBSDelinquency, CES / HELOC~1.0 / ~1.5n/aSep 2026

Sources: Federal Reserve via FRED; Capital Advisors Group (trust data); KBRA auto; Auto Remarketing and Auto Finance News (both secondary, citing Fitch); KBRA solar; KBRA marketplace loans (level paywalled); ELFA; SFA. Card and consumer changes are author's arithmetic from the year-earlier rates (4.19% and 2.87%). KBRA and Fitch use different index constructions.

7

Structures in depth

Part A · ABF

Section 4 described how each ABF structure works; this section sets out how large each one is, what it costs and where regulators are focusing. Banks remain the senior lenders behind most nonbank ABF, forward flow has become the main funding route for fintech consumer lenders and insurer rating rules shape which structures get built.

7.1 Warehouses and bank lending to nonbanks

Bank lending to nonbanks exceeds US$2tn on the broadest measure, and the credit intermediaries that originate ABF collateral take more than half of it. Three official series measure it differently:

  • Fed H.8: loans to nondepository financial institutions of US$2,066.8bn in the week to Sep 23, 2026, up 11.9% year on year (Federal Reserve H.8).
  • FDIC call reports: US$1.4tn at end-2025, or 5.6% of industry assets, up 35.2% in 2025, partly because of reclassification (FDIC Risk Review 2026).
  • Fed Financial Stability Report: US$2.6tn of bank credit commitments to nonbank financial institutions in Q4 2025, drawn and undrawn (Fed FSR).

A separate FDIC analysis gives the composition, so its shares should not be read against the end-2025 headline. Mortgage credit intermediaries took 24.5% of loans to nondepository financial institutions (NDFIs) at Q3 2025, business credit intermediaries 24.6%, private equity funds 24.0% and consumer credit intermediaries 8.1%; banks with more than US$100bn of assets held about 86% (FDIC).

Filed warehouse terms show tight senior pricing and high advance rates for proven originators. Oportun's four personal loan warehouses total US$1.14bn of capacity at a 95.0% advance rate, priced at Term SOFR+256–318bps with two- to three-year revolving periods (Oportun 10-K via edgar.tools). ACV Auctions' US$125.0mm auto floorplan warehouse pays Term SOFR plus a 0.11448% adjustment plus 3.00%, and its rate can step up after an early amortization event (ACV 10-K). Newer fintech originators pay more: SOFR plus 350–500bps for fintechs with 12–18 months' history, and first-time facilities price higher (Axis Group Ventures, secondary). The FSB puts borrowing-base fund financing at about 225bps (FSB). No citable market-wide data separates senior and mezzanine warehouse pricing.

7.2 Forward flow

Forward flow lets originators grow without holding loans, and the largest single commitment reaches €65bn. The buyer commits to purchase eligible loans as they are made; the seller usually keeps underwriting and servicing, must repurchase ineligible assets and may receive deferred consideration tied to performance (Weil, secondary). A plain forward flow sale generally falls outside the EU and UK Securitisation Regulations, but leverage on the purchased pool can bring it into scope (Weil, secondary). Affirm shows the result at scale: US$28.2bn of committed funding capacity across warehouses, securitizations and forward flow at Mar 31, 2026, with funding costs equal to 1.0% of GMV (Affirm).

Exhibit 12 lists the largest disclosed agreements; BNPL and fintech personal loans dominate, and terms cluster at two to three years.

Exhibit 12: BNPL and fintech personal loans dominate disclosed forward flow agreements

SellerBuyerAssetCommitment (bn)TermAnnounced
PayPalKKREuropean BNPLUp to €65Through Mar 2028Nov 2025
PayPalBlue Owl fundsUS BNPL ("Pay in 4")~US$72 yearsSep 2025
AffirmSixth StreetBNPL (AssetCo structure)Up to US$43 yearsDec 2024
UpstartCastlelakePersonal, auto, HELOCUS$4Up to 24 monthsJul 2026
PagayaBlue Owl fundsConsumer loansUp to US$2.424 monthsFeb 2025
Sallie MaeKKRPrivate student loans≥US$2 a year3 years initialNov 2025
UpstartFortressPersonal loansUS$1.2515 monthsApr 2026

Sources: PayPal (KKR); PayPal (Blue Owl); Affirm (Sixth Street); Upstart (Castlelake); Pagaya; Sallie Mae; Fortress (interested party). The PayPal–KKR figure is a cumulative purchase ceiling with a €6bn replenishing commitment, not capital outstanding.

7.3 Private ratings and NAIC

Insurers buy much of private ABF in rated form, so NAIC rules on private ratings and capital charges shape structuring. The NAIC told Senator Warren in Sep 2026 that private credit is about 13% of insurer invested assets, with newer forms below 6%, and that private letter ratings are "a meaningful but limited portion" (NAIC). Critics focus on rating quality. Fitch found that 106 of 109 privately rated private credit securities (97%) in 2023 received a higher rating from a rating agency than from the NAIC's Securities Valuation Office (SVO) (Capstone, secondary, citing Fitch). The NAIC says it is "not aware of any material instance" of misclassification (NAIC).

Four rule changes are in motion:

  • Bond definition. The principles-based bond definition took effect on Jan 1, 2025, and Item 2025-29 proposes treating rated notes issued by feeder funds as ABS rather than issuer obligations (Mayer Brown, secondary).
  • Disclosure. From Dec 31, 2026, Item 2025-19 requires insurers to quantify private placements supported only by private letter ratings (FactSet).
  • Capital charges. Collateral loan residual tranches will carry risk-based capital charges scaled by overcollateralization, from 45% below 111% to 22.5% at 200% or more, effective year-end 2027; the 45% charge on CLO residual tranches stays (Sidley, secondary).
  • Rating agency oversight. The NAIC exposed a credit rating provider due diligence framework on May 4, 2026 and is revising it (NAIC).

The stakes are concentrated. The FSB notes that PE-backed insurers control nearly US$900bn of liabilities and have about 27% of their holdings in structured securities, against about 12% at other large insurers (FSB). This FSB measure uses a different source, basis (holdings) and peer group from the NAIC figure used elsewhere in this primer: ABS and other structured securities at 31% of PE-owned insurers' bonds against 13% for the industry at YE2024 (see section 10.3).

7.4 Significant risk transfer

SRT has become a mainstream bank capital tool, led by Europe and growing in the US. Volumes depend on the measure, as Exhibit 13 shows, but every source records strong growth. Issuing banks gained an average of 43bps of CET1 (BIS). The Philadelphia Fed's worked example shows why: protecting 12.5% of an auto loan pool cuts the senior tranche to a 20% risk weight and lifts return on risk-adjusted capital from 6% to 24% (Philadelphia Fed).

Exhibit 13: SRT volumes vary by source, but all show rapid growth concentrated in Europe

MeasureScopeFigurePeriodSource
Loans securitized / tranches protectedGlobal bank survey€378bn / €30bn2025IACPM
Outstanding loans / tranchesGlobal bank survey€905bn / €80bnEnd-2025IACPM
Synthetic securitization issuanceEuro-area significant institutions€258bn (+47%)2025ECB
Protected assetsCanada, euro area, US, UK~€750bn (1.1% of bank assets)Feb 2026BCBS
Outstanding SRTUSUS$170bnQ4 2024Philadelphia Fed
Unfunded insurer protectionInsurer survey€4.7bn (+74%)2025IACPM via Finadium
Implied mezzanine spreadCorporate / SME / HVCRE383bps / 413bps / 886bps2024–2025IMF

Sources: IACPM; ECB; BCBS; Philadelphia Fed; Finadium (secondary, citing IACPM); IMF WP/25/200. Scopes differ and the rows should not be added together.

A few investors dominate the buy side. Multi-strategy managers and specialized SRT funds make up more than 70% of investors (IACPM), and the top 10 hold over 75% of outstanding exposure (IMF). Insurers writing unfunded protection attached on average at 2.0% and detached at 7.9% in 2025 (Finadium, secondary). Repo haircuts of 40–60% with daily margining cap leverage across the SRT market at about €10bn (BIS).

Supervisors are easing approvals while studying the risks. The Fed's Sep 28, 2023 FAQ opened a case-by-case path for directly issued credit-linked notes (IMF). The ECB launched a fast track in Jan 2026 that cuts approval to two weeks, though only two banks used it in Jan–Apr 2026 (ECB). The Basel Committee's Feb 2026 report flags capital relief without real risk transfer and bank financing of protection sellers (Jones Day, secondary). EU securitisation reform, including the SRT test, goes to a trilogue on Oct 21, 2026 (see section 15) (Agence Europe, secondary).

7.5 Fund finance and rated feeders

Fund finance is about a US$1.5tn market dominated by bank subscription lines, with NAV loans and rated structures growing fastest. The Fund Finance Association's first survey puts subscription lines alone at US$1.1tn or more and the total at about US$1.5tn, within a US$1.4–1.75tn range; large banks account for about US$800bn of commitments (FFA). Bank loans to private equity funds reached US$308.9bn at Q3 2025 (FDIC).

  • Pricing rises with risk. The FSB puts subscription lines at about 200bps and NAV facilities at 200–400bps (FSB).
  • NAV loans stay modestly levered. Loan-to-value ratios are "generally limited to 30%" (FSB). Oaktree and 17Capital forecast NAV deployment of US$70bn in 2025 and US$145bn in 2030 (Oaktree, interested party).
  • Rated feeders and CFOs package fund exposure for insurers. KBRA rated US$9bn of rated note feeders and US$16bn of collateralized fund obligations by Sep 2025, each above any prior full year, with no downgrades in 2025 (KBRA). Full-year KBRA-rated CFOs reached a record US$26.2bn (Gibson Dunn, secondary, citing KBRA).
8

ABF managers, bank partnerships and insurers

Part A · ABF

A small group of large alternative managers dominates private ABF, and most of them pair third-party funds with an affiliated or partnered insurance balance sheet. Banks have moved from competitors to partners: they source assets, provide senior leverage and sell loan books to the same managers. The three groups now form one funding chain, which is why the FIG sections that follow (sections 9–12) keep returning to ABF.

8.1 The manager landscape

Disclosed ABF AUM is concentrated in a few platforms, and no two firms define it the same way. KKR reports US$91bn of asset-based finance within US$331bn of Credit & Liquid Strategies AUM at Q2 2026 (KKR Q2 2026 earnings release). Ares reports about US$57.3bn of ABF AUM at Mar 31, 2026 (Ares release). PIMCO cites more than US$560bn "under management" in private ABF and structured credit, a figure that includes public structured credit (PIMCO, interested party). Blackstone, Apollo, HPS, Carlyle and Sixth Street disclose no discrete ABF AUM (Blackstone 2Q26 release; Carlyle Q2 2026 release). Exhibit 14 therefore shows each manager's closest disclosed measure, not a league table.

Exhibit 14: The largest ABF platforms sit inside insurance-linked alternative managers

ManagerClosest disclosed measureUS$bnAs ofRecent ABF vehicle or dealInsurance link
KKRABF AUM91Q2 2026ABF Partners II, 6.5 total (Jul 2025)Global Atlantic (owned)
AresABF AUM~57.3Mar 2026Pathfinder III, 8.5 (Jun 2026)Aspida (affiliated)
Apollo / ATLAS SPATLAS SP commitments under management~40Jun 2023FTAI Strategic Capital warehouse, 2.0 (Aug 2026)Athene (owned)
Brookfield / OaktreeBrookfield ABF platform60+Oct 2026Oaktree ABF Fund I, 2.0 (Oct 2026)Brookfield Wealth Solutions
BlackstoneInfrastructure and asset-based credit inflows in quarter9.9Q2 2026HSBC Australia loan book (Jul 2026)40 insurance clients (SMAs)
Blue Owl (Atalaya)Alternative Credit AUM14.6Q2 2026Asset Special Opportunities IX, ~2.9 (Mar 2026)None disclosed
CastlelakeFirm AUM~25Mar 2025Pagaya forward flow up to 1.0 (Aug 2024)None disclosed
VärdeFirm AUM16Oct 202513 deployed in ABF since 2008None disclosed
WaterfallFirm AUM12.1Mar 2026Whole loans and structured credit, 60+ sectorsNone disclosed

Sources: KKR Q2 2026 release; KKR via Nasdaq; Ares; Ares Q2 2026 presentation; Apollo (Jun 2023); ATLAS SP; Oaktree; Blackstone 2Q26 release; FinanceAsia (secondary); Blue Owl 8-K via StockTitan; Blue Owl; Castlelake; Pagaya; Värde; Waterfall (interested party). Measures are not comparable across rows; ATLAS SP figure is the latest disclosed (2023).

Scale comes from origination platforms, not only from funds. KKR counted 18 captive ABF platforms when it closed ABF Partners II in Jul 2025 (KKR via Nasdaq). Apollo originated US$127bn across 16 proprietary platforms in 2025, out of total origination of US$309bn (Apollo investor presentation, interested party). ATLAS SP, built from the former Credit Suisse securitized products group in Feb 2023, gives Apollo its own warehouse and structured credit lender (ATLAS SP).

Fund sizes are rising, and newer entrants are arriving through debut funds and acquisitions. Ares Pathfinder III closed at US$8.5bn of LP commitments on Jun 9, 2026, the largest ABF closed-end fund (see section 5 for fundraising totals) (Ares). Oaktree closed its first ABF fund at US$2bn on Oct 1, 2026 (Oaktree). Blue Owl agreed to buy Atalaya, which had over US$10bn of AUM at Jun 30, 2024, for US$450mm plus up to US$350mm of earnout in a deal announced on Jul 16, 2024 (Blue Owl). In Europe, Pollen Street closed Private Credit Fund IV at £2.5bn in Apr 2026 and reported AUM of £8.5bn (DirectorsTalk, secondary).

Rule of thumb (author's): before comparing two managers' ABF AUM, check whether the figure includes affiliated insurance assets, public structured credit or undrawn commitments; each can inflate the headline.

8.2 Bank–private credit partnerships

Banks increasingly originate and syndicate while managers supply the capital. The FSB describes such partnerships as "increasingly common" and estimates that about half of companies borrowing from private credit funds also bank with banks (FSB). The deals fall into three types: origination programs, financing collaborations and outright portfolio sales (Exhibit 15).

Exhibit 15: Banks now source, finance and sell assets to private capital rather than only compete with it

BankCounterpartyTypeSize (currency as reported)Date
CitiApollo (with Athene, Mubadala)Direct lending program, North AmericaUS$25bnSep 2024
CitiHPS (BlackRock)Private capital program, EMEA€15bnMay 2026
Société GénéraleBrookfieldPrivate debt fund€10bnSep 2023
BNP ParibasATLAS SP (Apollo)IG asset-backed financing and securitizationUS$5bn day-oneSep 2024
Wells FargoCenterbridge (Overland Advantage)Middle-market lending; bank is minority owner>US$7bn deployedJan 2026
HSBCBlackstoneSale of Australian home and personal loansA$36bnJul 2026
NewDay (Cinven, CVC)KKRUK card receivables plus forward flow£5.2bnSep 2025
Atlantic Union BankBlackstoneCRE loan sale~US$2bnJun 2025

Sources: Apollo; ABF Journal (secondary); Citi–HPS release via Yahoo Finance; Société Générale; BNP Paribas; FinanceAsia (secondary); CVC; Atlantic Union Bank. NewDay is a nonbank lender, included as a portfolio sale to private capital.

Each side brings what the other lacks. Banks keep client relationships, fee income and syndication flow without holding the full loan; Citi sources and HPS provides the capital in their EMEA program (Citi–HPS release via Yahoo Finance). Managers gain origination they could not build alone. Some banks lend directly instead: JPMorgan set aside US$50bn of its own balance sheet for direct lending, with nearly US$15bn more from co-lenders (ABF Journal, secondary). Equipment finance shows the same pattern, with First Citizens–Sixth Street, JPMorgan–Apollo and Goldman Sachs–Apollo partnerships all announced in 2025 (Equipment Finance News, secondary).

Loan book sales are getting larger. Blackstone described the HSBC Australian purchase as "the largest home loan portfolio transaction globally" (FinanceAsia, secondary); other reports sized the same deal at US$25bn, a currency and scope difference (SCMP, secondary). KKR and PIMCO jointly bought over US$5bn of Harley-Davidson retail loan receivables in Jul 2025 (PitchBook).

Direct bank exposure to private credit funds is small relative to bank balance sheets. The FSB puts it at about US$220bn of drawn and undrawn lines on member data and US$270–500bn on commercial data, less than 0.5% of bank assets (FSB). US bank commitments to private credit vehicles rose from about US$8bn in Q1 2013 to about US$95bn in Q4 2024 (Fed FEDS Note). The broader bank lending to nonbank lenders is far larger (see section 9.3).

8.3 The insurer–alternative manager model

Insurance liabilities give managers long-dated capital, and managers give insurers spread from private origination. The FSB estimates that PE-backed insurers control nearly US$900bn of insurance liabilities, up from US$67bn in 2012 (FSB). The NAIC counted 137 PE-owned US insurers at YE2024 with US$704.3bn of cash and invested assets, 7.8% of the industry (NAIC). Section 10 covers the regulatory debate; this section covers how the model works.

Three ownership forms coexist.

  • Owned insurer. Apollo owns Athene, which had US$314bn of net invested assets and a net spread of 1.14% at Q2 2026 (Apollo 8-K via StockTitan). KKR owns Global Atlantic, with US$220bn of AUM, of which US$164bn is credit (KKR Q2 2026 release). Brookfield Wealth Solutions held total assets of US$205.7bn after completing its acquisition of UK pension-risk insurer Just Group (Brookfield Wealth Solutions Q2 2026 release).
  • Minority stake plus advisory mandate. Carlyle cut its Fortitude Re stake to about 10.5% in 2022; the advisory agreement was expected to add US$50bn of fee-earning AUM and US$50mm of annual fee-related earnings (Carlyle).
  • Third-party mandates. Blackstone manages US$290bn of insurance AUM, up 15% y/y, for 40 insurance clients (Blackstone Q2 2026 call, via Investing.com). Insurance SMAs supplied US$7.5bn of its US$9.9bn infrastructure and asset-based credit inflows in Q2 2026 (Blackstone 2Q26 release).

The balance sheets tilt toward structured and asset-backed credit. Athene held 14% of net invested assets in ABS, 14% in residential mortgage loans, 12% in commercial mortgage loans and 7% in CLOs at Jun 30, 2026 (Athene investor presentation, interested party). Across PE-owned insurers, ABS and other structured securities made up 31% of bonds, against 13% for all insurers, with about 96% rated NAIC 1–2 (NAIC).

The spread advantage is the economic engine. Athene says about US$25bn of its Q2 2026 deployment was investment grade credit directly originated by Apollo, at about 190bps over comparably rated public corporates (Athene investor presentation, interested party). Brookfield Wealth Solutions deployed over US$5bn into Brookfield-originated strategies at a target yield of about 7% (Brookfield Wealth Solutions). The manager earns fees on the assets, the insurer earns the spread over its annuity crediting rate, and the capital rarely leaves: perpetual capital is 60% of Apollo's total AUM (Apollo 8-K via StockTitan). Bermuda anchors the model offshore: KBRA says it regulates about one-third of global asset-intensive reinsurance and holds more than 80% of offshore-reinsured US life and annuity liabilities (Royal Gazette on KBRA, secondary).

9

Banks

Part B · FIG

Banks on both sides of the Atlantic are earning strong returns on solid capital, yet they keep ceding direct corporate and consumer lending to nonbanks and refinancing those nonbanks instead. US banks earn wider margins, while European banks hold more capital and run on thinner margins. The link to ABF runs mainly through warehouse, fund finance and other loans to nondepository financial institutions.

9.1 Fundamentals

US bank profits rose sharply in Q2 2026. FDIC-insured institutions earned US$90.1bn, up 28.7% y/y, for an ROA of 1.37% (KBRA on FDIC QBP). Loans grew 6.8% y/y to US$13.9tn (Premier Insights, secondary). The five largest banks earned a combined US$49bn, up 39% (Quartz, secondary). JPMorgan alone reported US$21.2bn of net income (US$16.9bn excluding significant items) and a 29% ROTCE on US$5.0tn of total assets (JPMorgan 8-K).

The 2022–23 rate shock still sits on US balance sheets. Unrealized securities losses were US$326.7bn at Q2 2026, including US$216.9bn on held-to-maturity securities (Premier Insights, secondary). The Deposit Insurance Fund reached US$161.1bn, a reserve ratio of 1.48% (KBRA).

European banks earn lower returns on higher capital. EU/EEA banks reported CET1 of 16.1%, ROE of 11.3% and an NPL ratio of 1.8% in Q2 2026 (EBA Risk Dashboard). Euro area significant institutions earned an annualised ROE of 10.73% with a NIM of 1.54% (ECB Banking Supervision). Among the largest names, HSBC earned US$19.5bn of H1 2026 pre-tax profit with an 18.2% RoTE and 14.1% CET1 (HSBC).

Exhibit 16: US banks earn wider margins; European banks hold more capital

MetricUS, FDIC-insuredEU/EEA (EBA)Euro area significant institutions (ECB)
Net income, Q2 2026 (US$bn)90.1n/an/a
ROA (%)1.370.79n/a
ROE (%)n/a11.310.73
Net interest margin (%)3.31 (Q1 2026)n/a1.54
Cost-to-income (%)n/a51.553.06
Capital ratio (%)13.75 (Tier 1)16.1 (CET1)16.00 (CET1)
Leverage ratio (%)8.985.8n/a
NPL ratio (%)n/a1.82.17

Sources: KBRA on FDIC QBP; Premier Insights and Premier Insights Q1 (secondary; US NIM, Tier 1, leverage); EBA Risk Dashboard Q2 2026; ECB Banking Supervision. Q2 2026 unless noted. US capital and leverage measures differ from Basel CET1 and leverage definitions; EBA figures are from the EBA Risk Dashboard; the ECB column is the cleaner benchmark; n/a = not found.

9.2 Economics: margin, fees and capital

Net interest income drives both systems, but US margins are about twice European ones (author's arithmetic). US banks' NIM was 3.31% in Q1 2026, after an 8bps decline (Premier Insights, secondary), against 1.54% for euro area significant institutions (see Exhibit 16). European banks compensate with cost discipline and fee growth; BNP Paribas grew H1 2026 revenue 10.2% and pre-tax profit 21.3% (TAB Insights, secondary). Partnerships with private credit (section 8.2) let banks earn origination and syndication fees without a full capital charge.

Capital rules decide which assets banks keep. The US Basel III endgame re-proposal of Mar 19, 2026 carries an estimated −4.8% change in CET1 requirements for Category I–II banks (Freshfields, secondary); section 15 covers the detail. It would cut the risk weight on investment grade corporate exposures from 100% to 65% (Fed, Bowman speech). The 2026 Fed stress test projected US$708bn of losses and a 1.6pp aggregate CET1 decline across 32 banks (Federal Reserve). Banks' share of US corporate lending fell from 48% in 2015 to 29% in 2025 (Fed, Bowman speech), and senior lending to nonbanks plus SRT (section 7.4) lets them keep exposure at lower capital cost.

9.3 Lending to nonbanks

Loans to nondepository financial institutions (NDFIs) are growing faster than bank lending overall. Commercial banks held US$2,066.8bn in the week to Sep 23, 2026, up 11.9% y/y (Fed H.8), against 6.8% growth in total loans (see section 9.1). The FDIC call report measure, defined differently, was US$1.4tn at end-2025, 5.6% of industry assets, up 35.2% in the year partly because of reclassification (FDIC Risk Review 2026). Section 7.1 compares the measures; the bank-side view adds three points.

  • Exposure is concentrated in the largest banks. Banks with more than US$100bn of assets held about 86% of NDFI loans at Q3 2025, and ten institutions about 71% (FDIC). At banks above US$250bn, NDFI loans were 15.6% of total loans, against 1.2% in 2010 (PYMNTS on FDIC, secondary).
  • The borrowers are mostly other lenders. Business credit intermediaries took 24.6% of NDFI loans at Q3 2025, mortgage intermediaries 24.5%, private equity funds 24.0% and consumer credit intermediaries 8.1% (FDIC). Much of this is the warehouse and fund finance described in section 4.
  • Undrawn commitments add a contingent layer. The Fed puts bank credit commitments to nonbank financial institutions at US$2.6tn in Q4 2025, with PE, BDC and private credit borrowers about 25% of the total (Fed Financial Stability Report).

Regulators see the lending as safer than direct exposure but harder to monitor. Senior, over-collateralized loans to a nonbank should lose less than the underlying assets, yet the FDIC warns that in a downturn "NDFIs may need to sell assets, causing downward pressure on asset values" (PYMNTS on FDIC, secondary). Fed Vice Chair for Supervision Bowman called the reporting codes "too broad" to separate hedge funds, PE funds, private credit funds, BDCs and SPEs (Fed). The largest recent losses involved alleged collateral fraud: Tricolor cost JPMorgan US$170mm, Fifth Third US$178mm and Barclays US$150mm in Q3 2025 (Banking Dive, secondary; see section 16). Euro area banks' direct private credit exposure is smaller, at €62.5bn or 0.2% of assets (Insurance Journal on ECB, secondary).

10

Insurers

Part B · FIG

Life insurers have become the largest structural buyers of private credit and ABF, because record annuity sales give them long-dated liabilities that they back with private, often asset-backed, investment-grade paper. US insurers held US$9.6tn of cash and invested assets at end-2025, up 6.7% (NAIC). Life companies held US$6.1tn of that total and property and casualty (P&C) companies US$3.1tn (NAIC).

10.1 Balance sheets and the shift to private assets

Bonds still dominate, but a growing share is private. Bonds made up 59.8% of US insurer assets at end-2025, the first reading below 60%, while Schedule BA assets (the bucket for funds and other alternatives) rose 10.5% to US$639bn (NAIC). Privately placed securities were 48.4% of life-industry bonds, against 37.4% five years earlier (Insurance Business, secondary, reporting NAIC).

Private credit exposure depends on the definition. The NAIC puts insurer private credit at about US$1.2tn, about 13% of cash and invested assets and about 21% of bonds, a broad measure that includes traditional private placements (Insurance Business, secondary). Moody's counts US$807bn of "private and illiquid holdings" for the same date (Insurance Business, secondary). The NAIC told Congress that less than 6% sits in newer structures and that life insurers hold more than US$500bn of traditional private placements (NAIC letter to Sen. Warren). The FSB estimates that life insurers allocate about 10% of portfolios to private credit, against about 3% for non-life insurers (FSB).

10.2 Annuities drive the demand

US retail annuity sales reached a record US$464.1bn in 2025, up 7%, the fourth straight record year (LIMRA). Spread products led: fixed-rate deferred annuities sold US$165.3bn, fixed indexed annuities a record US$127.9bn and registered index-linked annuities a record US$79.5bn, up 20% (LIMRA). Each fixed annuity sold creates a liability that earns the insurer the gap between its portfolio yield and the rate credited to the policyholder, so private assets that add yield at the same rating widen that spread. Athene, for example, reported a net spread of 1.14% in Q2 2026 (Apollo 8-K). The Fed counts US$531bn of life insurer nontraditional liabilities at Q4 2025, up 15% in real terms, and describes life insurer leverage as "well into the upper quartile" of its history (Fed FSR; Fed FSR).

10.3 PE- and manager-affiliated insurers

Alternative managers own or advise a large and fast-growing slice of the life industry. ALIRT counts 93 privately owned, largely PE-linked life insurers with about US$1.2tn of assets, 19.8% of the US life industry, against 16 companies and US$85bn (2.5%) in 2011 (ALIRT via Insurance Business, secondary). The NAIC's narrower PE-owned group held US$704.3bn (7.8% of the industry) at end-2024 (NAIC). The FSB puts liabilities at PE-backed insurers at nearly US$900bn, against US$67bn in 2012 (FSB).

These insurers tilt toward structured credit. ABS and other structured securities made up 31% of PE-owned insurers' bonds, against 13% for the industry, with about 96% rated NAIC 1–2 (NAIC). PE- and manager-led life insurers hold 50% of the industry's affiliated fixed-income investments and 95% of its affiliated ABS (Retirement Income Journal, secondary, reporting NAIC). Athene shows the model at work: about US$25bn of its Q2 2026 deployment was investment-grade credit originated by Apollo at about 190bps over comparably rated public corporates, and 98% of its US$230bn of available-for-sale securities carry NAIC 1 or 2 designations (Athene, interested party). Section 8 covers how managers build these links.

10.4 Bermuda and Europe

Bermuda is the main offshore home for US annuity risk. Bermuda's long-term reinsurance industry held US$1.52tn of assets (Insurance Business, secondary, citing BMA data). KBRA estimates that Bermuda regulates about one-third of global asset-intensive reinsurance and holds more than 80% of offshore-reinsured US life and annuity liabilities (Royal Gazette on KBRA, secondary). The Bermuda Monetary Authority reported a median solvency ratio of 259% for long-term reinsurers at end-2023 and says 77% of their assets are investment grade or higher (BMA). US Treasury and the NAIC are now scrutinizing offshore reinsurance and private letter ratings (see section 15).

European insurers hold far less private credit, and Solvency II is easing securitisation charges. Euro area insurers held €211bn of private credit, 2.3% of assets (ECB via Insurance Journal, secondary). The revised Solvency II framework applies from Jan 30, 2027 and aligns capital factors for senior STS securitisation tranches with covered bonds, with lower factors for non-STS senior and non-senior tranches (European Commission). Allianz, the largest European insurer, reported a Solvency II ratio of 225% at Jun 30, 2026 (Allianz).

Exhibit 17: US life insurers fund private credit growth, and affiliated insurers lean hardest into structured assets

MeasureFigurePeriodSource
US insurer cash and invested assets (US$tn)9.6End-2025NAIC
US insurer private credit, broad (US$tn)~1.2 (~13% of assets)End-2025NAIC via Insurance Business (secondary)
Private placements, share of life bonds (%)48.4 (37.4 five years earlier)End-2025NAIC (secondary)
US retail annuity sales (US$bn)464.12025LIMRA
Privately owned life insurers, assets (US$tn)~1.2 (19.8% of life industry)2025ALIRT (secondary)
Structured securities, share of bonds: PE-owned vs industry (%)31 vs 13End-2024NAIC
Bermuda long-term reinsurance assets (US$tn)1.52Sep 2025BMA data (secondary)
Euro area insurer private credit (€bn)211 (2.3% of assets)May 2026 (ECB analysis)ECB (secondary)
Revised Solvency II appliesJan 30, 2027—European Commission

Sources: NAIC asset mix YE2025; Insurance Business (secondary); LIMRA; ALIRT via Insurance Business (secondary); NAIC PE-owned report; Insurance Business (secondary); Insurance Journal (secondary); European Commission.

The ALIRT and NAIC ownership figures use different perimeters, so the two should not be compared directly; the coincidence of the ALIRT asset figure and the NAIC private credit figure, both about US$1.2tn, is not a link between them.

11

Asset and alternative managers

Part B · FIG

Alternative managers are taking a rising share of asset management economics because credit, insurance capital and the wealth channel give them permanent, fee-paying assets that traditional managers lack. Global assets under management (AuM) reached US$147tn at end-2025, but about 80% of the industry's 2025 revenue growth came from market performance and margins sat at about 30% (BCG). By contrast, the largest listed alternative managers report fee-related earnings (FRE) margins of 42–70% (Exhibit 18).

11.1 Scale, credit and permanent capital

Credit is now the largest engine for the biggest managers. Apollo reported US$1.05tn of AUM at Jun 30, 2026, of which US$849bn was credit, and Q2 origination of US$74bn (Apollo 8-K). Its LTM origination was nearly US$320bn, and about 75% of Q2 debt origination was investment grade (Apollo Q2 call). Blackstone's Credit & Insurance segment held US$469.3bn of its US$1,346.3bn total (Blackstone). KKR's US$331bn of credit AUM includes US$91bn of ABF (KKR).

Exhibit 18: The largest alternative managers pair credit scale with insurance balance sheets and high FRE margins

ManagerAUM (US$bn)Credit AUM (US$bn)Q2 2026 FRE (US$mm)FRE margin (%)Insurance link
Blackstone1,346.3469.3 (credit and insurance)~1,800n.d.US$290bn insurance AUM, 40 clients
Apollo1,047849785n.d.Athene, US$314bn net invested assets
Brookfield>1,000n.d.808n.d.Brookfield Wealth Solutions, ~US$206bn assets
KKR796331 (incl. 91 ABF)~1,20070 (LTM)Global Atlantic, US$220bn AUM
Ares671.3440.5491.142.2Aspida (within US$10.8bn other)
Carlyle48521135847Fortitude Re adviser
Blue Owl319.0158.1392.258.5—

Sources: company Q2 2026 releases and filings: Blackstone, Blackstone call; Apollo 8-K; Brookfield Asset Management, Brookfield Wealth Solutions; KKR; Ares; Carlyle; Blue Owl 8-K. Jun 30, 2026. n.d. = not disclosed in sources used. Credit definitions differ by firm. Apollo's FRE margin is not shown because it could not be confirmed from the primary release. Blackstone does not report an FRE margin.

Permanent capital makes fees more durable. Perpetual capital is 60% of Apollo's AUM and 70% of its fee-generating AUM (Apollo 8-K). Blue Owl draws 85% of its FRE management fees from permanent capital (Blue Owl 8-K), and Ares's perpetual capital grew 34% to US$223.3bn (Ares). Insurance balance sheets add a second earnings stream: Apollo reported spread-related earnings (SRE) of US$877mm from Athene alongside FRE of US$785mm (Apollo 8-K).

Embedded growth is visible. KKR holds US$72bn of committed capital that is not yet paying fees, at a weighted average fee rate of about 90bps (KKR). Apollo targets FRE of about US$5.0bn by 2029, from US$2.5bn in 2025 (Apollo investor presentation, interested party).

11.2 The wealth channel

Individual investors are the newest source of permanent capital, and the first to test its liquidity. Blackstone's BCRED, a perpetual non-traded BDC, held US$94.6bn and its private equity vehicle BXPE US$25.3bn at Jun 30, 2026 (Blackstone). US interval funds reached US$126.4bn by late 2025, nearly double three years earlier (Morningstar/PitchBook via Squire Patton Boggs, secondary). The IMF estimates that semi-liquid vehicles hold about one-fifth of direct-lending loans (IMF). Retirement plans could be next: an executive order of Aug 7, 2025 led to a Department of Labor proposed rule on Mar 30, 2026 that offers a process-based safe harbor for alternatives in 401(k) plans, which remains a proposal (Kirkland & Ellis, secondary). In Europe, Apollo launched three evergreen ELTIFs under ELTIF 2.0 in Sep 2025 (Apollo).

Redemptions now constrain the channel. BCRED's Q2 2026 repurchase requests exceeded its 5% limit, about 50% were met, and the fund had net outflows of US$1.2bn (Blackstone Q2 call). Section 12 sets out the wider BDC picture.

11.3 Consolidation

Traditional managers are buying private credit capability rather than building it. BlackRock now owns HPS, which managed US$381bn at Mar 31, 2026 (Citi–HPS release). Blue Owl agreed to buy Atalaya in a deal announced on Jul 16, 2024, for US$450mm plus an earnout of up to US$350mm (Blue Owl), and Brookfield, which owns Oaktree, describes an ABF platform of more than US$60bn (Oaktree). Section 8 covers ABF-specific manager scale.

12

Specialty finance, BDCs and nonbanks

Part B · FIG

Nonbanks now hold half of global financial assets and originate most US mortgages and many consumer loans, but they fund themselves largely with bank lines, securitization and, for BDCs, retail capital that is proving less patient than expected. The FSB measures nonbank financial intermediation (NBFI) at US$256.8tn at end-2024, 51% of global financial assets, growing 9.4% against 4.7% for banks (FSB). Its narrow measure, which counts only activities that may create bank-like risks, was US$76.3tn (FSB). Private credit is a small part of either total at US$1.5–2tn (end-2024 data, FSB May 2026 report), and the FSB warns of "severe limitations in the availability of data" (FSB; FSB).

12.1 Nonbank lenders

Nonbanks lead in mortgages and unsecured consumer credit. Nonbanks produced 65.6% of US residential mortgages in 2025, and the top five lenders held 21.5% of originations (Inside Mortgage Finance). Rocket (429,332 loans) and UWM (422,120) led 2025 HMDA loan counts, with JPMorgan fifth (HousingWire, secondary). Fitch estimates that fintechs originated about half of US unsecured personal loans in 2025, against 21% for banks (Asset Securitization Report, secondary). Nonbank shares in auto and other consumer lending were not found in the sources used.

Their funding is the ABF market. Specialty lenders finance originations through bank warehouses, then sell loans through securitization and forward flow (see section 4). Affirm, for example, had US$28.2bn of committed funding capacity across these channels at Mar 31, 2026 (Affirm). Banks direct about 57% of their loans to nondepository institutions toward credit intermediaries such as mortgage, business and consumer lenders (FDIC via PYMNTS, secondary); section 7 sets out total bank lending to nonbanks. The FDIC warns that in a downturn these borrowers "may need to sell assets, causing downward pressure on asset values" (FDIC via PYMNTS, secondary).

12.2 BDCs

Perpetual non-traded BDCs now hold most BDC assets. The BDC universe reached US$575bn across 179 funds in Q1 2026 (LSTA). Perpetual-life BDCs held US$309.5bn in 53 funds, public BDCs US$176bn and other non-traded and private BDCs US$89bn (LSTA). Perpetual-life funds are 30% of the universe by count but about 54% by assets (author's arithmetic). The Fed puts perpetual-life BDCs at US$306bn gross and US$161bn net assets, and with interval funds at US$425bn gross, at Q4 2025 (Fed FSR).

Credit quality is softening from a low base. The weighted average BDC non-accrual rate rose to 1.99% in Q1 2026, from 1.42% in Q4 2025 and 1.36% a year earlier, with average leverage of 0.92x (LSTA). PIK income fell to 4.33% of new originations from 6.11% the prior quarter (LSTA). Ares Capital, the largest listed BDC, reported a US$29,349mm portfolio across 619 companies, non-accruals of 2.4% at cost and 1.4% at fair value and debt-to-equity of 1.15x at Jun 30, 2026 (Ares Capital). Across private credit more broadly, Fitch's trailing default rate reached a record 6.3% in Aug 2026, and PIK or interest deferrals made up 47% of default events (Benzinga via Webull citing Fitch, secondary).

12.3 Redemption pressure in non-traded BDCs

Non-traded BDCs offer quarterly liquidity against illiquid loans, and in 2026 investors asked for more than the funds would pay. Nine perpetual BDCs tracked by JPMorgan received US$13.4bn of redemption requests in Q1 2026 and met US$7.8bn, after requests of US$7.2bn the prior quarter (LSTA). Blue Owl's technology-focused OTIC received requests equal to 40.7% of shares in Q1 2026 and 38.1% in Q2 against a 5% cap, while its larger OCIC fund received 21.9% and 18.8% (PitchBook; Reuters via WMBD, secondary). Requests at the largest non-traded BDC managers ran at 9–17% in Q2 2026 (Reuters via WMBD, secondary). The IMF notes that "rising borrower stress and growing retail exposure could test semiliquid structures" (IMF). iCapital, an interested party, estimates that requests at two to four times the limit could keep funds oversubscribed for three to five quarters (iCapital). Section 16 treats the episode alongside other liquidity failures.

Exhibit 19: Nonbanks are large and growing, while BDC credit and liquidity metrics are weakening

MeasureFigurePeriodSource
Global NBFI assets, broad (US$tn)256.8 (51% of global financial assets)End-2024FSB
Global NBFI, narrow measure (US$tn)76.3End-2024FSB
Global private credit (US$tn)1.5–2End-2024FSB, May 2026 report
Nonbank share of US mortgage originations (%)65.62025Inside Mortgage Finance
Fintech share of US unsecured personal loans (%)~502025Fitch est. (secondary)
BDC universe (US$bn; funds)575; 179Q1 2026LSTA
Perpetual-life BDCs (US$bn)309.5Q1 2026LSTA
BDC non-accruals, weighted average (%)1.99 (1.36 a year earlier)Q1 2026LSTA
BDC average leverage (x)0.92Q1 2026LSTA
Nine perpetual BDCs: requested vs met (US$bn)13.4 vs 7.8Q1 2026LSTA
Blue Owl OTIC redemption requests vs cap (%)40.7 vs 5Q1 2026PitchBook
US private credit default rate, TTM (%)6.3Aug 2026Fitch (secondary)

Sources: FSB NBFI monitoring report; FSB private credit report; Inside Mortgage Finance; Asset Securitization Report (secondary); LSTA; PitchBook; Benzinga via Webull (secondary).

The Fitch default rate includes PIK and deferral events, which make up almost half of its count, so it measures something different from BDC non-accrual rates and the two should not be compared directly.

13

The money

Economics & Regulation

Returns rise with proximity to the first loss and to the origination franchise. Senior lenders earn a few hundred bps over SOFR, SRT investors target returns from mid-single digits to mid-teens (KKR, see Exhibit 20), and alternative managers turn fees on permanent capital into the highest margins in the sector. Banks earn the lowest return on assets but apply the most leverage.

13.1 Economics by layer of an ABF capital stack

The originator earns the gross asset yield and passes most of it up the stack. US and UK auto and card loans often price "above 20%" at origination (AllianceBernstein, interested party). Senior warehouse lenders take the safest slice at the thinnest spread: Oportun's warehouse trusts advance 95% at Term SOFR + 2.56% to + 3.18% (Oportun 10-K). Private ABF captures a premium over the public takeout market, with PIMCO putting unlevered private deal spreads at 300–450bps, about 240bps over public ABS (PIMCO, interested party). Section 4 covers the mechanics and section 7 the structures.

Exhibit 20: Spreads widen and loss exposure rises down the stack; first-loss capital targets mid-to-high teens

LayerTypical holderPricing or target return (as reported)Loss or protection marker
Asset at originationOriginatorUS/UK auto and card loans "often above 20%"; average card APR 21% (mid-2026)Card ABS trust charge-offs 1.24–2.28% at major bank trusts, 4.17% at Synchrony (Jun 30, 2026)
Senior warehouseBanks; ATLAS SP-type lendersOportun SOFR + 256–318bps at 95% advance; fintechs with 12–18 months' history SOFR + 350–500bps (secondary); FSB borrowing-base proxy ~225bpsPrime consumer advance rates 75–85% (secondary)
Public ABS, seniorInsurers; asset managers; banks3-year AAA card 29–37bps (Jun 30, 2026); prime auto AA 75bps to BBB 130bps (Oct 2025)Card excess spread ~10.0x charge-offs; prime auto ANL 0.66% (Jul 2026)
Public ABS, nonprimeCredit funds; insurersSubprime auto BBB 180bps (Oct 2025)Nonprime auto ANL 9.46% (Jul 2026)
Private ABF, unleveredABF funds; insurer SMAs300–450bps; ~240bps over public ABS; corporate direct lending 425–550bpsModeled 5-year return 9.4% vs 8.5% for direct lending
SRT mezzanine/first lossCredit funds; SRT funds; insurersImplied spreads: corporate 383bps, SME 413bps, HVCRE 886bps; target IRRs "mid-single digits to mid-teens"Insurer deals average 2.0% attachment, 7.9% detachment (2025)
Equity and opportunisticABF opportunistic funds; platform owners"Mid to High Teens"; FS KKR expected ABF IRR ~14%Takes first loss and fraud risk (see section 16)
Fund financeBanks; insurersSubscription lines ~200bps; NAV facilities 200–400bpsNAV LTVs "generally limited to 30%"

Sources: AllianceBernstein; Capital Advisors Group; Oportun 10-K; Axis Group Ventures (secondary); FSB; IMF GMM; KBRA; PIMCO; IMF WP/25/200; KKR; Finadium (secondary, citing IACPM); Brookfield; PitchBook. Manager figures (AllianceBernstein, PIMCO, KKR, Brookfield) come from interested parties; PIMCO returns are modeled.

Pricing data is plentiful but loss data is not: the research for this primer found no regulator or rating-agency loss series for private ABF, so public ABS indices serve as the proxy (see section 6). SRT shows why banks pay for protection. In the Philadelphia Fed's worked example, protecting 12.5% of an auto pool cuts the senior risk weight from 100% to 20% and lifts return on risk-adjusted capital from 6% to 24% (Philadelphia Fed). Actual relief averaged 43bps of CET1 for issuing banks (BIS).

Rule of thumb (author's): in a levered ABF stack, the advance rate and the cost of senior funding drive equity returns more than small changes in asset yield.

13.2 FIG profitability

Each FIG business earns money differently: banks earn a thin return on a large levered balance sheet, insurers earn a spread between asset yield and crediting rate, and alternative managers earn fees with little capital. US banks earned an ROA of 1.37% in Q2 2026 (KBRA). Athene earned a net spread of 1.14% in the same quarter (Apollo 8-K). KKR reported a 70% FRE margin over the last twelve months (KKR), more than twice BCG's margin of about 30% for asset managers overall (BCG).

Exhibit 21: Alternative managers earn the widest margins; banks and insurers earn thin returns on large balance sheets

SegmentMeasureValuePeriod
US banks (FDIC-insured)ROA (%)1.37Q2 2026
US banks (FDIC-insured)Net income (US$bn)90.1Q2 2026
US banks (FDIC-insured)NIM (%)3.31Q1 2026
JPMorganROTCE (%)29Q2 2026
EU/EEA banks (EBA)ROE (%)11.3Q2 2026
Euro area significant institutions (ECB)NIM (%)1.54Q2 2026
Euro area significant institutions (ECB)Cost-to-income (%)53.06Q2 2026
HSBCRoTE (%)18.2H1 2026
Athene (Apollo)Net spread (%)1.14Q2 2026
Global asset managersOperating margin (%)~302025
KKRFRE margin (%)70LTM Q2 2026
Blue OwlFRE margin (%)58.5Q2 2026
CarlyleFRE margin (%)47Q2 2026
AresFRE margin (%)42.2Q2 2026

Sources: KBRA (FDIC data); Premier Insights (secondary, NIM; Q2 2026 NIM not found); JPMorgan 8-K; EBA Risk Dashboard; ECB Banking Supervision; HSBC; Apollo 8-K; BCG; KKR; Blue Owl 8-K; Carlyle; Ares. FRE margins are company-defined and not strictly comparable.

13.3 Profit pools

The profit pool follows control of origination and of long-dated capital. Originators that sell assets but keep servicing retain a fee stream: PayPal keeps underwriting and servicing on receivables sold to Blue Owl and KKR (PayPal), and Sallie Mae retains servicing and earns fees under its KKR partnership (Sallie Mae).

Managers earn the most durable fees on perpetual capital. Perpetual capital makes up 60% of Apollo's AUM and 70% of its fee-generating AUM (Apollo 8-K), and 85% of Blue Owl's FRE management fees come from permanent capital (Blue Owl 8-K). KKR holds US$72bn of committed capital, at a weighted fee rate of about 90bps, that is not yet paying fees (KKR).

Insurers capture the spread on private origination. Athene deployed about US$25bn of Apollo-originated investment-grade credit in Q2 2026 at about 190bps over comparably rated public corporates (Athene, interested party). Banks increasingly earn by financing the nonbanks that hold the loans (see section 7.1) and through origination partnerships (see section 8).

14

Market structure and competition

Economics & Regulation

Banks still originate and fund most ABF assets, but nonbanks now lead several consumer segments and hold a rising share of the risk. Nonbanks hold 34% of US ABF but only 13% in Europe (Oliver Wyman; see section 3.2). Among managers, competition turns on access to origination and insurance capital more than on price.

Exhibit 22: Nonbanks lead origination in mortgages and personal loans; banks fund them and keep cards

SegmentOrigination led byRisk held or funded byMarker
US residential mortgagesNonbanks: 65.6% of 2025 originations; top five 21.5%Securitization; bank warehouse linesBank loans to mortgage credit intermediaries US$315.8bn (Q3 2025)
US unsecured personal loansFintechs ~half; banks 21%; credit unions 18% (Fitch est., 2025)Forward flow buyers; ABSUnsecured consumer ABS US$25.6bn in 2025, +54%
BNPLAffirm; PayPal; KlarnaForward flow funds (KKR, Blue Owl, Sixth Street); ABSKKR up to €65bn of PayPal Europe receivables
US vehicle loansCaptives ~50% of vehicle ABSABS investors; warehouse banksVehicle ABS US$165bn in 2025, a record
Credit cardsBanks (e.g., American Express, Capital One trusts)Bank balance sheets; bank card ABS trustsUK exception: KKR bought £5.2bn of NewDay receivables
EquipmentBanks and finance companiesBank–private credit partnershipsFirst Citizens–Sixth Street, JPMorgan–Apollo, Goldman Sachs–Apollo (2025)
Aircraft and digital infrastructureLessors and operatorsABS; ABF funds; insurersAviation ABS >US$10bn in 2025; data center ABS/CMBS US$61bn outstanding
SRTBanks (62 in survey)Credit funds and asset managers close to 60% of investors (IMF WP/25/200; categories differ from IACPM's, see section 7.4)Top 10 investors >75% of exposure

Sources: Inside Mortgage Finance; FDIC; Asset Securitization Report (secondary, citing Fitch); PayPal; Inside Mortgage Finance; Capital Advisors Group; CVC; Equipment Finance News (secondary); Maples Group; SFA; IACPM; IMF WP/25/200.

Banks have become lenders to their competitors. The bank share of US corporate lending fell from 48% in 2015 to 29% in 2025 (Federal Reserve, Bowman), while bank loans to nonbanks grew fast (see section 7.1 for the H.8 and call report measures). That lending is concentrated: banks with more than US$100bn of assets held about 86% of NDFI loans and ten institutions about 71% (FDIC, Q3 2025). About half of the companies that borrow from private credit funds also borrow from banks (FSB).

A few platforms hold much of dedicated ABF capital. KKR reported US$91bn of ABF AUM (KKR, Q2 2026) and Ares about US$57.3bn (Ares, Mar 31, 2026). Together they equal about one-third of Blue Owl's US$450bn estimate of dedicated ABF manager AUM (author's arithmetic, mixed dates; PitchBook). SRT is more concentrated still: the largest single investor holds 31% of European exposures (IMF).

Four barriers protect incumbents.

  • Origination. Apollo sourced US$127bn of its US$309bn 2025 origination through 16 proprietary platforms (Apollo, interested party); KKR owns 18 captive ABF platforms (KKR, Jul 2025).
  • Servicing. Sellers usually keep servicing, so buyers depend on the originator's operations (see section 4.4).
  • Data and controls. The alleged 2025–26 fraud cases show the cost of relying on borrower-supplied collateral data (see section 16).
  • Long-dated capital. Blackstone manages US$290bn for insurers (Blackstone call), and KKR's Global Atlantic holds US$164bn of credit AUM (KKR); see section 10.

Substitutes cap private pricing. Public securitization absorbs the most standard assets: about US$339bn of US ABS in 2025 (Valuation Research, secondary) and €252.3bn of European issuance (AFME). Banks can also sell whole books, as HSBC did with A$36bn of Australian loans to Blackstone (FinanceAsia, secondary), buy protection through SRT, or co-originate through partnerships such as Citi–HPS (€15bn) (Citi–HPS release).

15

Regulation and policy

Economics & Regulation

Policy is moving in two directions. Bank capital rules are easing in the US and being phased in with relief in Europe, while scrutiny is moving to where the risk now sits: insurer balance sheets, bank lines to nonbanks and semi-liquid retail funds.

15.1 Banks and securitization

US agencies re-proposed the Basel III endgame on Mar 19, 2026, together with a revised standardized approach and a GSIB surcharge re-proposal. The endgame framework would be mandatory only for Category I–II banks, and Category III–IV banks may opt in. Across the package, estimated CET1 changes are −4.8% for Category I–II banks, −5.2% for Category III–IV and −7.8% for smaller banks (Freshfields, secondary). The re-proposal would cut the risk weight on investment-grade corporates from 100% to 65% (Federal Reserve, Bowman). The 2026 stress test cut aggregate CET1 by 1.6pp across 32 banks, on losses of US$708bn (Federal Reserve).

Europe is changing the securitization rules that shape bank demand for SRT and ABS. The European Parliament's position cuts the senior non-STS p-factor from 1.0 to 0.6 (Orrick, interested party), but the third trilogue on Sep 29, 2026 ended without agreement (Agence Europe, secondary). Supervisors are cautious on SRT. The Basel Committee flagged bank financing of protection sellers and capital relief that exceeds real risk transfer (Jones Day, secondary). Even so, the ECB now approves qualifying SRT deals in two weeks (ECB); section 7.4 covers the mechanics.

15.2 Insurers

US regulators are tightening how insurers capitalize and rate private assets. The NAIC will require insurers to quantify placements supported only by private letter ratings from year-end 2026 (FactSet) and will replace the flat 6.8% charge on collateral loans with charges of 22.5–45% on residual tranches, scaled by overcollateralization, from year-end 2027 (Sidley, secondary). Fitch found that 106 of 109 privately rated private credit securities rated in 2023 received a higher rating than the SVO's original assessment (Capstone, secondary, citing Fitch). The NAIC says it is "not aware of any material instance" of misclassification (NAIC); section 7.3 covers private ratings. The US Treasury has joined scrutiny of Bermuda reinsurance (Insurance Business, secondary). In Europe, the revised Solvency II applies from Jan 30, 2027 and aligns STS senior securitization charges with covered bonds (European Commission).

15.3 Retail access and system monitoring

US policy is widening retail access just as official monitors question semi-liquid structures. The Department of Labor proposed a safe harbor for alternatives in 401(k) plans on Mar 30, 2026 (Kirkland & Ellis, secondary). The IMF warns that "rising borrower stress and growing retail exposure could test semiliquid structures" (IMF GFSR). The FSB's May 2026 report lists leverage, liquidity mismatch, bank and insurer interlinkages, retail access and data gaps as the main private credit vulnerabilities (FSB). The Bank of England is running a private markets stress exercise with 46 participants; final results are due in early 2027 (Bank of England).

Exhibit 23: Most pending rules land between Dec 2026 and Jan 2027

RuleJurisdictionStatus (Oct 4, 2026)Key dateChannel to ABF/FIG
Basel III endgame and GSIB surcharge re-proposalUSProposed Mar 19, 2026; comments closed Jun 18, 2026Final rule not datedEndgame framework mandatory for Category I–II only, opt-in for Category III–IV; lower corporate risk weights
eSLR recalibrationUSFinal Nov 25, 2025Effective Apr 1, 2026GSIB holding companies at 3% plus 50% of method 1 surcharge
SRT reservation of authority (Reg Q FAQ)USIn force since Sep 28, 2023Case by caseDirectly issued CLNs can qualify for capital relief
Securitisation reviewEUNo agreement at Sep 29, 2026 trilogueOct 21, 2026 trilogue; Dec 31, 2026 targetp-factor; insurer protection threshold €15bn to €10bn
FRTB (CRR3) targeted reliefEUDelegated act Jun 4, 2026Jan 1, 2027, for three yearsMarket-risk capital for trading desks
Basel 3.1 (PS1/26)UKFinal Jan 20, 2026Jan 1, 2027 (internal models Jan 1, 2028)No material change to firm-level RWAs vs near-final rules
Solvency II reviewEUAdopted; EIOPA standards Jul 15, 2026Jan 30, 2027Lower charges for STS senior tranches
CLO RBC; private-letter-rating disclosureUS (NAIC)Adopted Jun 23, 2026; Item 2025-19Dec 31, 2026CLO residual charge kept at 45%
Collateral-loan RBCUS (NAIC)Adopted Jun 11, 2026Year-end 2027Residual charges 22.5–45% by overcollateralization
Alternatives in 401(k) plansUS (DOL)Proposed Mar 30, 2026Final rule not datedRetail inflows to private credit and ABF vehicles

Sources: Freshfields (secondary); Federal Register; IMF WP/25/200; BPI (secondary); Agence Europe (secondary); Walkers (secondary); European Commission; PRA; European Commission; EIOPA; Sidley (secondary); FactSet; Kirkland & Ellis (secondary).

16

What goes wrong

Economics & Regulation

The largest recent ABF losses involved collateral that was allegedly missing or pledged twice, not weak asset performance. Earlier FIG failures came from funding runs and concentrated counterparty exposure. Today's live risks combine both: rising redemption requests at semi-liquid funds and a corporate private credit default rate at a record.

16.1 Collateral that was not there

Three cases in twelve months showed how warehouse and receivables structures fail when lenders rely on borrower-supplied data. First Brands carried debt of "over US$11bn," including US$4.6bn off balance sheet, and some invoices were reportedly financed more than once (BRAKE Report, secondary; Willkie, secondary); the case converted to Chapter 7 on Aug 24, 2026 (BRAKE Report, secondary). Tricolor allegedly pledged the same auto loans to several warehouse lines and kept pledging them after sale into securitizations (Banking Dive, secondary). Its three disclosed bank losses total US$498mm (author's arithmetic). Market Financial Solutions, a UK bridging lender, entered administration in Feb 2026 with an estimated shortfall to creditors of more than £1.3bn (Bridging & Commercial, secondary). Lawyers now recommend lockbox accounts, fresh lien searches, independent receivable verification and never letting the borrower act as sole servicer (Willkie, secondary).

16.2 Runs and gates

Liquidity mismatch is the risk that moved from banks to funds. In 2023, SVB faced US$42bn of withdrawal requests in one day (Wikipedia, secondary). In 2026, the pressure fell on non-traded BDCs. Blue Owl's OTIC received requests for 40.7% of shares in Q1 2026 against a 5% cap (PitchBook), so holders received about one-eighth of what they asked for (author's arithmetic). Across nine perpetual BDCs, requests of US$13.4bn met US$7.8bn of payouts in Q1 2026 (LSTA). Section 12 covers BDC structure.

16.3 Credit and policy shocks

Credit stress is concentrated in corporate private credit and nonprime consumer loans. Fitch's US private credit default rate reached 6.3% in the twelve months to Aug 2026, with PIK and interest deferrals making up 47% of default events (Webull/Benzinga, citing Fitch, secondary). Subprime auto ABS 60+ day delinquency reached 6.74% in Dec 2025 (Auto Finance News, secondary, citing Fitch). Policy can also break a niche: Sunnova and Mosaic filed in Jun 2025 amid high rates and threatened cuts to residential solar tax credits (Solar Builder, secondary).

Exhibit 24: Alleged fraud, funding runs and concentrated exposures explain most failures

CauseCaseDateScaleWhat failed
Alleged fraud/double-pledgingFirst BrandsCh. 11 Sep 2025; Ch. 7 Aug 24, 2026Debt >US$11bn (including US$6.2bn on, US$4.6bn off balance sheet)Invoices reportedly financed more than once; off-balance-sheet SPVs
Alleged fraud/double-pledgingTricolorCh. 7 Sep 2025Bank losses: JPMorgan US$170mm, Fifth Third US$178mm, Barclays US$150mmAuto loans allegedly pledged to several warehouses and ABS
Alleged fraud/double-pledgingMarket Financial SolutionsAdministration Feb 20, 2026Estimated shortfall >£1.3bn; Barclays exposure reported at ~£500mmBridging-loan collateral
Funding runSVBFailed Mar 10, 202389% of US$172bn deposits uninsuredConcentrated uninsured deposits
Funding runCredit SuisseUBS takeover Mar 19, 2023CHF16bn AT1 written to zeroWealth outflows (CHF111bn in Q4 2022)
Supply chain financeGreensillInsolvency Mar 8, 2021Credit Suisse SCF funds ~US$10bn"Future receivables"; loss of US$4.6bn insurance cover
Prime brokerageArchegosDefault Mar 26, 2021Bank losses >US$10bn (Credit Suisse US$5.5bn)Concentrated swap exposure across banks
Fintech middleware (BaaS)SynapseCh. 11 Apr 2024Ledger shortfall US$65–96mm; ~10 million end usersLedger reconciliation
Consumer lendersSunnova; MosaicCh. 11 Jun 2025Sunnova debt US$10.67bn; Mosaic DIP US$45mmRates, tax-credit risk
Liquidity mismatchNon-traded BDCsQ1–Q2 2026OTIC requests 40.7% vs 5% capQuarterly redemptions against illiquid loans

Sources: BRAKE Report; BRAKE Report; Banking Dive; Bridging & Commercial; Wikipedia (2023 banking crisis); Wikipedia (Credit Suisse); Wikipedia (Greensill); Wikipedia (Archegos); Wikipedia (Synapse); Solar Builder; PitchBook. All except PitchBook are secondary; Wikipedia entries compile press reports.

16.4 Systemic warnings

Official monitors see the main channel as bank exposure to nonbanks. In the IMF's adverse scenario, about 18% of global banks by assets would breach CET1 thresholds, rising to 21% once nonbank shocks are added (IMF GFSR, Oct 2025). The FDIC warns that NDFIs "may need to sell assets" in a downturn, pushing down asset values (PYMNTS, secondary, citing FDIC). The Fed reports life insurer leverage "well into the upper quartile" (Federal Reserve FSR), and the BIS notes that 40–60% repo haircuts cap leverage in the SRT market at about €10bn (BIS).

Not every authority sees a systemic threat. The ECB finds euro area bank exposure to private credit at €62.5bn, or 0.2% of assets (Insurance Journal, secondary, citing ECB), and the OFR estimates a 12-month default probability of 1.3% on bank loans to private credit (OFR). JPMorgan's Jamie Dimon framed the other view after Tricolor: "When you see one cockroach, there are probably more" (Fortune, secondary).

Rule of thumb (author's): in ABF, check whether the collateral exists and is pledged only once before modeling how it performs.

17

The industry map and company profiles

Players & Outlook

ABF runs through seven layers of firms: long-term capital, institutional LPs, the wealth channel, banks, managers, originators and the infrastructure that rates, services and verifies collateral. The largest groups span several layers; Apollo and KKR own insurers that buy credit their managers originate (KKR Q2 2026 release; Athene; Brookfield Wealth Solutions). Exhibit 25 sets out the map; Exhibits 26–31 profile leading firms.

Exhibit 25: Capital flows from insurers, LPs and wealth vehicles through managers and banks to originators

LayerFunction in ABFExamplesProfiled in
Life insurers and reinsurersBuy IG private ABF and private placementsAthene, Global Atlantic, Brookfield Wealth Solutions, Fortitude Re17.2
Pensions and sovereign fundsCommit to ABF funds; buy forward flowADIA, Mubadala17.3, 17.4
Wealth channelSemi-liquid funds with periodic redemptionBCRED, KKR Asset-Based Finance Fund, OWLCX, Apollo ELTIFs17.5
BanksWarehouse and fund finance, SRT, loan salesJPMorgan, Citigroup, HSBC, BNP Paribas, Barclays17.1
Alternative and ABF managersRaise funds, buy pools, own origination platformsApollo, KKR, Blackstone, Ares, Castlelake, Värde17.3, 17.4
Originators and specialty financeOriginate and service; sell via forward flow or ABSAffirm, PayPal, Upstart, Pagaya, Rocket, UWM17.5
InfrastructureRatings, servicing and back-up servicing, data verificationKBRA, Fitch, Moody's, Egan-Jones, back-up servicers17.6

Sources: Oaktree; Apollo (ADIA); Fortress (Mubadala); KKR Asset-Based Finance Fund; PayPal; author's classification.

17.1 Banks

The large banks fund, partner with and sell to nonbanks more than they compete with them. Banks above US$100bn of assets held about 86% of bank loans to nondepository financial institutions in Q3 2025, and ten institutions held about 71% (FDIC).

Exhibit 26: Six banks act as financiers, partners and sellers to private ABF capital

BankHQScale (latest)Role in ABF and private credit
JPMorgan ChaseNew YorkTotal assets US$5.0tn; Q2 2026 net income US$21.2bn; CET1 (standardized) 14.1%US$50bn own-balance-sheet direct lending plus ~US$15bn from co-lenders (Feb 2025, secondary); US$170mm Tricolor loss (Q3 2025)
CitigroupNew YorkCitibank NA assets US$1,976.2bn (Jun 30, 2026)US$25bn direct lending program with Apollo (Sep 2024); €15bn EMEA program with HPS (May 2026)
HSBCLondonTotal assets US$3.44tn; RoTE 18.2%; CET1 14.1% (H1 2026)Sold A$36bn Australian home and personal loan book to Blackstone (Jul 2026, secondary)
BNP ParibasParisH1 2026 pre-tax profit +21.3% (secondary)US$5bn day-one financing collaboration with Apollo's ATLAS SP (Sep 2024)
BarclaysLondonH1 2026 pre-tax profit +17% (secondary)US$150mm Tricolor loss; reported ~£500mm exposure to Market Financial Solutions, which Barclays says is materially lower (secondary)
Goldman SachsNew YorkGoldman Sachs Bank USA assets US$758.8bn (Jun 30, 2026)Equipment finance partnership with Apollo (May 2025, secondary)

Sources: JPMorgan 8-K; Federal Reserve Large Commercial Banks; HSBC interim results; Apollo IR; Citi–HPS release; BNP Paribas; ABF Journal, FinanceAsia, TAB Insights, Banking Dive, Bridging & Commercial, Equipment Finance News (all secondary).

Economics. Senior lending to nonbanks earns a modest spread on little capital: the FSB puts subscription lines at about 200bps and borrowing-base fund financing at about 225bps (FSB). SRT raises the return on what banks keep; in a Philadelphia Fed worked example, protecting 12.5% of an auto pool lifts return on risk-adjusted capital from 6% to 24% (Philadelphia Fed). Sector returns are covered in section 9.

17.2 Insurers

Insurers tied to alternative managers are the largest buyers of investment-grade private ABF. PE-owned US insurers held 31% of their bonds in ABS and other structured securities at YE2024, against 13% for the industry (NAIC).

Exhibit 27: Manager-affiliated insurers dominate the buy side for IG private ABF

InsurerOwnership / domicileScale (latest)ABF link
AtheneApollo subsidiary; Bermuda and IowaNet invested assets US$314bn; net spread 1.14% (Q2 2026)ABS 14%, residential mortgage loans 14% and CLOs 7% of net invested assets
Global AtlanticKKR-owned; Boston and BermudaAUM US$220bn, of which US$164bn credit (Q2 2026)Captive buyer of KKR credit
Brookfield Wealth SolutionsListed (BNT); Bermuda and TorontoTotal assets US$205.7bn (Jun 30, 2026)Over US$5bn into Brookfield-originated strategies at ~7% target yield; acquired Just Group (UK)
Fortitude ReCarlyle, T&D Holdings et al.; Bermuda"US$100bn+" assets (2023)Asset-intensive reinsurer advised by Carlyle
MetLifeListed; New YorkQ2 2026 adjusted earnings US$1.6bn; MIM AUM US$748.1bnIn-house investment manager
AllianzListed; MunichSolvency II ratio 225%; third-party AuM €2.161tn (Jun 30, 2026)Owns PIMCO, a large ABF manager

Sources: Apollo 8-K (via StockTitan); Athene; KKR; Brookfield Wealth Solutions; Fortitude Re; MetLife; Allianz.

Economics. The model earns a spread between annuity crediting rates and private asset yields. Athene deployed about US$25bn of investment-grade credit originated by Apollo in Q2 2026 at about 190bps over comparably rated public corporates (Athene). Capital rules now set the cost of that spread: the NAIC keeps a 45% charge on CLO residual tranches from YE2026 and scales collateral-loan residual charges from 22.5% to 45% by overcollateralization from YE2027 (Sidley, secondary).

17.3 Alternative managers

Six listed alternative managers anchor ABF fundraising, and five have insurance links. Managers define "ABF AUM" differently, so the credit lines in Exhibit 28 are not comparable (see section 8).

Exhibit 28: The largest alternative managers run on fee-related earnings, increasingly from permanent capital

ManagerAUM (US$bn)Credit or ABF lineFRE, Q2 2026 (US$mm)FRE marginInsurance link
Blackstone1,346.3Credit & Insurance US$469.3bn~1,800—Insurance AUM US$290bn, 40 clients
Apollo1,047Credit US$849bn785—Athene
KKR796ABF US$91bn~1,20070% (LTM)Global Atlantic
Ares671.3Alternative Credit US$59.1bn (not ABF AUM; ABF ~US$57.3bn at Mar 31, 2026, Exhibit 14)491.142.2%Aspida (in US$10.8bn "Other")
Brookfield Asset Management>1,000Brookfield ABF platform >US$60bn808—Brookfield Wealth Solutions
Blue Owl319.0Alternative Credit US$14.6bn392.258.5%—

Sources: Blackstone 2Q26 release; Blackstone call transcript; Apollo 8-K (via StockTitan); KKR Q2 2026 release; Ares Q2 2026 presentation; Brookfield Asset Management; Oaktree; Blue Owl 8-K (via StockTitan). Apollo's margin is not shown because it could not be confirmed from the primary release; Blackstone and Brookfield do not report one on a comparable basis.

Economics. Managers emphasize permanent capital because it pays fees indefinitely. Perpetual capital is 60% of Apollo's AUM, and 85% of Blue Owl's FRE management fees come from permanent capital (Apollo 8-K; Blue Owl 8-K). KKR has US$72bn of committed capital not yet paying fees, at a weighted average rate of about 90bps (KKR).

17.4 ABF specialists

Below the listed managers sits a tier of specialists that built ABF franchises before the asset class had a name. Värde has deployed US$13bn in ABF since 2008 (Värde). Ares Pathfinder and KKR's ABF funds are covered in section 8.

Exhibit 29: Specialists compete on origination access and sector expertise

FirmOwnership / HQScale (latest)Focus and notable activity
ATLAS SP PartnersApollo affiliates and investors; New York~US$40bn commitments under management (Jun 2023); current figure not disclosedWarehouse and securitization lender built from Credit Suisse's securitized products group; US$700mm facility for Pagaya (Sep 2026)
CastlelakePrivate; MinneapolisAUM ~US$25bn (Mar 2025); ~US$29bn invested in consumer and SMB loans since 2015Aviation and consumer; US$4bn Upstart forward flow (Jul 2026)
VärdePrivate; MinneapolisAUM US$16bn (Oct 2025)ABF and fund finance
WaterfallPrivate; New YorkAUM US$12.1bn (Mar 31, 2026)Whole loans and structured credit
Atalaya (Blue Owl)Acquired by Blue Owl (announced Jul 16, 2024); New York>US$10bn AUM (Jun 30, 2024); Fund IX ~US$2.9bn (Mar 2026)Asset-backed special opportunities
Pollen StreetListed (POLN); LondonAUM £8.5bn; Private Credit Fund IV £2.5bn (H1 2026)UK and European specialty finance lending

Sources: Apollo (Jun 2023); ATLAS SP; Castlelake; Upstart; Värde; Waterfall; Blue Owl (Atalaya); Blue Owl (Fund IX); DirectorsTalk, secondary. Company sites are interested parties.

Economics. Specialists earn the illiquidity and complexity premium described in section 13. PIMCO, an interested party, puts private ABF deal spreads at 300–450bps unlevered, about 240bps over public ABS (PIMCO).

17.5 Specialty finance and BDCs

Specialty finance companies originate the loans that ABF funds buy, and BDCs channel wealth-client capital into private credit. Both depend on external funding: Affirm had US$28.2bn of committed funding capacity across warehouses, securitizations and forward flow at Mar 31, 2026 (Affirm).

Exhibit 30: Originators fund through forward flow and ABS; BDCs fund through equity and leverage

CompanyTypeScale (latest)Funding model
AffirmBNPL originator (AFRM)US$28.2bn committed funding capacity (Mar 31, 2026)Forward flow with Sixth Street (up to US$4bn)
UpstartLending marketplace (UPST)US$4bn Castlelake and US$1.25bn Fortress agreements (2026)Forward flow
PagayaConsumer lending network (PGY)ABS issuance >US$26bn since launch (Feb 2025)ABS plus forward flow (US$2.4bn Blue Owl)
Rocket and UWMNonbank mortgage lenders429,332 and 422,120 loans in 2025 HMDA data (secondary)Warehouse lines, then agency sale
BCREDPerpetual non-traded BDC (Blackstone)US$94.6bn (Jun 30, 2026)Continuous equity sales; Q2 2026 repurchase requests above the 5% limit, about half met
Ares Capital (ARCC)Listed BDCPortfolio fair value US$29,349mm; 619 companies (Jun 30, 2026)Debt-to-equity 1.15x; non-accruals 2.4% at cost, 1.4% at fair value

Sources: Affirm supplement; Affirm–Sixth Street; Upstart; Fortress; Pagaya; HousingWire, secondary; Blackstone; Blackstone call transcript; ARCC 8-K.

Economics. Originators that sell forward keep servicing and origination fees and avoid funding the balance sheet; Affirm's funding costs were US$113.8mm, or 1.0% of GMV, in its fiscal Q3 2026 (Affirm). BDCs earn a levered spread on loans. The LSTA puts average BDC leverage at 0.92x and the weighted non-accrual rate at 1.99% in Q1 2026, up from 1.42% a quarter earlier (LSTA).

17.6 Infrastructure: rating agencies, trustees, servicers and data

Private ABF depends on third parties to rate notes, take over servicing and verify collateral, and the alleged 2025–26 frauds tested each function (see section 16). Trustee market data was not found.

Exhibit 31: Rating, servicing and verification firms sit at the points where recent ABF failures occurred

Firm or functionRoleScale or activityRecent development
KBRARates rated note feeders, CFOs and esoteric ABSRated note feeders US$9bn and CFOs US$16bn by Sep 2025Zero downgrades on rated note feeders and CFOs in 2025
FitchRatings and default dataTTM US private credit default rate 6.3% (Aug 2026, secondary)NAV finance rating criteria (Feb 2025, secondary)
Moody's and Morningstar DBRSRatings on new asset typesRated CoreWeave's US$8.5bn GPU-backed facility A3 and A (low)First investment-grade GPU-backed financing (Mar 2026)
Egan-JonesPrivate letter ratings for insurersMarket share not foundSenate letter on private credit ratings (Jul 2025)
Back-up servicersStand ready to take over collectionsCold, warm (~30-day takeover) or hot (immediate) (secondary)Mosaic servicing transferred in bankruptcy (secondary)
Data and verification vendorsTape checks and collateral monitoringFull-portfolio verification offered by vendors such as Cascade DebtThird-party verifiers among open EU trilogue issues (Sep 2026, secondary)

Sources: KBRA; Webull/Benzinga citing Fitch, Fried Frank, Academy Securities, Elevenflo, Agence Europe (all secondary); CoreWeave; Senate Banking Committee; Cascade Debt (vendor, interested party).

Economics. Private ratings set insurer capital charges, so rating quality has direct economic weight. Fitch found that 106 of 109 private credit securities privately rated in 2023 (97%) received a higher rating than the SVO's original assessment (Capstone citing Fitch, secondary). From YE2026 statements, the NAIC requires insurers to quantify every private placement supported only by a private letter rating (FactSet).

18

Trends and outlook

Players & Outlook

Six trends stand out in late 2026: banks financing nonbanks, insurance capital as anchor, a rising ABF share of fundraising, new collateral, regulatory catch-up and diverging consumer credit.

18.1 Six trends

Banks finance nonbanks rather than compete with them. US bank credit commitments to nonbank financial institutions reached US$2.6tn in Q4 2025; commitments to private equity, BDCs and private credit, about a quarter of the total, grew 17% in 2025 (Fed FSR). Partnerships and portfolio sales extend the pattern, from Citi's €15bn program with HPS to HSBC's A$36bn Australian loan sale to Blackstone (Citi–HPS; FinanceAsia, secondary).

Insurance balance sheets anchor demand. Blackstone's insurance AUM rose 15% year on year to US$290bn in Q2 2026, and US$7.5bn of its US$9.9bn infrastructure and asset-based credit inflows came through insurance SMAs (Blackstone). Brookfield Wealth Solutions raised US$45bn in the quarter, including a US$40bn Just Group mandate (Brookfield Asset Management).

ABF takes a larger share of private credit fundraising. Closed-end ABF rose from 10.6% to 16.4% of closed-end private credit fundraising between 2024 and 2025 (see section 5). Direct lending's share fell from 58.4% in 2024 to about 31% in Q1 2026 (Squire Patton Boggs citing PitchBook, secondary).

Digital infrastructure and home equity add collateral. Data center ABS and CMBS outstanding grew from US$4bn in 2020 to US$61bn in 2026, and the SFA cites projections of US$180bn by 2028 (SFA). CoreWeave closed the first investment-grade GPU-backed financing in Mar 2026 (CoreWeave). Second-lien RMBS issuance, US$30bn in 2025, is expected to reach about US$40bn in 2026 (SFA).

Regulation is catching up with the structures. The EU securitisation reform, the US Basel III endgame re-proposal and NAIC capital and disclosure changes all reach decision points in the next six months (see section 15 and Exhibit 33). The Bank of England's private markets stress exercise, with 46 participants, reports in early 2027 (Bank of England; Bank of England scenario).

Consumer credit is splitting by borrower quality. KBRA's non-prime auto ABS annualized net loss rose 61bps year on year to 9.46% in Jul 2026, while the prime index held at 0.66% (KBRA). Bank credit card charge-offs fell to 3.82% in Q2 2026 from 4.19% a year earlier (Federal Reserve via FRED).

18.2 Outlook

Published forecasts point to continued growth, although most come from interested parties. KBRA expects US ABS issuance of US$385.2bn in 2026, about 5% above KBRA's own 2025 estimate (KBRA). Moody's expects private credit AUM to exceed US$2tn in 2026 and approach US$4tn by 2030 (Moody's). McKinsey estimates that US$5–6tn of US lending could shift to nonbanks over the next decade (McKinsey). KKR's projection of a US$9tn ABF market by 2029 is discussed in section 3.

Three factors could slow that path. New fraud cases would raise diligence costs and bank caution (see section 16). Redemption requests above quarterly caps would constrain the wealth channel; nine perpetual BDCs received US$13.4bn of requests in Q1 2026 and fulfilled US$7.8bn (LSTA). Tighter insurer capital rules would raise the cost of the largest buyer base. Looser bank capital rules point the other way: the Basel re-proposal would cut the risk weight on investment-grade corporate exposures from 100% to 65%, lowering banks' cost of holding such loans themselves (Federal Reserve).

19

Tracking the industry

Players & Outlook

Ten public series track ABF and FIG between annual reports; the H.8 bank data and KBRA indices are the highest-frequency reads.

Exhibit 32: Ten indicators track funding, credit, liquidity and capital flows

IndicatorLatest readingCadence and sourceWhat it signals
Bank loans to nondepository financial institutionsUS$2,066.8bn, +11.9% y/y (week to Sep 23, 2026)Weekly; Fed H.8Bank funding of nonbanks
Fitch US private credit default rate (TTM)6.3% (Aug 2026)Monthly; Fitch (secondary)Corporate credit stress
KBRA non-prime auto ABS annualized net loss9.46%, +61bps y/y (Jul 2026)Monthly; KBRAWeakest consumer segment
Bank credit card charge-off rate3.82% (Q2 2026) vs 4.19% (Q2 2025)Quarterly; Federal ReservePrime consumer health
BDC weighted non-accrual rate1.99% (Q1 2026) vs 1.42% (Q4 2025)Quarterly; LSTAWealth-channel credit quality
Perpetual BDC redemption requestsUS$13.4bn requested, US$7.8bn fulfilled (Q1 2026)Quarterly; LSTA, fund filingsSemi-liquid fund liquidity
European securitisation issuance€64.3bn issued, €52.1bn placed (Q2 2026)Quarterly; AFME (via LexisNexis, secondary)European takeout capacity
3-year AAA card ABS spread29–37bps over Treasuries (Jun 30, 2026)Daily dealer data; Capital Advisors Group citing J.P. MorganPublic benchmark for private premia
ABF share of closed-end private credit fundraising16.4% (2025)Annual; McKinseyLP appetite for ABF
US insurer private credit holdings~US$1.2tn, ~13% of cash and invested assets (end-2025)Annual; NAIC via Insurance Business (secondary)Largest buyer base

Sources: Fed H.8; Webull/Benzinga citing Fitch, secondary; KBRA; Federal Reserve via FRED; LSTA; LexisNexis citing AFME, secondary; Capital Advisors Group; McKinsey; Insurance Business citing NAIC, secondary.

Rule of thumb (author's): read funding series (H.8, redemptions) against credit series (defaults, losses); rising losses alongside gated redemptions mark stress.

20

Signposts and calendar

Players & Outlook

The next six months bring three regulatory decisions, two fraud trials and a full earnings cycle. Five signposts will show the direction of the trends in section 18:

  • EU securitisation: whether the Oct 21 trilogue agrees capital changes before the Dec 31 target (Walkers, secondary).
  • Redemptions: whether perpetual BDC tender requests fall back toward 5% caps (LSTA).
  • Insurer rules: NAIC decisions on rating provider due diligence and rated note feeders (Mayer Brown, secondary).
  • Bank appetite: whether Q3 results show nonbank lending still growing (JPMorganChase).
  • Fraud trials: what Tricolor and First Brands evidence shows about collateral checks (Inner City Press, secondary).

Exhibit 33: Regulatory decisions cluster at year-end; trials and conferences fill Q1 2027

DateEventWhat to watch
Oct 6–18, 2026IMF GFSR chapters (Oct 6 and 8); Annual Meetings, Bangkok, with chapter 1 (Oct 12–18, expected)Private credit and NBFI risk assessment
Oct 13–15, 2026JPMorgan Q3 results (Oct 13); other large US banks (expected)Nonbank lending growth, credit costs
Oct 18–21, 2026FT Live ABS East, MiamiIssuance pipeline and spreads
Oct 21, 2026EU securitisation trilogue, Strasbourgp-factor, risk-weight floors, SRT test
Oct 22–Nov 9, 2026Alternative manager Q3 results: Blackstone Oct 22, Blue Owl Oct 29, Apollo Nov 3, KKR Nov 9; Ares, Carlyle, Brookfield (expected)Insurance inflows, ABF AUM, BDC flows
Nov 2026 (expected)Fed Financial Stability Report; ECB Financial Stability ReviewOfficial views on private credit and NBFI risk
Nov 14–17, 2026NAIC Fall National Meeting, DallasRating provider framework; rated note feeders as ABS
~Nov 20, 2026 (expected)KBRA 2027 US ABS sector outlookIssuance forecast by sector
Late Nov 2026 (expected)FDIC Quarterly Banking Profile, Q3 2026Nonbank loan balances, bank earnings
Dec 2026 (expected)FSB NBFI monitoring report; Bank of England Financial Stability ReportNBFI system size; UK private markets view
Dec 31, 2026NAIC CLO capital charges take effect; private-letter-rating disclosure begins with YE2026 statements; Irish Presidency target for EU fileInsurer demand for privately rated paper
Jan 1, 2027UK Basel 3.1 implementation; EU FRTB targeted relief appliesBank capital for retained and traded assets
Jan 25, 2027Tricolor criminal trial, SDNY (secondary)Evidence on double-pledging and lender controls
Late Jan–mid Feb 2027 (expected)Q4 2026 results for banks and alternative managersFull-year ABF fundraising and credit costs
Jan 30, 2027Revised Solvency II appliesEU insurer capital for securitisation tranches
Feb 2027FFA Global Fund Finance Symposium, Miami Beach (Feb 1–4); First Brands founders' trial (expected, secondary); Fed 2027 stress test scenarios (expected); SFVegas (Feb 21–24)Fund finance terms; fraud evidence; bank capital
Early 2027Bank of England private markets exercise final reportPrivate markets stress results
Mar 2027 (expected)NAIC Spring National MeetingFollow-through on insurer rules

Sources: IMF; JPMorganChase; Mayer Brown; Agence Europe, secondary; Blackstone; Blue Owl; Apollo; KKR; FSLSO calendar; Sidley, secondary; FactSet; Walkers, secondary; PRA; European Commission (FRTB); Inner City Press, secondary; European Commission (Solvency II); FFA; BRAKE Report, secondary; Federal Reserve; Structured Finance Association; Bank of England. "(expected)" marks dates inferred from prior-year cadence.

A

Key players

Appendices

Exhibit 34 lists the firms that recur across the primer, grouped by layer as in Exhibit 25. Figures are the latest disclosed and are not comparable across rows.

Exhibit 34: A few banks, insurer-linked managers and originators recur throughout ABF and FIG

FirmTypeRole in ABF and FIGKey figure (period)Section
JPMorgan ChaseBankWarehouse and fund lender; US$50bn own-balance-sheet direct lending (secondary)Total assets US$5.0tn; net income US$21.2bn (Q2 2026)9, 17.1
CitigroupBankOrigination partnerships with Apollo and HPSUS$25bn (Sep 2024); €15bn (May 2026)8.2, 17.1
HSBCBankLoan book seller to BlackstoneA$36bn Australian loans (Jul 2026, secondary); RoTE 18.2% (H1 2026)8.2, 17.1
BNP ParibasBankFinancing collaboration with ATLAS SPUS$5bn day-one (Sep 2024)8.2, 17.1
BarclaysBankWarehouse lender hit by alleged collateral fraudTricolor loss US$150mm; MFS exposure reported at ~£500mm (secondary)16, 17.1
Goldman SachsBankEquipment finance partnership with Apollo (secondary)Bank USA assets US$758.8bn (Jun 30, 2026)17.1
Athene (Apollo)Life insurerBuys Apollo-originated IG creditNet invested assets US$314bn; net spread 1.14% (Q2 2026)8.3, 17.2
Global Atlantic (KKR)Life insurerCaptive buyer of KKR creditAUM US$220bn, US$164bn credit (Q2 2026)8.3, 17.2
Brookfield Wealth SolutionsLife insurerInvests in Brookfield-originated strategies; acquired Just GroupTotal assets US$205.7bn (Jun 30, 2026)8.3, 17.2
Fortitude ReReinsurerAsset-intensive reinsurer advised by Carlyle"US$100bn+" assets (2023)8.3, 17.2
Allianz (PIMCO)Insurer and asset managerOwns PIMCO, which reports >US$560bn in private ABF and structured credit, including publicSolvency II ratio 225% (Jun 30, 2026)8.1, 10.4, 17.2
BlackstoneAlternative managerInsurance SMAs; bought HSBC Australian loans; anchored CoreWeave facilityAUM US$1,346.3bn; insurance AUM US$290bn (Q2 2026)8, 11, 17.3
ApolloAlternative managerOwns Athene; 16 origination platforms; ATLAS SPAUM US$1,047bn, credit US$849bn (Q2 2026)8, 11, 17.3
KKRAlternative managerLargest disclosed ABF AUM; 18 captive platforms; PayPal and Sallie Mae flowABF AUM US$91bn (Q2 2026)8, 11, 17.3
AresAlternative managerPathfinder closed-end ABF fundsABF AUM ~US$57.3bn (Mar 2026); Pathfinder III US$8.5bn8, 11, 17.3
Brookfield Asset Management (Oaktree)Alternative managerABF platform; Oaktree's first ABF fundPlatform >US$60bn; Oaktree fund US$2bn (Oct 2026)8, 11.3, 17.3
Blue Owl (Atalaya)Alternative managerUS BNPL flow from PayPal; non-traded BDCs under redemption pressureAUM US$319.0bn (Q2 2026); OTIC requests 40.7% (Q1 2026)8, 12.3, 17.3
Sixth StreetAlternative managerAffirm forward flow; First Citizens equipment partnership (secondary)Up to US$4bn Affirm commitment (Dec 2024)7.2, 8.2
ATLAS SP PartnersABF specialistWarehouse and securitization lender, ex-Credit Suisse~US$40bn commitments (Jun 2023)8.1, 17.4
CastlelakeABF specialistAviation and consumer credit; Upstart flowAUM ~US$25bn (Mar 2025); US$4bn Upstart agreement (Jul 2026)8.1, 17.4
VärdeABF specialistABF and fund financeAUM US$16bn (Oct 2025)8.1, 17.4
Pollen StreetABF specialistUK and European specialty finance lendingAUM £8.5bn; Fund IV £2.5bn (H1 2026, secondary)8.1, 17.4
AffirmBNPL originatorFunds through warehouses, ABS and forward flowUS$28.2bn committed funding capacity (Mar 31, 2026)7.2, 17.5
PayPalBNPL originatorSells receivables and keeps servicingKKR up to €65bn (Europe); Blue Owl ~US$7bn (US)7.2, 13.3
Upstart and PagayaLending marketplacesFund through forward flow and ABSUpstart US$4bn Castlelake, US$1.25bn Fortress (2026); Pagaya >US$26bn ABS (Feb 2025)7.2, 17.5
Rocket and UWMNonbank mortgage lendersLead US mortgage origination429,332 and 422,120 loans (2025 HMDA, secondary)12.1, 17.5
BCRED (Blackstone)Perpetual non-traded BDCLargest wealth-channel credit vehicleUS$94.6bn (Jun 30, 2026)11.2, 17.5
Ares CapitalListed BDCLargest listed BDCPortfolio US$29,349mm, 619 companies (Jun 30, 2026)12.2, 17.5
KBRARating agencyRates feeders, CFOs and esoteric ABSUS$9bn feeders, US$16bn CFOs (by Sep 2025)7.5, 17.6

Sources: as Exhibits 12, 14, 15, 18, 19 and 26–31, where each figure carries its primary link; secondary sources are marked in the cells. Manager figures are interested-party disclosures.

B

Glossary

Appendices

Terms defined in Exhibit 3 are not repeated here.

Annualized net loss (ANL)
A pool's net credit losses over a period, scaled to a yearly rate; KBRA's auto and solar indices use it (see section 6).
Back-up servicer
A party contracted to take over collections if the primary servicer fails; arrangements are graded cold, warm or hot by readiness (see section 4.4).
Basel III endgame
The US implementation of the final Basel III bank capital standards; Basel 3.1 is the UK equivalent (see section 15).
Business development company (BDC)
A US closed-end vehicle that lends mainly to middle-market companies; it may be listed, privately offered or perpetual non-traded (see section 12.2).
Buy now, pay later (BNPL)
Short-term installment credit offered at the point of sale, funded largely through forward flow (see section 6.1).
Closed-end second and HELOC
Second-lien mortgage loans: a fixed loan or a revolving home equity line behind a first mortgage (see section 6.1).
Collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
A securitization of leveraged corporate loans, tranched from AAA notes to a residual equity tranche.
Credit-linked note (CLN)
A note whose repayment falls if losses hit a reference pool; banks issue CLNs to fund SRT protection (see section 7.4).
Early amortization
A trigger that stops a facility's revolving period and diverts collections to repay senior lenders, often with higher pricing (see section 4.2).
ELTIF
European long-term investment fund, the EU wrapper used to sell private-market funds to individual investors (see section 11.2).
eSLR
The enhanced supplementary leverage ratio applied to US global systemically important banks (see section 15).
FRTB
Fundamental Review of the Trading Book, the Basel standard for market-risk capital (see section 15).
Interval fund
A US registered fund that offers to repurchase a set share of its shares at regular intervals, usually quarterly (see section 11.2).
Lockbox (controlled collection account)
An account that receives borrower payments under lender control rather than the originator's (see section 16.1).
Nondepository financial institution (NDFI)
The bank reporting category for loans to nonbank lenders, funds and special-purpose entities (see sections 7.1 and 9.3).
Nonbank financial intermediation (NBFI)
The FSB's term for credit and investment activity outside banks; its narrow measure counts only bank-like risks (see section 12).
Non-accrual
A loan on which the lender has stopped recognizing interest income because payment is in doubt.
p-factor
The supervisory parameter in the EU securitization capital formula that sets how much capital a tranche carries relative to the underlying pool (see section 15.1).
Payment in kind (PIK)
Interest paid by adding to the loan balance rather than in cash.
Perpetual capital
Manager AUM with no fixed end date, such as insurance mandates and perpetual BDCs, which pays fees indefinitely (see section 11.1).
Private letter rating
A credit rating issued to the investor or issuer but not published; US insurers use them to obtain NAIC designations (see section 7.3).
Residual tranche
The most junior piece of a securitization, which receives what is left after all notes are paid.
Return on risk-adjusted capital (RoRAC)
Profit divided by the capital a position requires; SRT raises it by cutting required capital (see section 7.4).
Schedule BA
The US insurer statutory schedule for funds, joint ventures and other alternative assets (see section 10.1).
Securities Valuation Office (SVO)
The NAIC unit that assigns and reviews NAIC designations (see section 7.3).
Separately managed account (SMA)
A mandate run for a single investor, such as an insurer, rather than a pooled fund.
Servicer
The party that collects payments, manages delinquencies and reports pool data; in ABF it is usually the originator (see section 4.4).
Solvency II
The EU prudential regime for insurers, which sets capital charges by asset type (see sections 10.4 and 15.2).
Special-purpose vehicle (SPV)
A bankruptcy-remote entity that holds the asset pool and borrows against it (see section 4.2).
Spread-related earnings (SRE)
An alternative manager's earnings from the investment spread of an owned insurer (see section 11.1).
STS securitisation
A simple, transparent and standardized EU securitization that qualifies for lower capital charges (see sections 10.4 and 15).
Whole-loan sale
The outright sale of an existing loan book in one trade (see section 4.3).
C

Sources

Appendices

Every linked source in the primer, grouped by the section where it first appears. Sources marked "secondary" in the text are trade press or blogs.

1. The short version

2. Units and vocabulary

3. ABF definition and size

4. How ABF works

5. Investors and demand drivers

6. Asset classes

7. Structures in depth

8. ABF managers, bank partnerships and insurers

9. Banks

10. Insurers

11. Asset and alternative managers

12. Specialty finance, BDCs and nonbanks

13. The money

15. Regulation and policy

16. What goes wrong

17. The industry map and company profiles

18. Trends and outlook

19. Tracking the industry

20. Signposts and calendar